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FORMER BATTALION COMMANDER SURVEY
FOR
ACADEMIC YEAR 1992

BY

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Former Battalion Commander Survey for Academic Year 1992

A Group Study Project

by

Colonel Benjamin Farquhar, MI
Lieutenant Colonel Barry D. Miner, MI
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Roach II, MI

with assistance from

Glenda Y. Nogami, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

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With Assistance From: Glenda Y. Nogami, Ph.D.

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Since the mid-80s, the six "Army Imperatives" have served as guidelines for continuing to forge an Army of Excellence—a modern, lethal, versatile force, totally capable of fighting and winning on any battlefield. The *Survey of Former Battalion Commanders, Academic Year 1992*, a follow-on to a 1991 effort, is designed to capture this highly successful group's recent perceptions on how well these imperatives are being implemented throughout the Army. Over 300 former battalion commanders (FBCs) provided responses to more than 100 *Survey* questions. Most commanded for 13-24 months, were between 38-43 years old during command, and served an accompanied command tour. 22.5% commanded in Southwest Asia during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. A few of the many conclusions that can be drawn from the responses of these FBCs are:

- They believe quality of the force is high and Army Imperatives are essentially being properly emphasized and met in the field.

- Their concerns, many validated by Desert Shield/Desert Storm, focus on improving entry-level training, improving NCO leadership skills, enhancing family support programs, modernizing unit organization and equipment, revitalizing wartime preparation, and increasing training opportunities, facilities, and resources.

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Executive Summary

Since the mid-80s, the six "Army Imperatives" have served as guidelines for continuing to forge an Army of Excellence—a modern, lethal, versatile force, totally capable of fighting and winning on any battlefield. The *Survey of Former Battalion Commanders, 1992*, a follow-on to a 1991 effort, is designed to capture this highly successful group's recent perceptions on how well these imperatives are being implemented throughout the Army. Over 300 former battalion commanders (FBCs) provided responses to more than 100 *Survey* questions. 46% commanded combat arms battalions, 21% combat support, 21% combat service support, 12% BCT/AIT or other units. Most commanded for 13-24 months, were between 38-43 years old during command, and served an accompanied command tour. 22.5% commanded in Southwest Asia during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. A few of the many conclusions that can be drawn from the responses of these FBCs are:

- They believe quality of the force is high and Army Imperatives are essentially being properly emphasized and met in the field.
- Their concerns, many validated by Desert Shield/Desert Storm, focus on improving entry-level training, improving NCO leadership skills, enhancing family support programs, modernizing unit organization and equipment, revitalizing wartime preparation, and increasing training opportunities, facilities, and resources.

Continuation of the *Survey* is recommended. It will serve as a viable instrument for identifying recurring trends and issues of interest to senior Army leaders as they assess the current force and plan for the future.

Overview and Discussion

Introduction

In 1991, a survey of Former Battalion Commanders (FBCs) was conducted as a group study project by students at the U.S. Army War College. Over 250 Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels enrolled in resident Senior Service College programs for Academic Year 1991 (AY91) who were FBCs responded to survey questions intended to elicit their perceptions and opinions regarding battalion command, the climate of the Army, and a variety of topics associated with training, equipping, maintaining, and sustaining the force. This first survey was intended to serve as the basic instrument for use in following years to continue to capture the views and experiences of this highly successful group of Army officers. It also sought to provide some computer program assisted means for quantifying and sorting the information gathered for measuring trends, and to identify recurring issues of potential interest to the Army leadership. The "Former Battalion Commander Survey for Academic Year 1992 (AY92)" is a follow-on to this initial effort.¹

As with the first survey, the essential terms of reference for the AY92 Survey are the "Army Imperatives" as promulgated by former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Vuono—these "Imperatives" have not changed under the current Chief of Staff, General Sullivan.

1. Maintain a quality force—men and women who are educated, motivated, and ambitious.
2. Maintain dynamic, realistic doctrine to guide our actions on the battlefield.
3. Maintain a force mix that meets the needs of national security.

¹ Harold W. Lord, et.al., *Former Battalion Commander Survey 1991*, a student study project published by the U.S. Army War College (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1991).

4. Conduct tough, realistic training as the cornerstone of readiness and the basis for credible deterrence and capable defense.
5. Modernize to improve our warfighting capability in response to the modernization of our potential adversaries.
6. Develop competent, confident leaders.

The developers of the AY91 Survey assessed that only three of the imperatives were "quantifiable" and/or "lent themselves to analysis" (i.e., imperatives 1, 4, and 6). On this basis, the original survey questions were developed to "measure" opinions of FBCs as to whether or not these three imperatives were being met. While the basic survey format, methodology, and content did not significantly change with the AY92 Survey, questions were added to provide additional insights on the views of FBCs on other imperatives, and to provide information relative to experiences of FBCs involved with DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (DS/DS).

Although the questions remained the same, there was a fundamental change in the concept of analysis used in the AY92 Survey. Though perhaps a subtle distinction, the current authors believe that the imperatives are not "quantifiable," as suggested in the AY91 Survey, but they are "measurable." In simplistic terms, they are "measurable" to the degree they are either viewed "favorably" or "unfavorably" by FBCs, as indicated by the preponderance of quantifiable responses (e.g., percentages, frequencies, etc.,) to related questions, and as indicated by analysis of the extensive subjective written comments provided on specific questions or issues. In our view, survey questions can have applicability to several imperatives (e.g., a question dealing with the ability of NCOs to conduct "training" may also be perceived by a FBC as an issue related to "leadership"). "Measuring" an imperative becomes then a matter of thorough and careful analysis of all related evidence, both objective and subjective.

Some Up-front Assessments

Are we meeting the goals set forth in the Army Imperatives? How does a highly experienced and select group of officers—Former Battalion Commanders attending Senior Service Colleges, who have worked so closely with the ideas and goals underlying these imperatives in their 20+ years of service—respond to this question?

- Overall, FBCs are very positive about the Army, its soldiers and leaders, and the emphasis placed on the goals embodied in the Army Imperatives—they are being met!
- Quality of the force is perceived as high, but there is room for improvement in the education of junior officers and enlisted soldiers.
- Doctrine is substantially correct; often does not keep pace with equipment changes; and sometimes lags behind the realities of CS and CSS employment concepts.
- More and improved training areas are needed; CSS units need greater access to such areas; more joint and combined training is needed; NTCs continue to be viewed as extremely valuable training environments.
- Equipment improvements are needed—support vehicles, commo, aviation; generally, the Army is viewed as a well-equipped, modernized force.
- Good leaders across the board; CSMs may not be meeting expectations; senior-raters (including general officers) not meeting OER obligations; mentoring needs emphasis.
- Family Support Programs are good in concept and intent but have many flaws; “command team” concept has many perceived negatives.

How to Use the Rest of the Survey

The remaining text in this summary will provide a brief description of the survey methodology, a discussion of survey results dealing with the Army Imperatives and other topics of concern, and some more detailed conclusions and recommendations.

In Parts I and II of the AY92 Survey, for each question the reader can find relevant statistical data, along with a brief analysis of this data as it relates or is cross-tabulated to other Survey question results (both AY91 and AY92 Surveys). This is followed by written survey comments from respondents on that question or subject. Part III of the AY92 Survey contains written comments from respondents not tied to any specific question but categorized under 7 general headings (Family Support, Command, Training, Leadership, Personnel, Logistics, and Other). Additional reference data (e.g., Survey Questionnaire, statistical data runs, and the computer programs used) are included in the appendices.

Survey Methodology

The basic instrument used for conducting the AY92 Survey was the survey questionnaire developed for the initial Former Battalion Commander Survey conducted in AY91. The primary survey population remained essentially the same, that is, Army FBCs enrolled in Senior Service Colleges (Army/Air/Navy War College, National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces). Added for the AY92 Survey were those officers enrolled in SSC fellowship programs at other U.S. and foreign military institutions or in civilian university or private fellowship programs approved by the Department of Defense. The AY92 effort was oriented on the following objectives:

- Refinement of the survey instrument and methodology to achieve acceptable research standards and to provide the means for acquiring and evaluating useful data of a select population on recurring topics of interest on an annual basis;
- Modification of the survey instrument and methodology to improve statistical and evaluative validity, and improve simplicity and effectiveness of survey administration and data analysis through computer assisted models and procedures.

The following steps were taken to achieve these objectives:

- Overall assessment of AY91 Survey—i.e., computer model used, surveyed population, survey questions, data analysis, administration of survey, study conclusions and recommendations, etc.

- Review and analysis of each survey question in the context of relevance to existing imperatives and utility as an evaluative tool based on previous survey results.

- Based on the above, some AY91 Survey questions were deleted or updated and questions were regrouped. Other questions were added to provide information relative to recent DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM experiences, to provide data relative to "imperatives" not assessed in the AY91 survey, and to provide information on important issues not previously covered (e.g., Family Support Programs, the "command team concept"). Accordingly, the survey answer sheet (Scantron) and computer models/data evaluation tools (*Statistical Package for the Social Sciences* (SPSS))² were revised to meet the new survey format.

- Additional modifications to the AY91 Survey included format revisions to facilitate reading and understanding and administrative handling (i.e., mailing, distribution, and accountability of survey forms), updating SPSS formats where required, expanding the surveyed population to include FBCs in SSC fellowship programs (a group not included in the AY91 Survey), and adding a specific portion of the survey dedicated to encourage *more written comments* from the surveyed population. (See note below.)

Review of the AY91 Survey Conclusions and Recommendations

Separate conclusions and recommendations resulting from the AY92 Survey are covered later in this text. To further aid in understanding the survey methodology and its utility it seems worthwhile to first briefly review the AY91 Survey conclusions and

² Norman H. Nie, et. al., *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences*, 2d edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 1975).

NOTE: All Survey comments are included as received from survey participants. Names and vulgarities were omitted.

recommendations before proceeding to the "Analysis" portion of this overview. There were six *conclusions* from the previous survey:

- "The instrument design is valid." This conclusion appears to hold true, but clearly the survey needs to be thoroughly reviewed each time it is administered to ensure relevance to Army issues/concerns or programs which are based upon the Army's six "Imperatives." Moreover, as the imperatives change, then the survey context and content will need modification to reflect these changes.

- "Administering the survey and collecting the data is free from complexity." Again, this appears to be a valid conclusion. Though a great deal of time was involved in these two efforts as well as in data analysis; computer assisted word processing, modeling, and statistical analysis should make all of these efforts even less complex in the future. The vast amount of data (to include written comments from FBCs) obtained with the AY92 Survey suggests that many *more inferences might be derived from the results* if further analysis was feasible absent survey administration time and resource constraints (e.g., there appear to be more opportunities to relate the survey data to results from other studies, to do further correlation analysis, etc.,).

- "The field (i.e., FBCs) has an interest in providing feedback on their experiences." The extensive written comments provided with the AY92 Survey—at least five times the amount provided in AY91—seem to validate this conclusion. As previously noted, the AY92 Survey specifically encouraged such responses.

- "Guidelines such as "Imperatives" are, in many cases, quantifiable and measurable." The survey *questions* appear quantifiable, but by themselves the *imperatives* do not. This conclusion only appears supported from the standpoint of their being "measurable," and only then are the imperatives measurable by the cumulative statistics derived from sets of quantifiable questions more or less related to the substance of a specific imperative. There are likely more and probably better "measures" of the imperatives available. Since the original intent of the first survey was

to provide a vehicle for identifying trends through recurring use of the survey in subsequent years it was believed that the essential aspects of the survey (i.e., the context of the "imperatives" and the related questions) should not change in AY92. Otherwise, there would be no means for easily comparing results between the two efforts and seeing if any trends did appear. If more in-depth analysis and "quantification" is desired in future surveys, it is likely that other and/or additional survey questions will be needed, intended perhaps not to measure a broad imperative, but rather to measure a specific aspect of that imperative (e.g., How does education of the force serve as a measure of the quality of the force?).

- "The imperatives measured in the AY91 Survey have translated to application in the field, and the field is robust." This conclusion essentially restates what was noted above—there are probably many more events/conditions, etc., in the field that can be used to "measure" how well the imperatives are being implemented or applied.

- "The library of survey questions has applicability over time." A valid conclusion for many of the questions, conditioned upon the relevance of the "imperatives" or other items for which they serve as measures. Many of the same survey questions would still have applicability if they were used to measure some other criteria—e.g., "a trained force", a "maintained force", etc.

The *recommendations* from the AY91 Survey fell into two categories: those of a policy nature which required higher level authority to implement; and those related to the survey methodology, form, or procedures. Only the latter are discussed here. The policy-related recommendations, if appropriate, are discussed with those from the AY92 Survey later.

- It was recommended in the AY91 Survey that a separate category be established "for BCT/AIT battalion commanders and to segregate them from the remainder of the population." More is mentioned about this later in this report, but it appears to be a valid conclusion, substantiated by the AY92 Survey results. This segregation was not

done for the AY92 survey. As previously noted, since this was the first iteration of the original survey, it was believed that as few changes as possible should be made to facilitate comparison of results and provide an initial indicator of the instrument's continued usefulness/validity in the future, as presently structured.

- The AY91 Survey recommended that the category of "other" commanders be excluded from future surveys, based on the assumption that this category included some "administrative-type" battalions not associated with troop unit commands. While the assumption could be challenged, the point is that the category "other" is undefinable and creates confusion and should be further defined into specific command categories.

Special Considerations

Before proceeding to the "Analysis" portion, there are several important aspects for the reader to consider in evaluating the survey results:

a. Look at the statistics carefully, objectively—question the "balance." For example, if almost 52% of FBCs respond that MOS shortages "only slightly" or "not at all" degrade unit effectiveness, is that a positive or negative indicator of a trained and ready force? Add in "only moderately" responses and the percentage moves to 86% on the positive side, or almost 48% on the negative side when combined with those responses that say "greatly" degrade effectiveness. Is "moderately" a positive or negative perception? If considered positive, should almost 13% of the battalion commanders in today's Army believe that MOS shortages have such a "great" negative impact? Are there standards which are acceptable to the Army leadership?

b. The written comments in the AY92 Survey provide unique insights on a number of Army issues. They must be read and thought about as thoroughly as the statistical data. The general perception that people who voluntarily write responses usually do so in a negative or critical context may be argued. The AY92 Survey contains many

positive comments and constructive suggestions for resolving problems or addressing issues important to the Army. Read these comments objectively—look for issues lying under the surface.

c. The AY92 Survey contains a portion specifically for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM participants—23% of the survey respondents. An important section, but less so statistically than in terms of the issues identified in the subjective written comments. Weigh the importance of this portion of the Survey accordingly.

d. The Surveyed Population. Why are the views of former battalion commanders (FBCs) important? Though briefly mentioned earlier, the group of officers included in this survey comprises *the future population of Army leadership*. They have been highly successful in their careers, as evidenced by their very competitive selection to attend a Senior Service College. Most (over 90%) have been selected because of their proven success as battalion commanders of TO&E or TDA units, and others because they have excelled in their specialty areas. They are clearly in the top third of their contemporaries. This is the group that has implemented the Army Imperatives over the past years—they have been close to troops, the training and warfighting environments, have faced the challenges of resource constraints, deployments, new equipment fieldings, and a myriad of other matters associated with the exigencies of command and high-level staff positions. They have been directly involved with some of the most important and complex issues facing the Army. Their perspectives are important because they serve as timely indicators on the tone or climate of the Army in many vital substantive areas. Further, the perspectives they offer now may give some indications on what concerns they may carry with them as they assume higher ranks and positions in the future—from them may be derived the directions, guidance, and priorities for the Army in the years ahead.

ANALYSIS

1. Maintaining a Quality Force—educated, motivated, and ambitious men and women.

A quality force has been considered the most important of the imperatives—the “linchpin” for an effective Army.³ But what goes into measuring quality? It is much more than an “educated, motivated, and ambitious” force, and is inextricably tied to all those positive aspects and objectives upon which the six imperatives are focused—professionalism, quality of life, job satisfaction, effectiveness of equipment and training, viability of doctrine, leadership, etc. Many of these aspects are discussed later as we briefly assess the other imperatives. Over 30 Survey questions can be tied to this imperative. The weight of the survey results indicates that FBCs perceive that the Army is essentially meeting the intended goals of this imperative. Supporting evidence follows.

However, despite the overall perception of FBCs that the Army is maintaining a Quality Force, it is somewhat disturbing that, as compared with AY91 results, a higher percentage of this group feels less positive about an Army career now than when first deciding to make it a career (almost 20% expressed negative responses in AY92 compared to 14% in AY91). Such negative perceptions of these leaders could be manifested in behavior and attitudes that could affect subordinates (e.g., engendering decreases in motivation and enthusiasm)—perhaps signaling a cause for concern, especially if this downward negative trend continues, or even remains at this level. Slightly over half of the responses in both the AY91 and AY92 Surveys concerning career satisfaction were in the categories of “more, or much more, positively.” Should these percentages be higher? After all, it is said that today’s Army is the best ever—

³ Carl E. Vuono, General (Ret.), former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, “Six Imperatives for the Armor Force,” *Armor*, July-August, 1990, 15.

"the finest force this nation has ever fielded, the best trained, best equipped, and best led in the world."⁴

The surveyed FBCs worked with and led this "better" force. Further, this group of FBCs is near or at the zenith of a highly successful, rewarding career, as evidenced by SSC attendance, likely promotion to Colonel, and some for selection to higher level command. If the imperatives have really taken hold since implemented, why do we not see at least a 75% or better total rate of "more positive" responses from this presumably satisfied group of career officers? The written survey comments express concerns over the downsizing of the Army's force structure, reductions in resources, selective early retirement programs, reductions in force, uncertainties regarding future Army roles and missions, etc., all factors which may have influenced, and thus could possibly explain, the perceptions of this group. It could be argued that these factors were extant for the AY91 Survey, but perhaps not as prominently then as now. Due to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM many of these were not salient issues in AY91. In any event, this appears to be a survey item that should be studied, evaluated and monitored further.

Some of the same core evaluative Survey questions used to assess "training" and "leadership" are certainly applicable for assessing the "quality" characteristics of the force. FBCs were asked to rate, on a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high), nine rank groupings (private thru general officer) on "competence," "enthusiasm," and "ability to learn." Using these as "quality" indicators, overall the force is rated high in all three of these areas—mean scores of 7.3 or better in each. Looking at just "enthusiasm" as a measure of "motivation" (demonstrated by dedication to mission, job satisfaction, ambition, etc.)—as with the AY91 Survey, AY92 FBCs continued to view the force positively—as "enthusiastic." Among all groups, company grade officers continued to

⁴ Speech by General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 21 August 1991.

receive the highest ratings, warrant officers the lowest ratings. Among the enlisted ranks only, the PFC-SPC group continued to be ranked the highest on "enthusiasm" while the SFC group continued to be ranked lowest. With some slight exceptions (comparing the two Surveys), the trend appears that "enthusiasm" wanes as rank increases. The consistently low rating on "enthusiasm" for CSMs in both AY91 and AY92 Surveys may be cause for concern and further study.

Ratings on "ability to learn" for the same groupings (minus general officers) also followed a parallel trend in both Surveys, as did the "high" and "low" ratings in this area. What about using an "educated" force as a measure of quality? Most of the Survey questions on this "quality" topic relate to whether or not the education of the force is reflected by soldiers "trained" (educated) on the skills required to effectively conduct their missions. Survey results show the following:

- 41% of FBCs "agreed" that newly arrived soldiers were trained to standard in their MOS related skills; 35% "disagreed."
- 46% of FBCs "agreed" that junior officers were sufficiently grounded in doctrinal unit operations; 31% "disagreed."

Based on these responses, the question might arise—why are the very groups which are rated so high on "ability to learn" and "enthusiasm" coming straight out of the educational environment (i.e., training base) and perceived to be without needed skills? Further examination may be required on this issue.

A number of Survey questions were designed to address whether or not the Army's command culture, climate, and environment are conducive to developing and maintaining a quality force. (See note below.) Most FBCs expressed positive views

NOTE: Definitions Used (as with the AY91 Survey): Command Culture—shared values that validate the existence of shared experiences, self-regulating units, reduced need for explicit control enhancing organizational flexibility. Command Climate—a shared perception among the members of a unit about what life is like; fair, and challenges the unit to do its best. Command Environment—the aggregate of surrounding things, conditions, or influences; a combination of physical climate, social influences, military condition, and surrounding culture.

that the Army was doing well in these areas. In fact, responses in the AY92 Survey appear to be more positive than those of AY91 in most areas. For example:

- 84% of all those surveyed believed the command climate on their post/installation was supportive (82% in AY91).
- 77.1% of all FBCs surveyed "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that their higher headquarters established a satisfactory command climate. Based on their DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM experiences, 75.4% of those FBCs who participated "agreed" or "strongly agreed."
- 88% of all FBCs surveyed believed that the chain of command supported honest and accurate reporting (82% in AY91).
- 82% of all those surveyed felt that senior commanders would support them in difficult times (80% in AY91). 78.3% of the surveyed FBCs participating in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM "agreed" or "strongly agreed."
- 90% felt that the chain of command was fair (88% in AY91).
- 98% of all FBCs surveyed believed that they had a moderate- to high-level of freedom to command (84% in AY91). For FBCs participating in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM the percentage was 95.6%.

Written comments overall, however, did not support the rather positive statistical data on the "command environment," focusing instead on identifying problem areas. For example:

- An abusive, uncaring senior commander/leader can have a devastating impact on the command climate.
- Command climate or environment is often personality dependent.
- Conflicts exist between post/installation support and policies and those of the chain-of-command, particularly when different lines of authority are involved.

Several areas covered in the AY92 Survey, which were not covered in AY91, appear to have relevance to the issue of "quality." One area involves the subject of "Family Support Programs (FSPs)." The statistical data derived from Survey responses

clearly indicates that these programs are viewed as an "essential aspect of maintaining a quality force"—94% of FBCs (and their spouses) "agreed" or "strongly agreed." However, the extensive written comments provided on this topic, identify pervasive problems associated with the practical application and execution of these programs; to highlight some prevalent themes:

- Policy intent is not backed-up by resources—"more lip service than substance".
- Too much reliance on spouses (free labor) and volunteerism.
- Policies and procedures on FSP structures, resourcing, support arrangements, volunteer training, etc., appear ill-defined, non-standardized.
- FSPs should be working in peacetime; "FSPs/Army guidance was totally inadequate for a situation such as DESERT STORM."
- FSPs rely too much on a commander's initiatives.

Another "quality" subject area, the "command team" concept and the role of the spouse in that concept, carries many of the same themes and sentiments expressed in regard to FSPs. Again, the role of the battalion commander's spouse as a member of the "command team," as a positive and important influence on the unit, is overwhelmingly supported statistically by the Survey responses—80% indicating this view. But the statistics also indicate that this role for the spouse is not *clearly* "liked," and that large percentages perceive this role as "obligatory," and "not recognized adequately for time and effort involved."

The AY92 Survey indicates that more spouses must balance careers or work outside the home with the extensive demands of raising a family and doing volunteer work for the unit. For example, the number of battalion commanders' spouses working outside the home increased almost 15% from AY91 (43%) to AY92 (58%), but the AY92 group still maintained an 80% participation rate in unit activities. The issues/concerns of working spouses of battalion commanders should not be new to the Army leadership. Prior studies have clearly identified spousal dissatisfaction and

conflicts caused by trying to balance personal, family, and military/unit volunteer support priorities.⁵ The written survey comments present both positive and negative and should be read to get a feel for the full range of issues involved—an example of one illustrates some of the concerns:

"No one questions the importance or effectiveness of the increase in attention to families and the 'command team' in recent years. However, it often appears that we have gone over the line to the point where families were going to get some 'family caring' whether they wanted it or not. In addition, most of the programs assume a willingness on the part of the leaders' spouses—at all levels—to provide free labor needed to make these programs work. I sensed a growing amount of resentment from many spouses about this expectation...If we are really serious, perhaps we should look at better resourcing—in both dollars and manpower spaces—to make family programs work at unit level."

Another common topic area relating to force "quality" deals with the quality of the female soldier. Statistically, there were no discernible data trends (positive or negative) between the AY91 and AY92 Surveys. 37% of the FBCs surveyed commanded battalions where women comprised anywhere from 10% to 29% of the

⁵ A comprehensive survey of military spouses was conducted for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) in 1985. The results of the survey were reported in "Description of Spouses of Officers and Enlisted Personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces: 1985," prepared by the Research Triangle Institute, and published by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Over 41,000 military spouses responded to this survey, providing extensive data which describes this population, including their views on satisfaction with various aspects of military policy and military life which directly impact upon the family. Many of the same views in "roles of spouses," "Family Support Programs," "spouse employment," etc., expressed in the AY91 and AY92 Former Battalion Commander Surveys can be found for a similar population of spouses of Army LTCs and COLs in this 1985 DoD study.

"A Study of the Wife of the Army Officer: Her Academic and Career Preparation, Her Current Employment and Volunteer Services," by Elizabeth M Finlayson, 7 May 1969, reports the results of a random survey of 1000 wives of U.S. Army officers. Some of the findings of this study indicate that even in 1969, though only 20% of the wives surveyed were employed, another 50% of those not employed wanted to work either full or part-time outside the home. On the matter of volunteerism, almost 50% of the wives participated in volunteer services, 12% considering such services to require professional skills and another 38% considering such services to require special skills, both categories necessitating either college-level or specialized vocational training. With such marketable skills, the wives believed they were employable and would normally be compensated for such "work."

unit's strength. (50% of all those surveyed had units which were coded to preclude assignment of women). Less than 10% of the respondents who had females in their units stated that these soldiers had a "negative" impact on mission accomplishment. The majority of responses were that female soldiers had a "positive" to "strongly positive" impact. There were some concerns expressed in the written comments about the readiness impact of the sudden numbers of females who became non-deployable for DS/DS due to pregnancy, about their recurring work absences due to child care problems, and the impact of limited upper body strength of females.

As we discuss the next imperatives, it will be apparent that other Survey results will provide additional perspectives on how well the Army is "maintaining a quality force," particularly survey data and comments dealing with "training" and "leadership."

2. Maintaining dynamic, realistic doctrine to guide our actions on the battlefield.

While the AY91 Survey was not specifically designed to "measure" this imperative, there are questions in that Survey, along with some added to the AY92 version, that lend themselves to being descriptors of how well this imperative is being implemented. For example, if the Army trains as it would fight, that is, according to wartime doctrine, then we would expect to see some correlation between stated doctrinal concepts and the implementation of those concepts at NTCs, and certainly during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Did FBC responses surface any correlations?

- FBCs who participated in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (in the aggregate) believed (83%) that their units "frequently" or "almost always" fought the way they trained. The percentages, however, varied by type unit—Combat Arms (CA-94%), Combat Support (CS-82%), Combat Service Support (CSS-65%).

- When asked if "battalion doctrine proved correct during DS/DS employment" this group responded less affirmatively than on the previous point—in the aggregate only

67.7% noted this was correct "frequently" or "almost always". Again, the percentages varied by type unit—CA (81.8%), CS (58.9%), CSS (47.1%).

The lower percentages for CS and CSS units can be somewhat correlated to other survey data and partially explained by analyzing written comments. Predicated on the assumption that "maintaining doctrine" is a concept validated by realistic training according to doctrine, the correlation of data and comments imply:

- CS and CSS units have less opportunity to train doctrinally than CA units. CS and CSS peacetime missions, especially at EAC, often preclude exercising of these units other than "piecemeal," and only during large-scale exercises. Even then, "peacetime missions do not go away."

- Related to this, CS and CSS commanders are more "neutral" about how well the combat training centers support the Air-Land battle concept—again, the units generally do not train at NTCs except as a "slice."

- CS and CSS commanders indicated that they have difficulty getting priority use of training areas—often being preempted by CA units.

- Overall, Mission Training Plans (MTPs) were only used by about a third of the respondents. CSS unit commanders almost never used MTPs. Apparently many MTPs are still in draft, particularly for CSS units.

- In regard to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, logistics support was identified as the area posing the most difficulties for commanders of all type units. This is not an indictment of the dedication of CSS soldiers, but seems to reflect the impact of not training CSS units as they would fight. Doing this requires identifying resource needs (e.g., personnel and equipment) and adjusting organizational structures accordingly.

Some comments reflective of this view:

"The Army wants to fight CSS multifunctional but hasn't enough assets in the right places to organize and train that way in peace."

"Logistics system broken; could not push items forward to the fighters..."

"FSBs didn't have enough trucks to bring regular supplies forward...PLL has to be raised during peacetime because that is what you need in war and you must learn how to store, transport, and account for it. It is expensive but must be done or you train in a dream world thinking you have enough trucks and parts when you don't."

While the Army is leading the way in many areas related to the development of joint and combined doctrine (e.g., serving as the lead agency for *Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*), FBCs indicated they had few opportunities to train according to this new doctrine. For example, 55% of the FBCs stated they "seldom" or "almost never" trained with joint representation—a slightly higher percentage than in the AY91 Survey. There were only minor percentage differences by type unit.

It appears, particularly from responses to the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM portion, that "dynamic and realistic doctrine" was better "maintained" for those units that had more opportunity to train in peacetime as they would likely fight during conflict—this essentially refers to Combat Arms units. Ensuring opportunities in the future for all type units, especially CS and CSS units, to maintain and continually evaluate such doctrine in the future will be especially challenging. This will be particularly difficult in light of decreasing resources while at the same time increasing emphasis to use and "maintain" new joint doctrinal concepts.

3. Maintaining a force mix that meets the needs of national security

As with the last imperative, the AY91 Survey questions were not designed to measure how well this "force mix" imperative has been met by the Army. There is no intent to do so here. Further surveys may find this more worthwhile/useful because of its salience.

4. Conducting tough, realistic training as the cornerstone of readiness and the basis for credible deterrence and capable defense

The mandates and principles for this imperative are stated in *FM 25-100, Training the Force*, which also served as the source document for developing and interpreting the AY92 Survey questions and responses regarding this imperative. To set the stage for this section it would help to restate some of the basic tenets found in *FM 25-100*.⁶

The Army training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime.

- Training focus is on wartime missions.
- Training is the top priority.
- Maintenance is a vital aspect.
- Realistic, sustained, multiechelon totally integrated combined arms training must be stressed at all levels.
- All training must be carefully planned, aggressively executed, and thoroughly assessed.

*General Carl E. Vuono
FM 25-100, 1988*

Principles

- Train as a combined arms team
 - Train as you fight
 - Use appropriate doctrine
 - Use performance oriented training
 - Train to challenge
 - Train to sustain proficiency
 - Train using multiechelon techniques
- Train to maintain
- Make commanders the primary trainers

FM 25-100, 1988

⁶ Department of the Army, *FM 25-100, Training the Force*, 1-1-1-4.

Over 40 AY92 Survey questions address this imperative. The following categories—*training guidance, resource availability, readiness, individual and unit capabilities* are encompassed within this imperative. Written comments were extensive. Overall, commanders appear satisfied with the Army's training emphasis and direction and believe this imperative is being met. There were areas of disagreement on some matters relative to the type unit (i.e., CA, CS, CSS). Major differences and anomalies will be noted in the analysis. To the extent possible, data results will be organized and discussed under the categories noted above.

a. Training guidance. The 25 Series of Army manuals serve as the cornerstone for planning and executing training.

- As with the AY91 Survey, over 80% of the AY92 respondents indicated that overall training guidance intent is clearly conveyed by senior headquarters—"to make training tough and realistic."

- 84.7% of FBCs developed training "frequently" or "almost always" in accordance with the 25 Series (86% in AY91). One comment noted, "25 Series was the bible."

- 71.9% stated that they had received clear training guidance from their senior headquarters (79.3% in AY91). Comments indicated, however, that written guidance was often provided late.

- As a mechanism for deriving training direction, MTPs were used by less than 50% of the respondents—CSS commanders were mostly negative on the relevance and use of MTPs, if they had them at all.

- Training guidance from higher may often be disseminated at Quarterly Training Briefings, consistent with the tenets of *FM 25-100*. 82.3% of commanders gave quarterly briefings to their senior raters; some more frequently. (76.5% in AY91).

- Training *directives* from higher headquarters were generally not favorably considered by FBCs to be enhancements for conducting training. Only 42% "agreed"

or "strongly agreed" that these were beneficial (41% in AY91). Comments noted that the directives were too restrictive and, again, often not timely.

- Similarly, *taskings* from higher headquarters, particularly those that were not training-related (e.g., VIP visits) and/or which required changes to scheduled training, were generally viewed unfavorably. 71.4% of the FBCs indicated such taskings "sometimes," "frequently," or "almost always" hindered training. This AY92 data was consistent with that of AY91.

b. Resource availability. Did FBCs believe they were provided with sufficient resources (funds, facilities, people, equipment and supplies, and time) to accomplish their training missions effectively?

- In general, 80.1% of the FBCs surveyed indicated that they had sufficient resources to do most of the training desired (82.4% in AY91). Some of the major resource shortfalls identified included "time," "training areas," and "repair parts."

- 82.7% of the FBCs stated that they "frequently" or "almost always" had adequate funds for training (81% in AY91). Written comments, however, suggest that funds may have been made available for training at the expense of something else—"we mortgaged maintenance readiness," "training plans were revised to meet funding constraints," etc.

- Involvement of senior commanders in resource management continues to appear fairly high—84% of the FBCs noted that senior headquarters cross-leveled critical resources between units when needed (81% in AY91).

- Training resources (i.e., ranges, training areas, etc.) appear to be readily available "frequently" or "almost always" for the majority of units (72.3%). However, there are some recurring themes found in the FBCs' written comments which suggest some shortfalls or problems may exist. Availability of and access to upgraded live-fire training areas and maneuver areas, especially overseas, and ranges suitable for long range tank gunnery, missile firings and AH-64 gunnery, are limited. Such limitations

force untimely and disruptive modifications to training schedules, and foster competition for scarce resources between type units. CSS commanders believe the priority for such facility use invariably goes to CA units, causing further challenges for CSS units to meet basic weapons qualifications requirements. "We have to schedule training around the availability of ranges" was a comment common to the survey—regardless of whether a CA, CS, or CSS unit.

- Unfinanced requirements seemed to pose less of a problem and inhibitor to training with the AY92 Survey respondents (less than 7% saw a definitive problem) than with the AY91 group (almost 25%). By the same token, DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM priorities may have overcome the problems associated with meeting UFRs—"When alerted for SWA, we found out how many UFRs we really needed to fight," one FBC commented. "No problem getting what we needed," commented another.

- A significant number of FBCs noted that facility unavailability "moderately" or "greatly" degraded unit operations and training (28.2%, up from 21.4% in AY91). Inadequate maintenance facilities, motor pools, hangars for helicopter units, and weapons ranges were cited as problem areas most frequently in the written comments.

- In the area of manpower resources, challenges for FBCs seemed to concentrate in two areas—having the right numbers, and having the right skills—neither seemed to be quite enough, especially for CS and CSS units.

- MOS shortages, especially in low-density MOSs, appear to be a growing problem. 47.4% of respondents indicated that such shortages "moderately" or "greatly" degraded unit effectiveness (compared to 27% in AY91)—**a 20% Increase!**
- These shortages, when combined with the earlier data indicating that a large percentage (35%) of FBCs do not believe newly arrived soldiers are trained to standards (i.e., do not have the right skills) in their MOSs, have potential to further exacerbate training management problems at unit level.

- Additionally, a relatively large percentage of FBCs (24%) did not feel confident that newly arrived soldiers possessed mastery of basic soldier skills (marksmanship and NBC training were highlighted as weak areas).
- Who is relied upon to make up for these training/skill shortfalls—NCOs who execute training! Unfortunately, 17% of the respondents "disagreed" that the NCO corps was able to plan and conduct individual training to standard. Most "disagreements" came from CSS commanders—the very units where critical MOS and personnel shortfalls appear to have the greatest impact on readiness.
- Such personnel constraints and shortfalls may partially explain why most commanders (65.1% in AY92, 58.5% in AY92) "disagreed" that their units could handle increased individual training requirements if AIT were cut back. CSS commanders "disagreed" most (75.8%).

- Equipment and supply resources were not as thoroughly assessed as some other resource areas in regard to adequacy for meeting training requirements. Written comments focused on some negatives dealing with use of obsolete or older equipment for training purposes, lack of equipment for hands-on training (particularly new, and high-tech items) at training schools and in units, and non-availability of some major end items (usually lacking because of low ALO status) which detract from realistic, doctrinal wartime training. DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM-related participants reaffirmed overall AY92 Survey responses which voiced needs for selective equipment modernization and upgrading (e.g., CSS vehicles which can move faster to keep pace with armor and mech, commo upgrades, etc.). Illustrative of training impacts from the supply resource side were FBC comments calling for more flexibility with PLL stocks and repair parts. On the availability of ammunition (a specific Survey issue) there generally does not appear to be an overall problem—improvements seem to have been made since the AY91 Survey. Only 10.6% of FBCs in AY92 (compared to 30.6% in AY91) indicated they "seldom" or "almost never" had

enough ammunition to meet STRAC standards. Nevertheless, the same recurring ammo shortfalls continue to be noted from one year to the next—missiles, AT rounds, .38 and .45 ammo, grenades, rockets for helicopters. Commanders continue to call for more ammo for more live-fire and night-fire (beyond STRAC in CA units), and for relief from what is perceived to be a “cumbersome and broken ammo forecasting and distribution system”—viewed as a training detractor because it consumes so much of the trainer’s time and attention.

- Along the same line, “Time” was noted as an important resource in several contexts. Generally, FBCs believed that careful training planning could preclude many time-management problems. As referenced earlier, unanticipated taskings (e.g., visitors) or events causing changes to training schedules (e.g., bumped from or weathered-out on a weapons range) increase the challenges of keeping necessary training on-track. Further, lack of adequate numbers of and quality facilities (e.g., ranges) slows down training execution, as do systemic, administrative procedures that require focused battalion leadership involvement and management to overcome. For example, although 89% of the FBCs stated their units could “frequently” or “almost always” attain standards on individual marksmanship training, comments noted that “it required maximum effort at all levels of command” to accomplish, and “hundreds of hours were wasted wrestling with the ammo system and lack of ranges.” Almost 1/3 of the FBCs were neutral or “disagreed” that they had enough training days. CA units notably want more. CS and CSS commanders remarked that their training days were constrained because of real-world mission support.

In general, the Survey data responses indicate that battalion commanders are adequately guided, resourced, and supported by leaders and the Army system to meet training requirements. All want to do more to increase training, and most want and need more resources to accomplish this. As derived most notably from the written

comments, resource problems do appear to exist—availability of people and facilities being emphasized most often.

c. **Readiness.** For AY92, 83.4% of FBCs, (86% in AY91), believed that training guidance supported the mandate for tough, realistic training. But was guidance implemented and realized for all types of units? It has already been noted that CS and CSS commanders commented on the difficulties of training their units in peacetime against wartime doctrine/standards. Real-world, peacetime missions often preclude field training of these units at the same levels of robustness and intensity as that of CA battalions. The value of NTC training to meet this guidance was strongly endorsed by respondents who had experienced one or more NTC/CMTC/JRTC battalion rotations (41% of the surveyed population). One comment stated "NTC was realistic and fully prepared the unit for SWA." However, the overwhelming majority of these NTC participants (98%) were CA commanders; CS and CSS commanders again noting their limited opportunities for such training.

Of the FBCs who commanded in SWA during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, most had 30-90 days for focused training prior to the start of the ground campaign. Though the vast majority believed their units were well trained prior to deployment, more than two-thirds felt this additional training was critical to the unit based on the SWA mission. In the vital area of NBC readiness, only 78.2% of this group believed their units were trained to fight effectively in an NBC environment. Written comments indicated that many readiness concerns of commanders were tied to equipment shortages.

d. **Individual and unit capabilities.** Except for the limitations noted above on the skill levels and training of entry level soldiers, commanders believe the "trainer" resource is adequate, but not much beyond that.

- 74% of FBCs "agree" or "strongly agree" that NCOs have sufficient knowledge and ability to carry out their training responsibilities. A full 18% (almost equally divided by type unit) "disagree" or "strongly disagree."

- Similar statistics were obtained regarding the capabilities of junior officers to carry out their training responsibilities—74.7% agreeing, 15% disagreeing.

The Survey did not measure the impact of differences in various resource levels (e.g., funds for training) between type-units (CA, CS, CSS).

5. Modernize to Improve our warfighting capability in response to the modernization of our potential adversaries.

This was not included as a "measurable" imperative in the initial AY91 Survey and no specific questions were added to measure this in the AY92 Survey. However, data from some questions, along with perspectives provided in the written comments, offer insights on how FBCs may perceive this imperative is being met. Two key measurable items that may have applicability:

- FBCs participating in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (regardless of type unit) clearly noted (84.1% "agreeing" or "strongly agreeing") that, based on their DS/DS experiences, changes were required to their unit's TOE/TDA.

- Of the areas noted as needing the most change, "equipment" ranked highest (46.4%), followed by "organization" (31.9%), "personnel" (13%).

The comments vary on the type of changes perceived to be needed or which are recommended—most involve CSS units. Across all type units, upgrades in vehicles, parts tracking, commo, navigational equipment, and NBC equipment, seemed to be mentioned the most in need of improvement.

6. Developing Competent, Confident Leaders.

As measured by the results of this Survey (largely confirming AY91 results), FBCs firmly believe this imperative is being met. They are proud of the soldiers, NCOs, and

junior officers they see in today's Army, and confident of Army leadership at all levels. Several issues and concerns on this imperative, however, were surfaced. The discussion below is best set within the proper context of the nine leadership competencies delineated in *FM 22-100, Military Leadership*.⁷ These provide the framework for leadership development and *assessment* by the Army and should be understood by the reader.

Leadership Competencies

- Communications**
- Supervision**
- Teaching and Counseling**
- Soldier Team Development**
- Technical and Tactical Proficiency**
- Decision Making**
- Planning**
- Use of Available Systems**
- Professional Ethics**

One of the key measures of "competence" from the Survey comes from how the respondents rated, on a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high), nine rank groupings (from private to general) on this trait. (The relative rankings for the three traits "competence," "enthusiasm," and "ability to learn," are compared at the end of Separate Survey Question D). The rankings for "competence," followed a path of "lower rank-lower competence," "higher rank-higher competence." Two slight exceptions, in the officer group, company grade officers were rated lowest, in the enlisted group, SSG/SGTs were rated lowest. One plausible explanation for these slight deviations is that it is at these ranks that new supervisory/leadership roles are first assumed, and "leader development" time is needed before it is reflected by the members of this group as competent and confident behavior.

⁷ Department of the Army, *FM 22-100, Military Leadership*, Appendix A, 66-68.

A measure of competency from *FM 22-100* that is most commonly associated with "quality" involves "ethics"—professional and personal. Since this trait generally touches upon all groups equally, we will first review how FBCs perceive the overall ethics and personal conduct of the force.

- As to whether or not a group possessed satisfactory moral and ethical standards: 94% of the FBCs "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that the Officer Corps and 80.7% that the NCO Corps possessed satisfactory standards. The lower NCO scores were not attributable to any particular NCO group statistically, but written comments focused on junior NCO grade problems—"too much drinking," "fraternization," "off-duty misconduct." Overall, FBCs viewed the force as "ethical".

- Alcohol abuse (not drug abuse) was viewed as a problem for junior enlisted and NCOs. Commanders' written comments reflected that the problem is "certainly not as prevalent in today's Army as it was" when they were first commissioned 20+ years ago. FBCs "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that it **was** a problem for junior enlisted (22%), for NCOs(15.2%), and for officers (1.3%). Problems were considered as "isolated" cases. CONUS units had higher percentages in these categories than did overseas units. These statistics closely match those from the AY91 Survey.

- As a measure of "ethical" competence, the Survey questions on "honesty of reporting" within the chain of command received high scores as mentioned earlier—88% of the FBCs "agreed" that the chain supported such reporting, and that they received honest reporting from their subordinates (93% "agreeing").

Other measures of competence of the force (such as technical and tactical proficiency, planning, supervision, etc.,) are best described by rank groupings.

- **Junior enlisted.** Despite high marks on "enthusiasm" and "ability to learn," this group was not perceived by FBCs as particularly competent in either the AY91 or AY92 Surveys. As previously noted, they received the lowest overall score among all

groups on this attribute, and were considered by many commanders as lacking in both basic soldier and MOS skills upon arrival in the unit.

- **NCOs.** In general, the NCO Corps is considered a competent component of the force. Approximately 75% of the respondents "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that NCOs were able to plan and conduct training to standards, and that they had sufficient knowledge and ability to carry out their training responsibilities. Slightly less than 20% of the respondents "disagreed" on each point. Written comments by respondents on NCO-related survey questions were extensive, and reflective of the difficulties encountered when trying to pin-down FBCs' perceptions of this group. As one comment stated "the quality of the NCO Corps is highly varied—some are great, while others are terrible." NCO performance during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was reflected as good by FBCs' comments—"they came into their own." 90% of those surveyed "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that BNCOC/ANCOC attendance improved the training capability of NCOs.

- **Officers.** Results of the AY92 Survey show that the competency of the Officer Corps overall is considered high by FBCs. In regard to junior officers, 82.7% of the respondents "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that junior officers were able to effectively conduct small unit collective training. 75% also expressed similarly positive opinions about the levels of junior officers' professional knowledge and skill to do all their training missions. Only 46% agreed that this group had adequate background in unit doctrine. 83% agreed that company grade officers understood organizational structure and relationships. 98.6% of FBCs indicated they gave their junior commanders moderate (34%) to high (64.6%) rates of freedom to command, clearly reflecting confidence in the competence of this group.

The perceptions of FBCs on the competency of more senior officers were mostly gleaned from their written comments on "command climate"-type questions, and on items dealing with senior-subordinate relationships (e.g., unit visits by the senior,

knowing how the unit was doing, etc.). Perceptions were good; FBCs were complementary of most competency attributes of their seniors. FBCs had some special concerns about senior level performance counseling. Basically, they believe it is broken as a system at the general officer, senior rater level. For example, while 95% of the FBCs alleged a very active counseling program with their own subordinates, ensuring that their senior rater profiles were known, that OERs were discussed before forwarding, and that positive counseling occurred, 82% stated their senior rater did not discuss their OERs with them prior to forwarding. Also 56% did not know their senior rater's profile. Senior rater mentoring occurred, but was generally described by FBCs as **"informal and quick," "conducted on the run."**

Before proceeding to the "Conclusions" and "Recommendations," two topics should probably be briefly highlighted, by virtue of the emphasis placed upon them by FBCs in their written comments.

- While both the Leavenworth and branch-specific phases of the Pre-Command Course (PCC) were favorably viewed by the surveyed group, about one-third still were neutral or had negative opinions. Perhaps of significance, however, is the fact that survey questions on PCC generated one of the highest number of written responses for any subject area—possibly indicating strong opinions (pro or con) on this matter.

- Threaded throughout various survey questions were comments by TDA (such as BCT/AIT) battalion commanders, which indicated concerns on their part that such commands did not get the same positive policy or career progression emphasis from the Army leadership as TOE battalions.

Conclusions

The conclusions drawn from the AY92 Survey fall into two parts—1. those drawn from analysis of the responses; 2. those drawn from administering the Survey.

Part 1—Survey Responses

a. Responses from the surveyed population of Former Battalion Commanders indicate that the Army Imperatives are being supported and implemented in the field, and generally that:

- quality of the force is high.
- doctrine is realistic and substantially correct.
- the force is capable.
- the force is essentially well resourced and equipped.
- tough, realistic training is being emphasized and conducted.
- leaders are competent and confident.

b. Responses from the surveyed population indicate that some improvements, policy or functional reviews, or additional emphasis may be warranted in select imperative-related areas, which include:

- improving soldier basic skill and AIT/MOS training.
- improving the effectiveness of NCOs as "trainers."
- enhancing capabilities of individuals and units (by type) to realistically train against wartime doctrine and requirements.
- improving the availability and quality of training areas and facilities.
- increasing training resources.
- resourcing and improving soldier and family quality of life programs.
- emphasizing senior leader counseling and mentoring.
- organizing and equipping the force, particularly CSS units.

Part 2—Survey Administration

a. The Survey instrument is valid and relevant as a mechanism for gathering data on, and subsequently examining and explaining, a variety of areas/topics of Army interest.

b. The responses/data from the Survey can serve as useful measures of certain components of the Army Imperatives or similar guidelines.

c. Administration of the Survey, data collection and analysis, are relatively free from complexity, particularly as aided by available computer-assisted research programs/models.

d. As evidenced by use of the base Survey, the AY92 Survey appears to have further applicability as a data gathering and data base tool for future studies and analysis.

Recommendations

The recommendations are provided in two parts—1. those which essentially require decisions for implementation by authorities external to the research group; 2. those applicable to the form or content of the Survey and its potential as a future study project by AWC students or others.

Part 1—Policy-related recommendations

a. Continue to conduct the Survey for each of the next five years to track the attitudes of Former Battalion Commanders on the general climate of the Army, and on specific issues of recurring interest and concern to the Army Leadership.

b. Direct further study and research to examine the relevance and validity of issues or concerns raised in the AY91 and AY92 Surveys; the following are some suggestions:

- Examine the impact of critical MOS shortages, specifically by type unit (CA, CS, CSS).
- Conduct additional research to identify the underlying frictions/concerns of senior Army officers (and their spouses) over the "command team" concept, and spousal roles and participation in military unit support activities and volunteer programs.

- Conduct research to evaluate the utility, resourcing, and effectiveness of Family Support Programs, particularly in light of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM experiences.
- Review and assess CS and CSS organizations, missions, and doctrine with a view toward resolving disconnects or conflicts between accomplishing their peacetime missions and taking advantage of their opportunities to train as they would fight.
- Review the effectiveness of the Leavenworth PCC program, and more specifically the proponent PCC efforts.
- Study and assess if Army policies and intent regarding soldier and officer counseling and mentoring are being adhered to, particularly by senior officers.
- Study the availability and quality of training facilities to meet realistic, wartime focused training requirements for all type units (CA, CS, CSS).
- Evaluate junior officer training programs with a view toward assessing the need for broader doctrinal training (e.g., echelons corps and below (ECB), joint and combined).
- Assess the abilities of NCOs, by grade (to include CSMs), to motivate and to conduct effective training.

c. Disseminate the Survey results to senior Army commanders, and to the TRADOC proponent schools, for further discussion and study. Solicit and consolidate feedback and monitor resolution of identified issues.

Part 2—Survey-related recommendations

a. Delete the category "other" from type-battalion on the Survey. This category has no data relevance.

b. In conjunction with the above, add the category of BCT/AIT battalions to the Survey. These commanders play an extremely important role in the training and development of soldiers, and they are in close touch with some of the most pressing issues faced by the Army.

c. Reorganize the Survey to place questions related substantively in the same section of the Survey.

d. Conduct the Survey as soon as possible. The large number of surveys issued each year at the AWC often result in the last ones issued getting the least amount of attention.

PART I

Question 1


What type of battalion did you command?

1. Combat Arms
2. Combat Support
3. Combat Service Support
4. Other

Analysis (Q. 1)

Compared to the AY91 Survey, the composition of AY92 respondents by type battalion changed with increases in CS and Other by 3.5% and 3.9% respectively. Combat arms and CSS respondents decreased from AY91 by 7.7% and .4% respectively. The overall number of survey respondents increased from 256 (AY91) to 302 (AY92).

Statistical Data (Q. 1)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Combat Arms	1	136	45.0	45.6	45.6
Combat Support	2	63	20.9	21.1	66.8
Combat Service Spt	3	63	20.9	21.1	87.9
Other	4	36	11.9	12.1	100.0
.	.	4	1.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.997	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	298
Standard Deviation	1.075	Maximum	4.000	Missing Cases	4

Question 2


Your age when you assumed command was:

1. Under 35
2. 35-37
3. 38-40
4. 41-43
5. 44-46

Analysis (Q 2)

89% of the respondents assumed battalion command between the ages of 38 and 43. 6.6% assumed command between the ages of 44 to 46 and only 4.3% between 35 to 37.

Statistical Data (Q. 2)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
35-37	2	13	4.3	4.3	4.3
38-40	3	130	43.0	43.2	47.5
41-43	4	138	45.7	45.8	93.4
44-46	5	20	6.6	6.6	100.0
.		<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.549	Minimum	2.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.648	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Question 3


Your battalion was part of a:

1. Separate brigade
2. Division
3. Corps
4. Echelons above Corps
5. Other

Analysis (Q. 3)

Compared to the AY91 Survey, the number of respondents decreased in Divisional type units by 9.3% and increased by 4% and 5.4% in EAC and Other.

Statistical Data (Q. 3)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Separate Brigade	1	50	16.6	16.6	16.6
Divisional	2	116	38.4	38.4	55.0
Corps	3	45	14.9	14.9	69.9
EAC	4	32	10.6	10.6	80.5
Other	5	<u>59</u>	<u>19.5</u>	<u>19.5</u>	100.0
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.781	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	1.376	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	0

Question 4


How long were you in command?

1. 12 months or less
2. 13-18 months
3. 19-24 months
4. 25-30 months
5. 31 or more months

Analysis (Q. 4)

90% of the respondents were in command between 13 to 24 months. 4.7% commanded less than 19 months and 5.3% were in command in excess of 30 months.

Statistical Data (Q. 4)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
12 Months or Less	1	2	0.7	0.7	0.7
13-18 Months	2	12	4.0	4.0	4.7
19-24 Months	3	193	63.9	64.3	69.0
25-30 Months	4	77	25.5	25.7	94.7
31 or More Months	5	16	5.3	5.3	100.0
	.	2	0.7	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.310	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	0.665	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	2

Survey Comments (Q. 4)

- I was DA select for a 12 month command in Korea. The division expected me to "voluntarily" extend for 6 to 12 months. We should command 18 to 24 months. The Army needs one policy.
- 24 mo. at Bn plus 36 mo. at Bde (88-91)

Question 5


What percentage of your soldiers (officers and enlisted) were women?

1. No women in unit
2. Less than 10%
3. 10-19%
4. 20-29%
5. 30% or greater

Analysis (Q. 5)

36.9% commanded battalions in which women soldiers accounted for 10-29% of their unit's strength and 6.3% had units where women soldiers comprised greater than 30% of the unit.

Statistical Data (Q. 5)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
None	1	117	38.7	38.9	38.9
< 10%	2	54	17.9	17.9	56.8
10-19%	3	70	23.2	23.3	80.1
20-29%	4	41	13.6	13.6	93.7
> 30%	5	19	6.3	6.3	100.0
.		1	0.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.306	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	1.283	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 5)

- My medical company (FSB, Mech Div) averaged 35-45%.
- Many times they were in the low density MOSs (e.g., fuel handlers, supply) so when you lost one, it really hurt.
- Less than 10%—however, officers were approximately 30%.

Question 6


Was your unit coded to preclude the assignment of women to any positions?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

Analysis (Q. 6)

49.5% of the respondents commanded units which were coded to preclude women soldiers.

Statistical Data (Q. 6)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Yes	1	149	49.3	49.5	49.5
No	2	144	47.7	47.8	97.3
Do Not Know	3	8	2.6	2.7	100.0
	.	1	0.3	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.532	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.551	Maximum	3.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 6)

- MEDIVAC unit attached to my battalion was coded to prohibit female UH-60 pilots.
- I commanded a medical battalion with other Corps units assigned (i.e., chemical) some were male only. Females assigned to units were not a detriment to mission accomplishment with one exception—single parent and female soldiers with small children were often absent due to illness and sitter problems.
- Only one section of 25 positions which supported Rangers, etc.

Question 7


In your battalion, what impact did female soldiers have on mission accomplishment?

1. Strongly negative
2. Negative
3. Neither positive nor negative
4. Positive
5. Strongly positive
6. N/A, no women

Analysis (Q. 7)

37.2% indicated that women soldiers had either a positive or strongly positive impact on mission accomplishment. Only 5.6% responded that women soldiers had a negative impact on mission accomplishment.

Statistical Data (Q. 7)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Negative	2	17	5.6	5.6	5.6
Neither	3	59	19.5	19.6	25.2
Positive	4	74	24.5	24.6	49.8
Strong Positive	5	38	12.6	12.6	62.5
N/A	6	113	37.4	37.5	100.0
.		1	0.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.568	Minimum	2.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	1.316	Maximum	6.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 7)

- Negative impact only with regards to pregnancies and sole parents, especially during deployment to SWA.
- In many MOS's if it were not for the female soldier the units would have not been able to perform.
- For the most part, they were good soldiers. They had the same impact as good male soldiers.
- In supply and maintenance areas no negative impact; at times an extreme impact in medical/evacuation and special MOS(drugs/pharmacy & x-ray).
- Overall they did all missions very well; upper body strength and pregnancy were only salient problems and they were not pervasive.
- Female soldiers seldom meet the standard; they routinely fall out of PT and have a higher level of personal problems and absences from work; they have difficulty getting along with superiors that are also females.
- The women did their jobs well.
- The Army must make a decision and quit trying to make distinctions based upon echelons in the Field Artillery.
- One third of battalion female soldiers (20 of 60) became pregnant after deployment notification. Represented a loss in key and trained personnel up to and through combat phase. Breaks team building and adds turbulence.
- Upper body strength was a problem. Pregnancies with reduced work hours and six weeks maternity leave had a negative impact on available strength.
- Positive—but couldn't replace men in BSA with females; required special field accommodations.
- I was very fortunate to command in an ACR, hence no women. My experience previous to that as battalion XO in a divisional CSS unit was very negative and disappointing despite having an open mind on arrival.
- Too many females came up non-deployable when my unit deployed to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. (Either family support package was unexecutable or pregnancy.) Also had nine pregnancies in Saudi.
- Females generally preformed same as males. Of the officers, 3 of the top 5 platoon leaders were female. On the other side, the worst lieutenant was a female.
- Female drill sergeants always did an above average job.
- As a group they had the same variety of impacts as the men did; good and bad—mostly good.
- Overall female soldiers had a positive impact on the battalion. However, the issue of single parent ,both male & female, and unmarried pregnancy had negative impact especially after alert.
- No TILT. One way or another they contributed just like all the rest.
- My good female soldiers were inspirational to everyone. It motivated everyone to see our females perform 4 mile runs to exceed standard PT requirements too.

Question 8


Where was your command's permanent duty station?

1. CONUS
2. Europe
3. Korea
4. Panama
5. Alaska
6. Hawaii
7. Other


Analysis (Q. 8)

Compared to the AY91 Survey, the percentage of respondents that commanded in Europe decreased 7.3% while CONUS and Panama increased 4.8% and 2.3% respectively.

Statistical Data (Q. 8)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
CONUS	1	185	61.3	61.7	61.7
Europe	2	79	26.2	26.3	88.0
Korea	3	14	4.6	4.7	92.7
Panama	4	8	2.6	2.7	95.3
Alaska	5	4	1.3	1.3	96.7
Hawaii	6	7	2.3	2.3	99.0
Other	7	3	1.0	1.0	100.0
.	.	2	0.7	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.667	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	1.186	Maximum	7.000	Missing Cases	2



Question 9


Was it an accompanied tour?

1. Yes, my spouse/family accompanied me
2. Yes, but my spouse/family did not accompany me
3. No
4. N/A, I am not married

Analysis (Q. 9)

6.2% of the respondents that commanded a battalion in an accompanied tour area were either unmarried (3.6%) or commanded without their spouse/family present (2.6%). AY91 respondents that commanded without spouse or family in an accompanied tour area accounted for 1.2%.

Statistical Data (Q. 9)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Yes with Spouse	1	275	91.1	91.1	91.1
Yes without Spouse	2	8	2.6	2.6	93.7
No	3	8	2.6	2.6	96.4
N/A	4	<u>11</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.6</u>	100.0
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.189	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	0.653	Maximum	4.000	Missing Cases	0

Question 10


To what extent did your spouse participate or lead activities to support you while in command?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always
6. N/A, not married

Analysis (Q. 10)

Only 4.3% of the respondents indicated that their spouses seldom or almost never participated or led activities in support of them while in command. 80.3% responded that their spouses frequently or almost always participated in support activities.

Statistical Data (Q. 10)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	10	3.3	3.3	3.3
Seldom	2	3	1.0	1.0	4.3
Sometimes	3	32	10.6	10.7	15.0
Frequently	4	67	22.2	22.3	37.3
Almost Always	5	174	57.6	58.0	95.3
N/A	6	14	4.6	4.7	100.0
	.	2	0.7	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.447	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	1.009	Maximum	6.000	Missing Cases	2

Survey Comments (Q. 10)

- Extremely active and supportive both prior and during command.
- No pressure for her to do it.
- I used a team consisting of XO & CSM wives.
- I couldn't have asked for more—nor could the families of the SQDN. An unbelievable amount of pressure was put on CMD TM spouses...very "DiRECTIVE". Been married 22 years...spouse has participated. After Bn/SQDN CMD & DS/DS she'll no longer associate with the Army...I think it's a real loss!!
- Our family support group was extremely strong and effective. Because of frequent deployments (OCONUS) our FSG was active throughout my command. My spouse led a care (steering committee) which worked closely with the rear detachment CDR to resolve family problems, address concerns, and provide assistance before official command actions were necessary. It works!
- She believed in the command team idea and provided effective leadership at Bn/Bde level in the FSG and the community generally. She was however

regarded as a pain by the garrison staff during Desert Storm. I believe it was because she stayed on them to provide services they promised to provide but tended not to honor in the breach.

- Always—Especially during Desert Storm. What a performance (!!) by all concerned.
- Much pressure on the wife during Desert Shield/Desert Storm as I had a 1200 person task force.
- This has nothing to do with command or effectiveness of a commander.
- My wife participated and led activities to support the command/unit.
- I was a bachelor for half of my tour—my XO's wife took over the senior lady role. It is not possible to do without.
- Not married—XO's wife was very helpful.
- Not married—but the XO's wife or another major's wife filled in and did great. They were wonderful ladies.
- NA—Spouse did not accompany me, thus she participated in nothing.

Question 11


Did your spouse work outside the home for pay while you were in command?

1. Yes, full time
2. Yes, part time
3. No, did not work outside the home
4. N/A, not married

Analysis (Q. 11)

Only 37.9% of the commanders indicated that their spouses did not work outside the home. AY91 respondents indicated that 50.2% did not work outside the home.

Statistical Data (Q. 11)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Full Time	1	106	35.1	35.2	35.2
Part Time	2	69	22.8	22.9	58.1
Not Outside Home	3	114	37.7	37.9	96.0
N/A	4	12	4.0	4.0	100.0
	.	<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.106	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.939	Maximum	4.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 11)

- Was never a negative factor. Readily accepted.
- She quit in order to serve as a "battalion commander's wife".
- She quit her job when I took command so she could better fulfill her "command team" responsibilities!
- Yes, full time—also, many other key personnel wives did. Today's economics drive this.
- This is a stupid question!
- Frowned-upon by senior commanders; where it wasn't frowned-upon, non-working wives were forced to participate in activities and carry their load.
- Until Desert Storm she worked—then she quit her job. Battalion was more than full time business then.

Question 12


What portion of your command time did budget management require?

1. 10% or less
2. 11-20%
3. 21-30%
4. 31-40%
5. 41-50%
6. More than 50%

Analysis (Q. 12)


92.7% of the respondents indicated they spent less than 21% of their time on budget management. 64.7% combat arms respondents indicated they spent less than 10% of their time on budget management. AY91 Survey results for combat arms commanders with less than 10% was 71.9%. 46% of the combat service support commanders spent more than 11% of their time on budget verses 35.2% and 36.6% for combat arms and combat support respectively.

Statistical Data (Q. 12)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
< 10%	1	188	62.3	62.5	62.5
11-20 %	2	91	30.1	30.2	92.7
21-30%	3	14	4.6	4.7	97.3
31-40%	4	5	1.7	1.7	99.0
41-50%	5	2	0.7	0.7	99.7
> 50%	6	1	0.3	0.3	100.0
.	.	1	0.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.488	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.769	Maximum	6.000	Missing Cases	1



Survey Comments (Q. 12)

- Tremendous XO & S4 saved me a great deal of time.
- Small time expenditure, but money played a major role in almost every command decision. Therefore, it had a 80-90% effect factor.
- Based on my experience—let battalions/or Brigade manage their own budget vs the DIV . Much more cost effective.
- Regt CDR worked hard to keep budget MGMT off the SQDN CDR. We only needed to ensure prudent use of available funds.
- Budget management was tied into everything we did. The budgeting process at Bn level is an abortion.
- None, budget at higher HQ.
- I had a first rate XO/S3 and I know the system. Time spent includes audit by staff and presentation for decision. My point is budget time is hard to measure; but the budget required constant mgt to preserve training or at least know what we would have to give up.
- I had a great S4 and even a greater Bn XO. I also firmly believed in commanding, delegating, and not micromanaging.
- Budget management at battalion level is broke! I had to pull budget info from higher and develop on my own initiative—no one else at higher headquarters seemed to care!
- Financial/budget management is broken in the Army. I've not seen many organizations that had a clue as to status of funds, how many related to training quotas, etc. TUFMIS/Budget Management at installation level to platoon should be relooked and emphasized at TRADOC schools. Units need standardized automated system to track and evaluate performance of budget execution.
- I gave guidance. The XO tracked in detail.
- I supervised and gave guidance to the XO who managed in great detail on a daily basis.

Question 13


Was ammunition available for you to meet STRAC standards?

- 1. Almost never**
- 2. Seldom**
- 3. Sometimes**
- 4. Frequently**
- 5. Almost always**



Analysis (Q. 13)

Only 10.6% of the respondents indicated they seldom or almost never had enough ammunition to meet STRAC standards. 30.6% of the AY91 respondents indicated ammunition was a problem in meeting standards. 14% of the combat arms respondents indicated ammunition was a problem verses 9.6% and 3.3% of the combat support and combat service support respondents. 15.2% of the respondents that commanded in Europe indicated ammunition was seldom or almost never enough to meet standards.

Statistical Data (Q. 13)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	19	6.3	6.5	6.5
Seldom	2	12	4.0	4.1	10.7
Sometimes	3	38	12.6	13.1	23.7
Frequently	4	68	22.5	23.4	47.1
Almost Always	5	154	51.0	52.9	100.0
.		<u>11</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.120	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	291
Standard Deviation	1.184	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	11



Survey Comments (Q. 13)

- Varied widely on type weapon. Not a major factor. Too many folks use STRAC as an excuse or crutch. We taught & trained on marksmanship not STRAC.
- Stinger missiles were not available to qualify to STRAC standards. Subcaliber training device was not available.
- But we used ammo not used by other units; Soldiers should fire with M16 each quarter.

- The issue was not as easy as availability; too often, the ammunition was used for pet projects directed by Division competition, directed live fire, etc.; although these pet projects did have some training value, they were not necessarily the training needed.
- Problem was cumbersome ammunition forecast procedures which were completely disjointed with time requirements needed to schedule ranges; all was very "ify"; neither Div Cdr or ADC really were sensitized enough to sort it out.
- Ammunition was not available in sufficient quantity to accomplish desired training standards.
- We did not meet STRAC requirements for ammo.
- A top priority within the Division was to have ammo for training.
- Hand Grenades and missiles not available; rockets restricted due to ranges—otherwise OK.
- STRAC ammo limits did not support all weapons live fire I would have liked.
- We never had enough ammo to conduct training such as field fire and transition ranges, only qualification, for all crew served weapons.
- Could rarely get 45 or 38 ammo for pistols.
- A constant problem! .45 cal ammunition was a persistent shortage item. When .223 ammunition (M-16A2) became a problem we attempted to use subcaliber devices using .22 cal LR—it didn't work very well, particularly in cold weather.
- Small arms was occasionally problematic (.45/5.56mm).
- We always had more than enough ammo.
- .45 cal shortages existed throughout my tour.
- .45 cal ammo was always a problem.
- Couldn't get AT rounds.
- Aircraft rockets a huge problem.
- Had problem keeping trained and qualified door gunners. They were only attached for 120-179 days. Big training problem to get NVG and M60D qualified.
- What is STRAC? It means a number of things; depends on your functional area.
- There is not enough training ammo for readiness of infantry units, and the STRAC standards are too low for infantry units. One objective was to conduct marksmanship training (zero, field or KD, and day/night qualification) every quarter, plus squad, platoon or company live fire exercises every quarter. My yearly ammo allocation did not support this type of program but we were able to get most of what we needed from other units. One year we fired 107% of allocation, and the next 142%. I cannot overemphasize the importance of live fire training.
- Small arms ammo was never a problem. The ammunition for firing M60 machine-guns, mortars and TOW ammo allocation did not allow each of my 20 TOW gunners to fire a live missile once per year.
- Only M16 and 9mm ammo were below STRAC.
- Only problems were with hand grenades and LAWS.
- The only ammo shortages were Army-wide problems. My battalion got its share on a pro-rata basis as distributed at installation-level.
- With ROTC support and NTC rotations, ammo was always available. Each year I received a plus-up from FORSCOM.

- My battalion was a unique battalion with the mission to deploy worldwide in 3-15 man teams to install communications—electronic equipment in support of Information Systems Command units, other DA units, other DOD services and Department of State. We had only small arms and NBC equipment in the battalion, but in inadequate quantities to arm entire organization. There were enough to train with and meet Army Standards.
- Soldiers only fired weapons for qualification.
- We did adjust STRAC standards IAW USAREUR standards to match ammo with training intentions; USAREUR Reg 350-1 became our criteria.

Question 14


Did you have sufficient training funds?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always


Analysis (Q. 14)


82.7% of the respondents indicated they frequently or almost always had sufficient training funds. Only 5.0% indicated they almost never had sufficient funds for training. Only 7.4% of the combat arms respondents indicated training funds as a problem. 6% of the CONUS based commanders indicated they seldom or almost never had sufficient training funds.

Statistical Data (Q. 14)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	5	1.7	1.7	1.7
Seldom	2	10	3.3	3.3	5.0
Sometimes	3	37	12.3	12.4	17.4
Frequently	4	80	26.5	26.8	44.1
Almost Always	5	167	55.3	55.9	100.0
.	.	<u>3</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.318	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	299
Standard Deviation	0.932	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	3





Survey Comments (Q. 14)

- Would have enjoyed more but they were adequate.
- Final budget allocation was based on "fair share" of shortages. Little to no relationship to training events. Same training at less cost.
- Leaders at Division level diverted P2 \$ to non-battalion training; It cut down on my OPTEMPO.
- We executed IAW USAREUR Reg 350-1. A function of careful planning and setting priorities.
- Would have been a problem if the unit did not deploy. OCONUS deployments meant a CINC picked up the bill for training while the unit was deployed. Home station budgets did not provide much beyond garrison sustainment.
- Flying hour dollars did not meet the actual costs of fuel and repair parts for the CH-47.
- The problem, as I saw it, was not funds but managing your time, training, and resources to accomplish the greatest value for each dollar in our limited amount of time.
- There was never enough money to do all the training the Brigade Combat Team wanted to do. Training plans were constantly revised due to a shortage of funds.
- For my 1st year commanding, this answer requires a simple comment: we had money to train, but we mortgaged our maintenance readiness by fooling ourselves as to "future"—10/20 cost.
- Unit did not have tactical equipment. SGT training conducted in unit.

Question 15


What was the average personnel turnover rate (per month) during your command?

1. Less than 10%
2. 10%-15%
3. 16%-20%
4. 21%-25%
5. 26%-30%
6. More than 30%

Analysis (Q. 15)

91.9% of the respondents indicated that they experienced an average turnover rate of 20% or less.

Statistical Data (Q. 15)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
< 10%	1	117	38.7	39.1	39.1
10-15%	2	132	43.7	44.1	83.3
16-20%	3	26	8.6	8.7	92.0
21-25%	4	15	5.0	5.0	97.0
26-30%	5	1	0.3	0.3	97.3
> 30%	6	8	2.6	2.7	100.0
.	.	3	1.0	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.913	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	299
Standard Deviation	1.065	Maximum	6.000	Missing Cases	3

Survey Comments (Q. 15)

- As a non-cohort CONUS division we were the overseas bill payer.
- My major problem—15 company commanders, 3 XO's, 4 S-3's, 13 1SG's.
- Turnover rate in Korea (1 yr tour) is completely unacceptable. Summer rates (June-Aug) is often 45-50% of unit strength. Senior NCO's, especially CSM's, tended to DEROS at 10 months. This caused increased turnover and resentment within the enlisted soldiers ranks.
- COHORT Bn, 2% turnover/month.
- COHORT, turned over once.
- (Less than 10%)With frequent OCONUS deployments this rate fluctuated greatly. Prior to and after deployments saw a significant rise in turnover—otherwise the units were fenced(stabilized for 120 days before/after deployments). STOP LOSS helped at a critical time but caused major problems when it was lifted.
- Until STOP LOSS & freezing of PCS's. Prior to that turbulence was having adverse affect on my readiness.
- Averaged 11-15% per quarter.

Question 16


How often were training resources (i.e. ranges, training areas, etc.) readily available?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always


Analysis (Q. 16)


9.7% of the respondents indicated that training resources were seldom or almost never available. Of the 9.7%, 4.0% were CONUS based and 3.7% were Europe based commands.

Statistical Data (Q. 16)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	3	1.0	1.0	1.0
Seldom	2	26	8.6	8.7	9.7
Sometimes	3	54	17.9	18.1	27.8
Frequently	4	107	35.4	35.8	63.5
Almost Always	5	109	36.1	36.5	100.0
.	.	3	1.0	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.980	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	299
Standard Deviation	0.993	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	3





Survey Comments (Q. 16)

- Priority given to BDE TF. Not a problem. You could always borrow/co-use with other units. Great cooperation.
- Ranges were a problem. Especially the 300 meter standard M-16 range.
- Ranges for Chaparral & Stinger were available only once per year and were not sufficient for realistic live fire exercises.
- Priority of ranges and training areas went to combat units.
- Often we had ammo but no range or we couldn't get ammo in time to take advantage of an opportunity range which opened up on short notice; Div ammo NCO was incompetent. Range availability was a factor in Europe.
- Main problem was getting access to weapons ranges during weekdays. Priority was given to line battalions, forcing us to use weekends. Not real good for morale!
- Most posts do not have the capability to conduct company-level combined arms live-fire exercises. A smaller Army has to be better trained and we must train our companies in combined arms warfare using real bullets. The changeover to Bradley has made live-fire training, to include qualification, extremely difficult because of range availability at Fort Benning.
- Combat Arms units had priority. As a CSS unit, we received what was left.
- Nearly impossible to get ranges during timeframes required. There were insufficient training areas to move complete aviation battalion to the field at the same time infantry battalion was training—big problem in Panama.
- Lack of maneuver training areas in Germany is a significant problem. We need to look at out-of-country options (e.g., SWA or NTC). A 5-18 km CMTC is not the answer—yet we keep putting more money and resources into the area.
- CSS units are the last in the pecking order for Live Training Area usage.
- Current Army ranges cannot support AH-64 aviation gunnery requirements—too small!

- Frequently, but not necessarily when I wanted the ranges. We had to schedule other training around the availability of ranges.
- We need more live fire training areas for Vulcan Air Defense Systems in Korea—not just SEA Range.
- Ranges required 90-day advance coordination.
- Ranges and training areas are managed on Okinawa by the USMC. By personally interfacing on a weekly basis with the USMC leadership (O6 and above) I was able to ensure availability for my battalion.
- The quality of training resources is really the operative here—not quantity. Ranges were not up-to-date with respect to targets.
- Ranges at GRAF/other places go to combat arms units first.
- MOUT Facility—hard to get! Quality marksmanship ranges with down range feedback for night firing—unavailable!
- Tank gunnery range constrained local maneuver area. We used the same terrain quite often.

Question 17


How often were unit unfinanced requirements significant inhibitors to training and operations?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always

Analysis (Q. 17)

6.7% of the respondents indicated unit unfinanced requirements were frequently or almost always significant inhibitors to training and operations.

Statistical Data (Q. 17)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	98	32.5	32.8	32.8
Seldom	2	104	34.4	34.8	67.6
Sometimes	3	77	25.5	25.8	93.3
Frequently	4	17	5.6	5.7	99.0
Almost Always	5	3	1.0	1.0	100.0
	.	<u>3</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.074	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	299
Standard Deviation	0.949	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	3

Survey Comments (Q. 17)

- When alerted for SWA we found out how many UFR's we really needed to fight.
- Shortage of MRE's was a significant detractor.
- Leaders would not let vehicles drive because of \$ shortage.
- We dropped training events because of OPTEMPO and ammo shortages.
- The major funding problem was lack of funds for purchase of hand tools—key resources in a FSB.
- This is a function of wise budget planning. At Bn we had it licked—at division & higher, serious issues!
- Usually could get UFRs funded.
- Usually found ways to overcome any financial constraints and still achieve objectives.
- Class IX sometimes exceeded allocations, requiring additional funds to repair customer vehicles/equipment.
- Control towers at Aviation Center (approx 20) were in poor condition; funds were not available for needed repairs.

Question 18


To what ALO was your unit organized?

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. N/A

Analysis (Q. 18)

46% of the respondents indicated their unit was organized at ALO1.

Statistical Data (Q. 18)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
One	1	137	45.4	46.0	46.0
Two	2	79	26.2	26.5	72.5
Three	3	27	8.9	9.1	81.5
N/A	4	55	18.2	18.5	100.0
	.	4	1.3	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.000	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	298
Standard Deviation	1.137	Maximum	4.000	Missing Cases	4

Survey Comments (Q. 18)

- I was organized @ ALO 1, but only resourced to C-3 due to drawdown in Europe.
- May have been ALO 2, but always fighting to be at ALO 2 (personnel) vs. ALO 3. NOTE: Difference between ALO 2&3 is one man.
- The Bn HQ was ALO3 while the companies were ALO1. This caused problems when the Bn HQ deployed. We were able to obtain a few (overstrength) officers otherwise our S3 section would have been unacceptably undermanned.
- ALO 2—this is contrary to AOE and is a problem in most aviation battalions.
- 2—My battalion had no problem with funds or training ranges, areas or time!

Question 19


Your assigned Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) constrained your unit's mission readiness.

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree

Analysis (Q. 19)

17.4% of the respondents indicated that their assigned ALO constrained their unit's mission readiness.

Statistical Data (Q. 19)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	97	32.1	33.7	33.7
Disagree	2	85	28.1	29.5	63.2
Neutral	3	56	18.5	19.4	82.6
Agree	4	34	11.3	11.8	94.4
Strongly Agree	5	16	5.3	5.6	100.0
.		<u>14</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.260	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	288
Standard Deviation	1.200	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	14

Survey Comments (Q. 19)

- Must have trained with full up MTOE requirement to deploy fully trained unit. "Fillers" are great but at last minute is not the time.
- Although I was ALO 1, shortages of lower ranks affected training; there should be a special ALO for E1-E4 which is above TOE.
- Especially with personnel fill, based upon an ALO 1 unit with same MOS's/languages on post with priority for fill.
- Shortages of key equipment and systems did impact readiness.
- No, but officer distribution plan did, and FAD did!
- ALO/turbulence and assigned strength put me as low as C3 and almost always at C2 due to personnel.
- Combat Service Support units are generally at ALO 4; the terminology should include reference to both TOE and TDA battalions.
- Poor question—a full ALO unit by definition meets mission readiness criteria.

- ALO 3 Combat Service Support units in support of ALO 1 Combat & Combat Support units have a real problem.

Question 20


Did your senior headquarters cross level critical resources between subordinate units?

1. Don't know
2. Not at all
3. Slightly
4. Moderately
5. Greatly

Analysis (Q. 20)

84% of the respondents indicated that cross leveling of critical resources between subordinates was being accomplished.

Statistical Data (Q. 20)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Don't Know	1	8	2.6	2.7	2.7
Not at All	2	40	13.2	13.3	15.9
Slightly	3	112	37.1	37.2	53.2
Moderately	4	109	36.1	36.2	89.4
Greatly	5	32	10.6	10.6	100.0
	.	1	0.3	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.389	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.937	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 20)

- Motor pool parking and maintenance areas were inadequate for a Bn with over 160 vehicles and 140 power units.
- It was like pulling teeth.
- This was quite well done, but disruptive at times.
- Not often, as it was understood by higher that cross-leveling punished good managers of resources.
- Being a one of a kind unit within the Division did not allow a lot of cross leveling!
- This was a disadvantage. We managed our money well where other units didn't, resulting in money being taken away from us often.
- Yes, but generally to meet the next NTC rotation., fill up rotational units then drought.
- Greatly within DIVARTY, but Division seems to prioritize units.
- We were resourced well in 11 ARC; considered ourselves a "have" unit; didn't flaunt it.
- Division HQ did the best they could. FORSCOM dropped the ball. Submitting a top ten personnel shortage list to FORSCOM every month was a wasted effort. For thirty months nothing changed.

Question 21


21. To what extent did facility unavailability degrade unit operations and training?

1. Not at all
2. Slightly
3. Moderately
4. Greatly
5. Don't know

Analysis (Q. 21)

28.2% of the respondents indicated that facility unavailability moderately or greatly degraded unit operations and training. 21.4% of AY91 respondents indicated moderately or greatly being effected by facilities unavailability.

Statistical Data (Q. 21)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Not at All	1	85	28.1	28.2	28.2
Slightly	2	128	42.4	42.5	70.8
Moderately	3	60	19.9	19.9	90.7
Greatly	4	25	8.3	8.3	99.0
Don't Know	5	3	1.0	1.0	100.0
	.	1	0.3	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.113	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.945	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 21)

- Caused significant expense & time to work around this shortfall.
- More 300 meter standard M-16 ranges are needed in Europe. This is a critical resource & causes significant wasted time or degradation of training. The Germans don't have any. We need to build one with the Germans in places like Baumholder.
- Ft Sill does not have authorized machine gun range for M60 or M2 (50 cal).
- Motor pool parking and maintenance areas were inadequate for a Bn with over 160 vehicles and 140 power units.
- Hangers condemned, motor pools lacked space and motor parks were mud holes.
- Lack of motor pool facilities severely inhibited maintenance operations.
- The 4 ID Pinyon Canyon Maneuver site: the EPA restrictions often prohibited the Brigade Combat Team from training when rain made maneuver conditions red. My last rotation—for 21 of 29 days the Brigade sat.
- Slightly—inadequacy of maneuver space a problem for mounted training and night tactical flying operations.

- Greatly—shortage of aircraft maintenance hangers and aircraft wash facility in Panama—aircraft were parked 1/4 mile from ocean—this resulted in a major corrosion problem.
- Coordinating training with allies overseas is difficult—allies control training areas, we take the leftovers and the decrements in training readiness when we get bumped or precluded from live fire and field exercise training areas.
- Motor pools, headquarters buildings, barracks, hanger facilities were poor.
- Unavailability of ranges degraded weapons qualification and ARTEP training.
- We had the poorest maintenance facilities in V Corps area of responsibility. One company's maintenance facilities were maintenance tents!
- Unit crashed in WWII wooden, disintegrating buildings. Troops lived in poorly constructed, over-crowded modular housing. Troops were moved three times (all) always after fixing up billets, always into billets that had been destroyed by some other unit. (CSM chain responsible for this.)

Question 22


To what extent did MOS shortages degrade unit effectiveness?

1. Not at all
2. Slightly
3. Moderately
4. Greatly
5. Not applicable
6. Don't know


Analysis (Q. 22)


47.4% of the respondents indicated that MOS shortages moderately or greatly degraded unit effectiveness. Of the 12.8% of the total respondents that indicated they were greatly effected, 8.1% were CONUS and 3.4% were Europe based. Only 27% of AY91 respondents indicated moderately or greatly being effected by MOS shortages.

Statistical Data (Q. 22)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Not at All	1	31	10.3	10.3	10.3
Slightly	2	124	41.1	41.3	51.7
Moderately	3	104	34.4	34.7	86.3
Greatly	4	38	12.6	12.7	99.0
Not Applicable	5	3	1.0	1.0	100.0
	.	2	0.7	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.527	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	0.879	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	2





Survey Comments (Q. 22)

- Low density MOS's were a constant problem.
- Supply is critical; NCO grades are more critical than most think (SSG/SFC).
- Especially NBC NCOs—big shortage.
- Especially in low density MOS's.
- MOS competency did.
- When my Bn received attachment of an Ordnance Company and responsibility for the installation ASP, I quickly acquired a major headache because of a severe shortage in ammo handlers. The lack of a qualified ordnance 1SG caused me to place a 95B (MP) E8 in the ordnance Co as a 1SG.
- My problem was undergrading and shortages in critical low density MOSs (45K,76L).
- Critical shortages of MOS 94B existed throughout my command tour.
- (FSB,Mech Div)—63B/E7; 91A/B, E1-E4; 76C, E1-E4.
- Slightly—low density maintenance and admin MOSs only.
- Critical MI MOS shortages: 98G (linguists), interrogators, mechanics (EW), communicators (SCI cleared), plus cooks and medical personnel. When will the Army solve these problems—they've been around forever!
- Shortages of MSG E8 first sergeants and SFC E7 platoon sergeants had greatest impact. Too many NCOs of these grades were "burned out" and could not perform with the troops.
- Severe shortages of 63B E6/E7. We need SGTs!
- Mechanics and cook shortages in my AD Battalion.
- ALO 3 units do not have enough NCOs to properly train their subordinate soldiers.
- Personnel in the correct MOS & grade. I sometimes had right MOSs but having soldiers assigned one to two grades lower had a significant impact,i.e., auth E5 support SGT, assigned an E3 supply Specialist.
- I suffered from shortages of admin clerks & mechanics, but I was a low priority unit for such replacements.

- There was a high percentage of senior grade imbalances, especially in grades 11B40 and 11B30. This was the result of the high promotion point requirement for 11B versus 11M. The upward substitution of E5s produced an experience shortfall in these key leadership positions.
- Greatly—upward substitution a problem. Imbalance of proper grade NCOs—lots of E5s, E6s, only a few E7s.

Question 23


How frequently did you defer repair parts requisitioning due to lack of funds?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always

Analysis (Q. 23)

Only 7.8% of the respondents indicated that they frequently or almost always deferred repair parts requisitioning due to lack of funds. 5.1% of AY91 respondents indicated they frequently or almost always deferred repair parts requisitioning.

Statistical Data (Q. 23)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	157	52.0	53.0	53.0
Seldom	2	68	22.5	23.0	76.0
Sometimes	3	48	15.9	16.2	92.2
Frequently	4	19	6.3	6.4	98.6
Almost Always	5	4	1.3	1.4	100.0
.		<u>6</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.801	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	296
Standard Deviation	1.017	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	6

Survey Comments (Q. 23)

- Retrograde/inactivation was concurrent with Desert Shield/Storm
- Parts ordered and shipped to USAREUR were diverted to the Desert. Parts would not have been a problem if equipment was permitted to be turned in to 10/20 stds, however, the command's turn in was code B. Accepting depot was extremely stringent on turn in stds.
- This may have been a serious problem if we were not able to use funds from the supported CINC's. If projected deployments had been cancelled it would have required a major budget adjustment for my unit at home station.
- Class IX account controlled by brigade.
- 1st year—frequently. 2d year bit the bullet and never did—cancelled major training instead of deferring maintenance.—Command support to do it too!
- I did not ask permission—I ordered it if I needed it and let others worry about paying for it.

Question 24


Was your budget based on projected training events or last year's expenditures?

1. Projected training events
2. Last year's expenditures
3. Other

Analysis (Q. 24)

60.5% of the respondents indicated that the basis of their budget was projected training events verses last year's expenditures. 65.6% of AY91 respondents indicated training events as the basis for their budgets also.

Statistical Data (Q. 24)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Projected Events	1	182	60.3	60.5	60.5
Prior Expenditures	2	67	22.2	22.3	82.7
Other	3	52	17.2	17.3	100.0
	.	1	0.3	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.568	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.770	Maximum	3.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 24)

- Planning was done by forecasting and using OPTEMPO rates, however, higher hqs often still sliced the pie based on last year's \$.
- Proportional "fair share" of brigade budget recognizing both last year's budget and training forecast.
- The submitted budget requirements were based on projected training events, but the \$s allocated were always a function of previous year's expenditures.
- We put a lot of quality effort in this area; problem was finding an S4 or Bn XO who knew how to do this; not taught sufficiently at Advance Course or CGSC.
- Of course you used last years training history to forecast your budget as well.
- Really not possible to answer accurately except to say available money drove training not the other way around.
- Mostly projected; data provided for costs was based on last year's expenditures for like events.
- Request was based on projected training. Allocation was sometimes a mystery.
- Last year's expenditures—forced to do this because of budget guidance; zero growth and 5% decrement.
- All.
- My budget request was based on carefully projected training events. What I received as my "fair share" allocation was derived from previous year's expenditures.
- Budget is a game. We plan based on projected events, but the money comes through based on last year.

- I activated a divisional battalion from scratch. Therefore, the budget projections for repair parts and funding of training were far less realistic during the first two cycles than the third budget which was being executed when I left command.
- BOTH, Last year's as an informal ceiling. Proj events to build justify budget \$0.
- Combination; more heavily on last year's expenditures.

Question 25


Sufficient resources were provided to accomplish:

1. All the training I desired
2. Most of the training I desired
3. Only required training
4. Less than required training
5. Much less than required training

Analysis (Q. 25)

80.1% of the respondents indicated that sufficient resources were provided to accomplish most or all of the training they desired. 82.4% of AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 25)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Much Less	1	3	1.0	1.0	1.0
Less than Required	2	21	7.0	7.0	7.0
Only Required	3	36	11.9	12.0	19.9
Most I Desired	4	192	63.6	63.8	83.7
All I Desired	5	49	16.2	16.3	100.0
.	.	1	0.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.874	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.798	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 25)

- The worst training resource was training areas. There was no area large enough to conduct combined arms operations above company level.
- Maneuver space at CMTC insufficient to integrate Air Defense Bns.
- Time was the biggest constraint; too much time was spent doing "good ideas."
- Would like to have trained more on gunnery ranges with EW threat, and that allow use of all aircraft systems.
- Time was the critical factor.
- Still needed Hellfire missiles to fire during scheduled semi-annual and annual live fire gunnery exercises!
- Our most serious problem was not resources, it was time. As with all MP units post support (law enforcement) often conflicted with desired training events. Unexpected crises often impacted on training time.
- Again it was feast or famine. From April 1989 until after my NTC rotation in Sept 1989 I feasted. From Sept 1989 until Desert Storm it was famine.
- As a signal unit at Ft Bragg, supporting the XVIII ABN Corps HQ's, my mission support was extensive. This mission support replaced my units planned Bn training.
- Repair parts—never enough for our aviation battalion. Time was a major problem. We flew so many hours of mission support that we didn't have time to do individual/collective internal training.
- Need MOUT sites for CSS units in Europe—that's primarily where they set up.
- With only one CH-47 company at Ft Bragg, individual aviator/crew training was sacrificed for meeting support missions.
- Time was as much a factor as other resources—a CSS commander—especially an FSB commander, does not control most of the time available.

Question 26


Training was developed IAW the 25 Series of Manuals.

- 1. Almost never**
- 2. Seldom**
- 3. Sometimes**
- 4. Frequently**
- 5. Almost always**

Analysis (Q. 26)

Only 3.3% of the respondents indicated that training was seldom or almost never based on the 25 Series of Manuals. 5.1% of AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 26)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	7	2.3	2.3	2.3
Seldom	2	3	1.0	1.0	3.3
Sometimes	3	36	11.9	12.0	15.3
Frequently	4	78	25.8	26.0	41.3
Almost Always	5	176	58.3	58.7	100.0
.	.	2	0.7	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.377	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	0.904	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	2

Survey Comments (Q. 26)

- TNG was top priority. 25 Series was the bible.
- It became the bible & we followed it fairly well.
- Training briefs were more an overview rather than a "contract".
- FM 25-100 is an excellent guide; too many Div Cdrs and above believe every paragraph is mandatory; in concept it is excellent, but it has become too overbearing; like all the senior level directed training, it requires too much time and effort and detracts from real training.
- (Almost always) Within constraints of budget or the occasional surprise opportunity.
- Common skills and SQT tng was standardized IAW 25 series. MOS specific/ASI training was under special technical guidance and conditions.
- In 2 of 4 Bns upon arrival of CDRs who instituted 25-100 principles. Only after our bottom up effort did brigade follow.
- To do so presumes that the unit operates daily as a unit. Aviation battalions typically work in small packages away from the flagpole: war-time mission training does not fit well into the 25 Series.
- The CSS community greatly lacks "how to train" manuals—tactical & technical.
- Chain of command—higher and lower—was in step with 25 Series Manuals.

Question 27


Senior headquarters provided clear training guidance.

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always

Analysis (Q. 27)

71.9% responded that training guidance received from senior headquarters was frequently or almost always clear. 79.3% of AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 27)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	6	2.0	2.0	2.0
Seldom	2	23	7.6	7.6	9.6
Sometimes	3	56	18.5	18.5	28.1
Frequently	4	102	33.8	33.8	61.9
Almost Always	5	115	38.1	38.1	100.0
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.983	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	1.026	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	0

Survey Comments (Q. 27)

- Broad enough to provide flexibility, direct enough to focus.
- It was a limiting factor; higher filled my training calendar.
- Very detailed but everything was top priority; biggest problem with Army senior leaders is inability to prioritize ten requirements and really mean it.

- Our goals had to be incorporated within Division's goals; Division incorporated METL from Division to team individual soldier.
- Allowed Bn Cdrs little flexibility.
- Quarterly training guidance was vague; training briefings spent 90% of the time on format not content.
- Higher Hqs was always behind the power curve on issuing guidance—I always issued mine before higher put theirs out.
- It was provided but the guidance was do everything. Everything was #1 priority thus there were no priorities.
- My battalion is a separate FORSCOM CSS unit which was assigned to the installation at Ft Bliss in peacetime. There was limited mission related training guidance from above. We developed our training program based on anticipated wartime missions through close coordination with anticipated higher HQ and participation in CPX, CFX, FTX, etc. We were able to prepare ourselves for war and were quite successful in SWA. The battalion has an ammo support mission in wartime, but no ammo companies in peacetime. In SWA we were assigned subordinate reserve and national guard companies that we had not known before. We were successful, but it took some effort preparing for our CSS mission. The battalion is now assigned to the 11th ADA Bde at Ft Bliss.
- But generic. My impression was that my Bde published training guidance just to meet the requirement and not to support mission directed training.
- Senior CDRs and HQs provide good words—don't have any control over funds—ranges or other resources like ammo, etc.—in reality you can't do it like you want to because of access to resources. (TRADOC TDA Bn)
- Yes—but often late! Can't wait forever.
- I knew what I had to do, but division & brigade couldn't provide timely guidance due to force mod impacts, NTC schedule changes, and Desert Shield/Storm.
- My S3 and I worked very closely with the Brigade Commander and Brigade S3 to ensure that training guidance was coherent.
- Home station guidance was timely and clear, but CAPSTONE-related guidance was a problem.
- Senior HQs was a garrison command. They showed very little interest in TO&E training.
- Quarterly and annually.
- Always late—I had to publish battalion guidance before receipt of higher guidance.
- Senior HQ provide trng guidance that fits combat units. CS/CSS units fend for themselves. The battalion supported 29 battalion sized units from 5 Bde units. A combat unit with equipment in my shop had a much higher priority than my own unit training.
- Although most heavily on Combat and CS rather than CSS tng.

Question 28


Training guidance supported the CSA intent for tough realistic training.

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree

Analysis (Q. 28)

Only 6.0% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that training guidance supported the CSA intent for tough realistic training. 4.3% of AY91 answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 28)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	10	3.3	3.3	3.3
Disagree	2	8	2.6	2.7	6.0
Neutral	3	32	10.6	10.6	16.6
Agree	4	129	42.7	42.9	59.5
Strongly Agree	5	122	40.4	40.5	100.0
.		<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.146	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.948	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 28)

- There is a dichotomy here; the guidance supported it but regulations on minimum safe distance, safety procedures, control, etc., degraded both realism and difficulty.
- Senior Cdrs' last second changes to guidance was far more disruptive than helpful; we are still trying to do too much; quality suffers therein.
- Those who created it thought it did.
- Training performed in my battalion and other battalions of our division was the most realistic I have ever experienced and rivals the ATCs.
- Did not get to train on METL tasks enough—day to day support missions were mostly day, single aircraft "ash and trash" hauls! Did not get to do enough NVG air assaults with infantry units.

Question 29


Repetitious return to the same training areas degraded training.

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree


Analysis (Q. 29)

31.1% of the respondents indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed that repetitious return to the same training areas degraded training. 30.1% of AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 29)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	19	6.3	6.4	6.4
Disagree	2	112	37.1	37.5	43.8
Neutral	3	75	24.8	25.1	68.9
Agree	4	79	26.2	26.4	95.3
Strongly Agree	5	14	4.6	4.7	100.0
.	.	3	1.0	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.856	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	299
Standard Deviation	1.031	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	3



Survey Comments (Q. 29)

- Availability of off-post/on-post areas coupled w/personnel turnover took care of this.
- Would have liked to have more variety in training areas, but given limited resources & maneuver right restrictions in Europe, I think we made the best of it.
- Training was paramount. Tng areas, \$, etc., were not an issue until political environment changed at election time. Political sensitivity then precluded off-post deployment for a few months before we were taken off mission to begin retrograde/inactivation.
- Happened rarely, but just change conditions (night, NBC MOPP 4, without key leaders).
- No deviation was allowed; options were available even in Europe, but leaders lacked funds or imagination.

- We were pretty creative, even in Germany, in this regard.
- My battalion went to NTC once and SWA, therefore no repetition in training events noted!
- Not true—So long as scenario changes and innovative training is scheduled. Soldiers are realistic, they understand. CDRs set the tone!
- This was not a real problem for my unit since we flew people all over Central and South America.
- Training areas are scarce in Korea!
- Ft. Ord training areas degraded training; Ft. Hunter-Liggett training areas did not degrade training.

Question 30


How frequently were off post training events an integral part of your training program?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always

Analysis (Q. 30)

20.4% of the respondents indicated that off post training events were seldom or almost never an integral part of their training program. 12.5% of AY91 responded similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 30)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	35	11.6	11.7	11.7
Seldom	2	26	8.6	8.7	20.4
Sometimes	3	64	21.2	21.4	41.8
Frequently	4	125	41.4	41.8	83.6
Almost Always	5	49	16.2	16.4	100.0
.	.	<u>3</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.425	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	299
Standard Deviation	1.205	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	3

Survey Comments (Q. 30)

- Numerous deployments to varied locations.
- Frequently, but on a downhill slide as the Wall went down & the already vocal German population became more anti-American/NATO.
- Train up for NTC; great training; don't allow this to get cut.
- Other than Graf/HTA, I only did two during 2 years and I had to risk my career to do them.
- Off post training area was 100 miles away; could not afford fuel and maintenance costs to road march that far very often.
- Only NTC rotations.
- There were adequate training areas/facilities on the installation. A 'great deal' of training was conducted during OCONUS deployments as mission permitted.
- Almost never—the garrison commander believed totally in home station training.
- We went to the field in 2ID whenever we could.
- I deployed aircraft frequently to support real world missions such as President Bush's visit to Venezuela, VP Quayle's visit to Columbia, Engineer units for nation building operations (nearly a continuous requirement), and medical readiness operations (nearly continuous requirement). I deployed the battalion on one occasion to conduct mountain/high altitude training.
- Off post training events were critical to some units because of the diversity and necessity to work with RC/CAPSTONE units.
- Exercises Sand Eagle and Solid Shield were the best training opportunities for the (CH-47) unit.
- Our Brigade averaged two off-post training events per year.
- It was not appropriate for my training battalion to go off post for training.
- My unit constantly deployed. In 36 months I was TDY or deployed 43 times. The unit training was its mission accomplishment and vis a vis I had outstanding LTs & SGTs; excellent young CPTs, mediocre senior CPTs & MAJs (with half dozen outstanding). Bn had 12 MAJs, 26 CPTs, 7 LTs & 2 WOs. Young soldiers were outstanding, senior NCOs mediocre.
- Lance missile Bn doesn't require as much field tng as a maneuver Bn.

Question 31


Your unit trained using Mission Training Plans (MTP) developed by TRADOC proponent schools.

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always

Analysis (Q. 31)

37% of the respondents indicated that their unit training seldom or almost never used MTPs developed by TRADOC proponent schools. 34.9% of AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 31)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	79	26.2	26.8	26.8
Seldom	2	30	9.9	10.2	36.9
Sometimes	3	66	21.9	22.4	59.3
Frequently	4	74	24.5	25.1	84.4
Almost Always	5	46	15.2	15.6	100.0
.	.	7	2.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.925	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	295
Standard Deviation	1.431	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	7

Survey Comments (Q. 31)

- Excellent documents.

- Used ARTEP, as the MTP was only published in draft toward the end of my command.
- In process of being developed for my subordinate units (type units) while I had command.
- MTP was in rough draft during my command tour.
- Parts were good for NCOs to use as models/start points in planning training.
- There is no MTP for an Apache Bn yet!!
- Ft Huachuca has not written the requisite MTPs for MI Bn's, nor any other relevant how to fight manuals for tactical MI units.
- Overly complex documents—relied on METL assessment more than MTP.
- Specific MTPs for TOE of my unit were not published. However, we adapted and adopted MTPs from similar/like units as suitable.
- This is where the standards are—a great planning & execution tool.
- Not available for Corps-level CSS units until the very end of my command tour. Maintenance unit draft MTP was used during last quarter.
- Almost never—had not been developed for my type of unit (combat support).
- Ft. Bliss has done a superb job!
- Almost never—The school has not addressed the new family of equipment or MOSs that made up my battalion. We developed our own battle drills that served us well in Saudi.
- First drafts became available for some of the troops during last six months prior to deployment to SWA.
- Because no MTA existed for my unit I developed & initiated my own.

Question 32


MTPs provide the basis for tough realistic training.

1. **Strongly agree**
2. **Agree**
3. **Neutral**
4. **Disagree**
5. **Strongly disagree**

Analysis (Q. 32)

48% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that MTPs provided the basis for tough realistic training. 53.2% of AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 32)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	9	3.0	3.1	3.1
Disagree	2	29	9.6	9.9	12.9
Neutral	3	115	38.1	39.1	52.0
Agree	4	114	37.7	38.9	90.8
Strongly Agree	5	27	8.9	9.2	100.0
.	.	8	2.6	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.412	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	294
Standard Deviation	0.900	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	8

Survey Comments (Q. 32)

- Our training plans were IAW NATO stds, much tougher & more realistic.
- Provides for realistic training. Depends on how we define tough. Weather and terrain can make training tough—but they are not constants.
- Mission focus and good first line leaders do this; a MTP provides ideas/framework but not the basics.
- Attitude and support of higher command is basis for tough realistic training; MTPs help form METL task development and provide clear standards.
- But they need expansion and modification IAW our METL and training limitations.
- Tough realistic tactical training, but simplistic, unrealistic and totally unchallenging logistics training.
- Experience provides the basis for tough, realistic training.
- Super documents!
- MTPs were not used. Training management in Europe encompassed 350-1.
- Strongly disagree—Don't stay current with equipment.
- Really didn't have a good MTP for EAC mission.
- The CSS folks have written MTPs that are unrealistic, but do provide a base and are useful. When you read the FSB MTP, one needs a Brigade staff to accomplish what they think we can do!!

- Excellent documents that can be "tweaked" to increase toughness, i.e., at night, with NVG, in MOPP 4...

Question 33


Higher headquarter's taskings, schedule changes, etc. hindered your ability to conduct training.

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always

Analysis (Q. 33)

26.4% of the respondents indicated that higher headquarter's taskings, schedule changes, etc., frequently or almost always hindered their ability to conduct training. 21.3% of AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 33)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	26	8.6	8.6	8.6
Seldom	2	57	18.9	18.9	27.6
Sometimes	3	138	45.7	45.8	73.4
Frequently	4	72	23.8	23.9	97.3
Almost Always	5	8	2.6	2.7	100.0
.		<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.930	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.937	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 33)

- Slight distractor. Normally these were taskings or VIP visits (therefore you put on dog & pony shows).
- Must be forceful-cooperative, but forceful.
- Major changes unavoidable due to unit participation in Operation Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm; none the less, adversely affected training plans.
- Most frequent complaint was inability of higher headquarters to finalize plans and/or ops orders for exercises; usually had to wait 3-5 days before STARTEX; put inordinate pressure on units.
- 1 ID has a good tasking system but accepts virtually all taskings. Generals X and Y were both hard over on funding training opportunities.
- An argumentative and emotional topic!! In fairness to brigade and division much was unavoidable at their level.
- Sometimes—but more community level taskings than "tactical" chain.
- Often inhibited my ability to observe training.
- 50% of my missions were received with less than 48 hours reaction time—this made unit training schedules a waste of time.
- Being a CSS battalion, mission support many times took priority over scheduled training. The Brigade's materiel readiness came ahead of my battalions' training readiness.
- Post support, personnel & equipment teachings for training support of schools, and local schools always teach procedures over training.
- Still do not have solid T5 lock-in!
- Approximately 50% of T5 lock-in violations were handed down from brigade or higher; whereas, the 50% were produced within the battalion. I feel the Army still needs to devote a substantial effort in T5 lock-in and near term planning for training.

Question 34


Higher headquarters directives enhanced your ability to conduct training.

- 1. Strongly agree**
- 2. Agree**
- 3. Neutral**
- 4. Disagree**
- 5. Strongly disagree**

Analysis (Q. 34)

42.2% of the respondents agreed or greatly agreed that higher headquarters directives enhanced their ability to conduct training. 40.8% of AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 34)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	10	3.3	3.3	3.3
Disagree	2	68	22.5	22.6	25.9
Neutral	3	96	31.8	31.9	57.8
Agree	4	114	37.7	37.9	95.7
Strongly Agree	5	13	4.3	4.3	100.0
.	.	<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.173	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.940	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 34)

- Very positive impact.
- We trained harder.
- Too many directives, too little time to do all plus implement subordinates' and your training.
- Too much micro-management—higher did not understand medical missions/execution.
- Generals 1 & 2 are good trainers and had good ADCs. General 3 turned Ft Riley's gunnery program around and 4 was a good tactical trainer.
- To clarify brigade & higher policies & goals, to set priorities, and to apportion brigade resources—yes.
- Higher HQs directives allow the battalion and lower level commanders little or no latitude in determining training.
- Strongly disagree—not disseminated soon enough for proper planning cycle.

Question 35


How often did you conduct combined arms training?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always

Analysis (Q. 35)

49.7% of the respondents indicated that combined arms training was frequently or almost always conducted. 61.8% of AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 35)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	63	20.9	21.6	21.6
Seldom	2	34	11.3	11.6	33.2
Sometimes	3	50	16.6	17.1	50.3
Frequently	4	105	34.8	36.0	86.3
Almost Always	5	40	13.2	13.7	100.0
.	.	10	3.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.086	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	292
Standard Deviation	1.373	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	10

Survey Comments (Q. 35)

- Trained as a BDE/BN TF. Our slice did everything with us.
- A must for any artillery unit; we need more as a Corps artillery unit.
- Cost of tank OPTEMPO and environmental constraints precluded most combined arms training.

- My brigade often fired Task Force Gunnery—which is invaluable.
- My battalion was an EAC Signals Intel Unit and therefore didn't have the opportunity to provide teams to combined arms training.
- Frequently, the chain of command placed major emphasis on combined arms. Several CPXs, BBS exercises, FTX yearly with at least 2 NTCs per year.
- Seldom— TUFF in signal units.

Question 36


How often did your training include joint service representation?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always
6. Not applicable

Analysis (Q. 36)

55.1% of the respondents indicated that their training seldom or almost never included joint service representations. 47.6% of AY91 respondents answered similarly. 51.8% and (AY91) 45.2% of the combat arms officers responded that joint service representation was seldom or almost never included in their unit training.

Statistical Data (Q. 36)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	108	35.8	36.5	36.5
Seldom	2	55	18.2	18.6	55.1
Sometimes	3	63	20.9	21.3	76.4
Frequently	4	33	10.9	11.1	87.5
Almost Always	5	13	4.3	4.4	91.9
N/A	6	24	7.9	8.1	100.0
	.	<u>6</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.527	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	296
Standard Deviation	1.564	Maximum	6.000	Missing Cases	6

Survey Comments (Q. 36)

- Limited to ANGLICO's and AF. We always had an AF TACP.
- As a CSS unit I supported the Air Force, Navy and Marines on a routine basis for some commodities, and periodically for others—garrison and field.
- USAF was non supportive—why? I don't know; I could get my ALO about anytime; I used an ALO 6-8 times during my command.
- No ALO assigned to Bn or Bde—almost impossible to get ALO to participate in training.
- We included USAF and USN in our deployments and nation building missions.
- Air Force willing to play, but air units were so far away that CAS couldn't arrive until mid-day.
- Tough to get our Air Force folks in. They talked good support, but only really got serious at NTC—or last major pre-NTC exercise.
- Probably more joint service training than any other aviation battalion—should have qualified for joint credit! We worked on a weekly basis rappeling marine security platoons, inserting navy SEALs, coordinating search and rescue with the Air Force, etc.
- We worked with 1st British Corps and 1st Belgium Corps every day; unique situation.
- ALO included in Regimental Gunneries and Exercises, not in CSS activities.

Question 37


The NCO Corps was able to plan and conduct individual training to standard.

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree


Analysis (Q. 37)

16.7% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that the NCO Corps was able to plan and conduct individual training to standard. 16.2% of AY91 respondents answered similarly. 28.6% of the combat service support respondents disagreed and 15.9% of the combat support respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the NCO Corps ability to conduct training to standard.

Statistical Data (Q. 37)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	3	1.0	1.0	1.0
Disagree	2	47	15.6	15.7	16.7
Neutral	3	25	8.3	8.3	25.0
Agree	4	167	55.3	55.7	80.7
Strongly Agree	5	58	19.2	19.3	100.0
.	.	2	0.7	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.767	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	0.971	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	2



Survey Comments (Q. 37)

- Majority knew it & could do it. Turnover constantly provided new challenges.
- They learned with command emphasis.
- Life at the squad leader & platoon sergeant levels was hand to-mouth. I saw little evidence of NCO's preparing themselves for training prior to the training event and regrettably too little time was focused solely on individual training, but junior NCO's didn't always show the initiative and knowledge to make this quality training. The experience of Desert Shield/Storm refocused this and the NCO's came into their own.
- Able to execute to standard but had difficulty planning w/o lots of supervision and help.
- A real weak point in 2 Bn/SQDN level commands. E6/E7 levels were the key weak links. PLDC was great as were most young E5 SGTs, very aggressive leaders.
- A major problem; the smart young fast moving NCOs can plan but they cannot (for the most part) execute or properly supervise or critique the execution; they can brief, very well, the outcome but it is not actually what "went on" in between the plan and the AAR; many excellent NCOs, given a plan, can execute it and train crews and individuals superbly.
- Strong on conduct, but weak on planning.
- Only after "significant emotional event" did the majority understand what standards meant and how to get to it.
- NCO Corps performed superbly under adverse conditions.
- Many intel types never seemed to grasp NCO business.
- The problem was not the NCO Corps, but a drive for numbers; the big problem in the NCO Corps training soldiers was that the MOS scores, EIBs, etc., were of such importance that it was very risky business to allow the NCO Corps to train their own soldiers; there was a lot of pressure to "round robin" training; this produced a few expert trainers (in a particular task) and a lot of beginner

trainers; it also had serious implications on leadership development, ability to hold NCOs accountable and decreased the prestige of the NCO Corps among junior enlisted soldiers.

- The backbone of our training was individual-squad-platoon level training; our NCOs, led by the CSM, made it happen.
- Drill Sergeants outstanding.
- NCOs were untrained on conducting good, realistic, interesting training; they knew what to do, not how to teach.
- The NCOs are capable, but resource planning and time were problematic. Probably my fault. We set aside a day per week for NCO planned training, but I don't believe I gave them adequate time to prepare training.
- When given the opportunity & resources ALWAYS! It was amazing in a most positive way!
- Quality of the NCO Corps is highly varied—some NCOs are absolutely great while others are terrible. Although bad ones can be & were addressed, it seems that too many poor ones got too far. By far the worst were E5s & E6s. (CSMs addressed separately).
- NCO's don't accept full responsibility for training their soldiers—they like to point out all the reasons why it cannot be done rather than how to train. Officers (Bn CDRs) have a hard time impacting through the chain of command in just two years.
- Room for improvement but we made great strides.
- Agree—key and integral part of training program.
- Only when commanders did not try to double schedule their time and when they were held accountable.
- NCOs aren't trained or capable enough to plan in the detail required at Bde and Division level planning standards.
- SQTs forced NCOs to remain proficient on individual skills. Doing away with SQTs is a mistake. NCO ability to conduct training was directly related to their ability to read and write. NCO ability to counsel their soldiers is deficient.
- NCOs are not trained to be instructors; yet are required to conduct 5 hrs of dedicated training per week. Would you follow this NCO who can't teach? This needs to be fixed in a CSS unit—with a mission to train daily!
- Biggest problem in the battalion—had major challenge training the NCOs that daily aircraft maintenance was training.
- Training was their weakness. Once they learned how to plan they did very well. They were great at conducting training.
- Many times the training had to be rescheduled due to mission support requirements; however, the NCOs did a good job of meeting the standard.
- We worked this issue very hard but I was never completely satisfied with results. Training NCOs to plan and conduct individual training still requires attention.
- About 50/50—some could, some couldn't.
- Battalion had 97 separate MOSs (not skill level). Some MOSs with no NCOs; some MOSs were highly technical and the MOS they grew into could not help train them.

Question 38


Your unit would have been able to handle an increased individual training requirement if AIT were cut back.

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree


Analysis (Q. 38)

65.1% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that their unit would be able to handle an increased individual training requirement if AIT were cut back. 58.5% of the AY91 respondents answered similarly. The strongest level of disagreement was provided by the combat service support respondents with 75.8% indicating disagreement or strong disagreement with the unit's ability to absorb additional individual training requirements.

Statistical Data (Q. 38)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	91	30.1	31.2	31.2
Disagree	2	99	32.8	33.9	65.1
Neutral	3	37	12.3	12.7	77.7
Agree	4	52	17.2	17.8	95.5
Strongly Agree	5	13	4.3	4.5	100.0
.	.	10	3.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.305	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	292
Standard Deviation	1.210	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	10



Survey Comments (Q. 38)

- It is not a problem to incorporate in your plan.
- Agree only because we can do anything—but it would have been unpleasant.
- Would have seriously degraded collective training time available.
- Yes, given the additional resources, ammo, and time required.
- Yes, but not without reduced readiness as we shift from a collective training focus.
- 67 MOSs in one battalion—CSS, especially ORD, are trained at about 20-25% in AIT—unit really struggles between training and mission to get folks up to standards.
- Time would be available if taskings were reduced which doesn't appear possible in the near future.
- AIT grads were received in poor physical condition.
- AIT soldiers are only marginally trained; they need more not less training.
- COHORT battalions do not apply to this question. Much easier for them to do this than regular replacement organization.
- We had too many highly technical MOS's to take on an added burden!
- Any increase in soldier training would, of course, detract from collective training opportunities (we didn't have a great deal of time to play with).
- (Strongly disagree) AIT can best be done if economy of scale can be achieved. You really can't do that very effectively in a battalion. As it is, taskings to support Armor BNCOC killed us.
- Provided quality at basic training improved!
- Not a chance—with all our mission support requirements this would be in my opinion impossible! NO "can do" here.
- I was AIT but based on that I would say it would greatly increase the unit training. Cuts are so deep nothing non-essential is left.
- Initial tech training (in my speciality—Finance) begins at home—AIT!! I'll refine & continue in unit.

- Absolutely not—in fact, we need better trained soldiers out of AIT. I was scared to death for many of my SL10 soldiers when DS/DS came about (I had to ship 45 of them to DS)
- We tried this in the 1970s and it was a failure.
- Aircraft maintenance is barely keeping up using the marginally trained mechanics units get now!
- The change to a generic "aviation mechanic" with specialization at the unit is going to set back the quality of maintenance several years. Further degradation will be seen when these soldiers become supervisors.
- Very difficult to support MOSs. No problem for SF(18).
- AIT must do better.
- Training and mission requirements would preclude doing this effectively.
- Agree—I could have spent some time on this; however, I don't advocate it.
- We were already working a 6 day week to meet all training and mission requirements.
- Strongly disagree—we already do too much of TRADOC's jobs (physical conditioning, marksmanship).
- That would be a disaster!

Question 39


BNCOC/ANCOC improved the training capability of the NCOs who attended.

- 1. Strongly agree**
- 2. Agree**
- 3. Neutral**
- 4. Disagree**
- 5. Strongly disagree**

Analysis (Q. 39)

90% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that BNCOC/ANCOC improved the training capability of the NCOs who attended. 85.1% of the AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 39)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Disagree	2	11	3.6	3.7	5.0
Neutral	3	15	5.0	5.0	10.0
Agree	4	175	57.9	58.1	68.1
Strongly Agree	5	96	31.8	31.9	100.0
.	.	1	0.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.156	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.782	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 39)

- Timing was never good but the schools were great.
- Too technically oriented—did not see a better leader & trainer come out of the program. (generalized comment)
- It took NCOs away from their families; we already spent and spend too much time away from home.
- NCOs routinely returned from BNCOC and ANCOC with no better appreciation of platoon or battery level tactics than they left with.
- Infantry ANCOC/BNCOC is not oriented enough to train our SL/PSG's and 1SG's. Need to get away from the SMA directed classroom reading, writing and arithmetic.
- (Agree) BNCOC at Riley produced good graduates but the costs to units to support was high. Furthermore BNCOC instructors often arrived at BNCOC because they were not wanted by the units.
- It improved their confidence but I didn't see this transferred into a "big" training advantage.
- Excellent return on investment.
- Agree—Great confidence builder.

- All NCOs were very disappointed in ANCOC—did little to train them as senior NCO leaders.
- Disagree—Unit battle drills are command evaluation ; did more to teach NCOs their training duties.
- ANCOC & BNCOC are structured too much. Like OBC & OAC, we should not be trying to make commissioned officers out of non-commissioned officers. Too much time is spent teaching theoretical B.S. These guys & gals need to know their MOS store cold. Knowing one's MOS cold is the first level in confidence building. The Army made a terrible mistake when it turned over formal training of NCOs to the NCO Corps (at least control over the POI). NCOs should continue to instruct & provide input though.
- ANCOC & BNCOC are organized wrong. It appears to me that the NCOs are trying to make these courses like OBC & OAC. There is too much touchy-feeling stuff. Should be more reorganized to produce apprentice journeymen & master NCOs.

Question 40


Junior officers were able to plan and conduct small unit collective training.

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree

Analysis (Q. 40)

Only 8.8% of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that junior officers were able to plan and conduct small unit collective training. 7.9% of the AY91 respondents answered similarly.

Statistical Data (Q. 40)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	5	1.7	1.7	1.7
Disagree	2	21	7.0	7.1	8.8
Neutral	3	25	8.3	8.4	17.2
Agree	4	202	66.9	68.2	85.5
Strongly Agree	5	43	14.2	14.5	100.0
.	.	<u>6</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.868	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	296
Standard Deviation	0.806	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	6

Survey Comments (Q. 40)

- Extremely good. Energetic, smart, competent, etc.
- Some could and some couldn't.
- Captains were very capable. Senior LT's who had been exposed to various troop leading positions were generally capable.
- Basic officer schools have improved LT quality tremendously in the ability to conduct training. Individual officer leadership doesn't have the emphasis I feel it needs.
- Like NCOs, effort is to get them up to speed on how to train—attitude change is necessary.
- Only with considerable coaching and preparation.
- Specialty platoon leaders did well at this. Tank platoon leaders are not really ready to plan/conduct collective training.
- Mine were the best collection of junior officers I ever saw in my 22 years of active duty.
- Too much interference from brigade.
- (Junior) officers were poorly trained in tactical/field skills.
- Disagree—very unfamiliar with 25-101 concepts upon arrival at unit.
- I agree, but only after a three-six month exposure to collective training. In other words, they didn't come to us from Fort Gordon ready to go !
- Aviation lieutenants only know basics of flying. They have no idea what a platoon leader is supposed to do. Leader development is a major challenge in aviation battalions.
- We don't do this well in CSS. I suspect there's no one in the service schools, particularly Fort Lee, who knows how to do this. Squadron commanders have to teach them. Most young officers are not equipped with the proper understanding of how to train.
- About 60-40.
- Really needed help from Bn S3.
- Strongly disagree—we just did not have the folks. NCOs did 99% of all our training. My officers had to man the shops, etc., in the FSB.

Question 41


The scenarios at the combat training centers supported the Air-Land battle concept.

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree

Analysis (Q. 41)

Only 4% of the responses indicated the scenarios DID NOT support the Air-Land battle concept. Comments indicated some weaknesses in CSS, Army Aviation, and USAF play at the CTCs.

Statistical Data (Q. 41)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	3	1.0	1.1	1.1
Disagree	2	9	3.0	3.2	4.3
Neutral	3	96	31.8	34.3	38.6
Agree	4	100	33.1	35.7	74.3
Strongly Agree	5	72	23.8	25.7	100.0
.		<u>22</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.818	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	280
Standard Deviation	0.891	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	22

Survey Comments (Q. 41)

- Not from a CSS support & sustain perspective.
- Not for CSS units.

- We did not operate in that scenario, however our combined NATO/SACEUR training was as realistic as we could make it.
- For Air Defense Bns, CMTC is totally inadequate. Insufficient enemy CAS and attack helicopter play & friendly planning and execution is inadequate to train the task force or Bde on airspace management.
- Designed to stress the ground maneuver Bn/TF CDR. Use of all the tenants of A/L battle & resources were consistently constrained to stress the CDR "in the box". BDE/REGT HQ are not as "actively" involved in the scenarios; could be more interactive.
- Superb training.
- USAF was not a player very often; battalion too low a level; air request system sucks and does not work against the all powerful OPFOR.
- Best training I've ever had.
- The NTC is the best thing that ever happened to me. I have been three times as Bn XO, Bde S3, and Bn CDR. In my view the scenarios are not always reasonable. Often scenarios put TF against defenses which never would be attacked by only a battalion TF. Finally the scenarios are designed for the 100% solution; i.e., you win only if you do everything right. The COG and Ops group can not allow themselves to become jaded—they do and tend to regard themselves as the keepers of the truth. Despite all of that, the NTC is the best training ground for combat that I know of.
- Agree—to the extent that battalions/brigades fight airland battle.
- (DISAGREE) Based on my tour at JRTC after Bn CMD.
- Generally agree. My disagreement with NTC is that during my 4 rotations the OCs did not allow me the flexibility in training I would have liked.
- NTC does not "play" CH-47s due to MILES. If they cannot support, there is no reason to include them in the package.
- However, the AH-64 was not allowed to be properly employed at the CMTC at Hohenfels, FRG due to size of the maneuver box and lack of MILES equipment for the aircraft.

Question 42


Your unit's performance at NTC/CMTC/JRTC was reflected on your OER?

1. Yes, explicitly referenced in the report
2. Yes, implied by the quality of the rating
3. No, was not reflected in the rating
4. N/A

Analysis (Q. 42)

Of the 132 Battalion Commanders who participated in NTC/CMTC/JRTC rotations, 53% indicated their unit's performance was explicitly referenced in their OER and another 29% indicated it was implied by the quality of their rating on the OER.

Statistical Data (Q. 42)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Yes, Explicitly	1	70	23.2	23.9	23.9
Yes, Implied	2	38	12.6	13.0	36.9
No	3	24	7.9	8.2	45.1
N/A	4	161	53.3	54.9	100.0
	.	9	3.0	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.942	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	293
Standard Deviation	1.279	Maximum	4.000	Missing Cases	9

Survey Comments (Q. 42)

- Although it was a TNG event, it clearly was a "pecker check". Old fashion you bet your bars.
- Yes—Not NTC, per se, but the NATO tactical evaluations & SACEUR missions.
- Did not get to do a rotation although I expect that the results would have reflected on my OER.
- Impossible to answer; OER & CTC don't mix; too much stacked against Bn Cdr; I've worked as Blue and OPFOR; should be viewed as a training event only; OPTEMPO precluded train-up; leaders dictated employment/ composition of forces.
- In one report; in 2 other reports implied.
- It was clear by the Div Cdr's comments that he considered JRTC a test of the commander and his training program.
- Was the central event of command.
- By virtue of overseas timing and assignments I have not been to NTC. I have participated in 3 Reforgers, 2 Team Spirits and numerous other field exercises. I was overseas when the Army said that was important. I believe lack of NTC will eventually have a negative effect on my career.

Question 43


How many NTC/CMTC/JRTC rotations did you experience while in command?

1. None
2. 1
3. 2
4. 3
5. 4 or more
6. Not applicable

Analysis (Q. 43)

41% of the Battalion Commander's surveyed experienced one or more NTC/CMTC/JRTC rotations while in command. Of those participating, 20% experienced 4 or more rotations while in command.

Statistical Data (Q. 43)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
None	1	80	26.5	27.0	27.0
One	2	52	17.2	17.6	44.6
Two	3	27	8.9	9.1	53.7
Three	4	20	6.6	6.8	60.5
Four or More	5	24	7.9	8.1	68.6
N/A	6	93	30.8	31.4	100.0
	.	6	2.0	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.456	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	296
Standard Deviation	2.069	Maximum	6.000	Missing Cases	6

Survey Comments (Q. 43)

- Subordinate transportation companies were able to train at NTC each year. Generally speaking, nondivisional Bns do not train at NTC aside from providing limited CSS slice elements.

Question 44


How frequently were quarterly Training Briefs IAW FM 25-100 conducted with your senior rater?

1. Never
2. Annually
3. Semi-Annually
4. Quarterly
5. More frequently than quarterly

Analysis (Q. 44)

This requirement appears to be well received and complied with in the field with 79% presenting quarterly training briefings to their senior rater.

Statistical Data (Q. 44)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Never	1	20	6.6	6.7	6.7
Annually	2	4	1.3	1.3	8.0
Semi-Annually	3	29	9.6	9.7	17.7
Quarterly	4	238	78.8	79.3	97.0
More than Quarterly	5	9	3.0	3.0	100.0
.		2	0.7	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.707	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	0.834	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	2

Survey Comments (Q. 44)

- Without fail.
- Never SQDN level to Corps CDR, semiannually Regt to Corps.
- Were conducted semi-annually, however, as I was "walking out the door" it was being changed to quarterly.
- Never—My senior rater visited my unit once in 2 years of command. I gave my training brief to the Corps CG with my SR rater present once. This was in the Bde conference room.
- Another bottom up effort. Training briefs were prepared more frequently than accepted.
- Brigade commander briefed all battalions training plans at division/post level session.
- Like clockwork!
- Were conducted, but senior leaders did not really understand their purpose.
- Great program!
- This is a first rate opportunity which my senior rater (CG) as well as ADCS & post staff always attended. A-Plus.

Question 45


Did your unit attain standards concerning the frequency of individual marksmanship training?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always
6. Not applicable

Analysis (Q. 45)

Although 89% frequently or almost always attained standards concerning the FREQUENCY of individual marksmanship training, comments indicate facilities and ammunition were a constant problem.

Statistical Data (Q. 45)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Never	1	1	0.3	0.3	0.3
Seldom	2	8	2.6	2.7	3.0
Sometimes	3	14	4.6	4.7	7.7
Frequently	4	43	14.2	14.3	22.0
Almost Always	5	226	74.8	75.3	97.3
N/A	6	8	2.6	2.7	100.0
	.	2	0.7	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.697	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	0.748	Maximum	6.000	Missing Cases	2

Survey Comments (Q. 45)

- We were always able to obtain additional ammo. Fired constantly.
- This required maximum effort at all levels of command & could not have happened w/o the total support & special emphasis placed on this by my CSM & NCO's.
- Ammunition availability for .45 cal and M203 were the only inhibitors.
- Ranges were not available in the MILCON to support Army standards.
- Fired more frequently than required.
- The cost/work load on individual soldier was high; we spent/wasted hundreds of hours wrestling with the ammo system and lack of ranges.
- But it took lots of work and lots of practice firing beyond normal marksmanship training.
- Medics exceeded Div and Corps standards on the average.
- We paid a lot of attention to weapon qualification.
- (Almost always) But tough.
- Cal 50 qualification and 40mm grenades were a constant problem.
- Almost always—Except for .38 cal pistol due to non-availability of ammunition.

- Meeting night fire requirements was real tough. Never met requirements for snipers.
- USAREUR requirements could not be met due to lack of facilities.
- Non-divisional units in FRG. Sometimes had trouble scheduling Ranger.
- Almost always—but an FSB needs to be able to train more crew served weapons teams, Dragons, TOWs, etc.

Question 46


How frequently did you require your units to conduct physical training (per week)?

1. <3 times
2. 3 times
3. 4 times
4. 5 times

Analysis (Q. 46)

91% of the Commanders conducted physical training three or more times a week, with 30% conducting it five times a week. Of the 30%, almost one-half are Combat Arms battalions.

Statistical Data (Q. 46)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
<3 per Week	1	11	3.6	3.8	3.8
3 per Week	2	114	37.7	39.9	43.7
4 per Week	3	69	22.8	24.1	67.8
5 per Week	4	92	30.5	32.2	100.0
.	.	16	5.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.846	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	286
Standard Deviation	0.924	Maximum	4.000	Missing Cases	16

Survey Comments (Q. 46)

- Remedial PT did 6x.
- Two of my companies performed PT 5 days a week.
- Initially four times per week—new CG restricted PT to 3 times per week (M,W,F)—couldn't have formations before 0730 on Tuesdays. Thursdays were SGT's training time (AM) and family time (PM).
- Physical training is training; needs to be required for all AC units 5 days a week.
- Five in garrison and 7 days a week in the field.
- I required 3 days per week—in reality units did it 5 days per week.
- PT 3 times per week & organized sports 2 times per week.
- Four days with squad and platoon level exercises and ability group runs. One day available for troop run or athletic event. One squad run per quarter. Master fitness trainer in each troop.
- Three times weekly for all; five times weekly for remedial PT and overweight personnel.
- 3 times—with sports on other 2 days; battalion run every other week.
- 6 days a week.
- Trainees are required to have PT 5 days a week; other cadre were required PT 3 days/week.

Question 47


How long was the normal garrison unit training day?

1. Less than 8 hours
2. 8-9 hours
3. 10-11 hours
4. 12 hours
5. Greater than 12 hours

Analysis (Q. 47)


90% worked between an 8-12 hour day, with the majority (51%) working 10-11 hours a day. Of the 20 battalions that worked more than a 12 hour day, 42% were combat arms. Additionally, 14 of the 20 battalions were located in CONUS. Comments reflect this is a difficult area to quantify due to extreme variations based on mission requirements.


Statistical Data (Q. 47)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
<8 Hours	1	10	3.3	3.3	3.3
8-9 Hours	2	89	29.5	29.8	33.1
10-11 Hours	3	155	51.3	51.8	84.9
12 Hours	4	25	8.3	8.4	93.3
>12 Hours	5	20	6.6	6.7	100.0
.	.	3	1.0	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.853	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	299
Standard Deviation	0.874	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	3





Survey Comments (Q. 47)

- 0630 PT, 1630 last formation (1130-1300 lunch).
- 10-12 hrs for soldiers & 12 or more hrs/day for officers.
- CBT units were 8 hrs or less. My unit, being a CSS unit, was forced into longer days due mostly to customer maintenance/CL IX warehouse operations.
- 0630-1630hrs.
- Define normal—I shot for 8-9 hrs but many factors affected it. It ranged from 8-12 hrs and sometimes surged to 12+ hrs.
- Prep time & PT/meals added 3hrs so 0630-1630 was the length of the day. Training occurred 0830-1130 & 1330-1630.
- 0630-1630.
- 0600-1700 on PT days and 0730-1700 on non-PT days.
- 12 hours plus weekends on aircraft maintenance.
- There was no normal training day—we worked on aircraft all the time, 7 days a week, if we had the parts! If we didn't have parts, we took them off other aircraft to survive.
- 12 for the majority of the battalion (FSB, Mech Div); more than 12 for the maintenance company and the battalion staff.
- I commanded a theater transportation battalion. My soldiers drove over 12.5 million miles during my command tour. Missions covered a 250,000+ square mile area. Soldiers drove 365 days a year—24 hours a day. Realizing the extraordinary mission requirements and safety considerations, work days varied considerably in length.
- Troops worked 12 hrs per day plus many weekends due to inadequate TO&E personnel authorizations for Apache (AH-64) maintenance positions.
- Unless we had 02 jobs with parts, then it was until the mission was done. Remember our mission = training, in an FSB.

Question 48


Your unit had a sufficient number of training days available to it.

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neutral
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree

Analysis (Q. 48)



68% agreed or strongly agreed there were a sufficient number of training days available, especially if you planned well and took advantage of all opportunities. Of the 66 battalions that indicated there were not sufficient training days, 42 % were combat arms. EAC battalions indicated the least problem with the number of training days.

Statistical Data (Q. 48)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	12	4.0	4.0	4.0
Disagree	2	56	18.5	18.8	22.8
Neutral	3	23	7.6	7.7	30.5
Agree	4	155	51.3	52.0	82.6
Strongly Agree	5	52	17.2	17.4	100.0
.	.	4	1.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	

Mean	3.601	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	298
Standard Deviation	1.100	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	4



Survey Comments (Q. 48)

- The Brigade Task Force in the NTC window got all resources. Meant the units "not in the window" went several months without good collective training.
- Depended on the year. Only Green Cycle was productive. Some years that's 25 weeks, some years 13 weeks.
- The tasking cycle made it tough; but everything was doable if you thought about it and took advantage of opportunity.
- We could always use more, of course!
- Agree—only because we worked weekends and extraordinary hours to make do.

- Very seldom was I given time to plan and execute my own training plan. We stayed in a reaction mode most of the time.
- Training POI was too short.
- SGTs time weekly, dedicated 5 hrs per week for training.
- CSS units are constrained in training days due to mission support requirements. Never enough time.
- "Training Days" was not the problem; rather "Training Nights." Night vision goggle proficiency in USAREUR, given the constrictions of when and where to fly, is difficult to achieve.

Question 49


Newly arrived soldiers had basic mastery of soldier skills.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree


Analysis (Q. 49)

Only 59% agreed or strongly agreed that newly arrived soldiers had a basic mastery of soldier skills. Of the 23.5% (69 battalions) that disagreed or strongly disagreed, 8.5% were combat arms, 6.5% combat support, 6.1% combat service support, and 2.4% other types. Marksmanship, NBC, and decontamination training were highlighted in the comments as weak areas.

Statistical Data (Q. 49)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	12	4.0	4.0	4.0
Disagree	2	57	18.9	19.1	23.2
Neutral	3	52	17.2	17.4	40.6
Agree	4	165	54.6	55.4	96.0
Strongly Agree	5	12	4.0	4.0	100.0
.	.	4	1.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.362	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	298
Standard Deviation	0.969	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	4



Survey Comments (Q. 49)

- Varied widely.
- European soldiers are better trained than CONUS soldiers who join a unit; If soldiers come from units just completing an NTC rotation, they are better trained than non-NTC rotation soldiers.
- Soldiers are particularly weak in marksmanship skills.
- They came prepared to do their job; basic field craft and survival/combat skills were extremely weak to nonexistent.
- Mechanics weak in experience and use of manual; crew chiefs need training.
- Lacked knowledge in field crafts.
- Retention of common tasks between Basic Training and arrival was not good; no practice in AIT for most loggies.
- Soldier skills were OK, but MOS skills were inadequate; they were not competent journeymen at their MOS skills.
- I was in AIT, those from Basic and DLI lacked soldier skills—couldn't march—do any of the basic soldier manual tasks.
- OSUT soldiers yes, USAREUR soldiers no.
- All lacking PMI, 22-5, and NBC skills.
- Particularly weak in NBC defense and decon training.

Question 50


Newly arrived soldiers were trained to standard in their MOS related skills.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree


Analysis (Q. 50)

Only 41% agreed or strongly agreed newly arrived soldiers were trained to standard in their MOS skills. A surprising 35% disagreed or strongly disagreed. The majority of those disagreeing were combat arms (15%) followed by CSS (10%), CS (9.6%), and Other (1%). DLI graduates, CMFs 63, 68J, and 76C were highlighted as problem areas.

Statistical Data (Q. 50)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	15	5.0	5.1	5.1
Disagree	2	90	29.8	30.6	35.7
Neutral	3	66	21.9	22.4	58.2
Agree	4	114	37.7	38.8	96.9
Strongly Agree	5	9	3.0	3.1	100.0
.	.	8	2.6	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.041	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	294
Standard Deviation	1.011	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	8



Survey Comments (Q. 50)

- Varied widely.
- School standards did not meet tactical unit standards.
- They were typically the ones to fail the PT tests and not to be ready for the field.
- DLI still graduates too many intelligence soldiers short of a 2/2 language proficiency.
- CMF 63 field—400+ tasks for a tank mechanic; trained on about 75-100 upon arrival.
- Especially deficient in marksmanship training.
- Academy of Health Sciences only familiarizes soldiers on certain skills.
- Nearly all CS and CSS soldiers required extensive unit level training and close supervision to bring them up to minimal standards of individual proficiency.
- Trained yes; disciplined/attentive, no.
- Depending upon the training philosophy at USAMPS the soldiers were either trained in MOS specific (law enforcement) or soldier (combat MP) skills. It's really tough to master both in the short time of AIT. We worked to strengthen both skills.
- Armor crewman/HEMETT operators/clerks/mechanics, in short, everyone needs more hands on before arriving in units. Maintenance training at AIT must be non-existent.
- For the most part, I think training base does fine—decay of skills & depth of training are real problems.
- They arrived as good apprentice (aviation) mechanics.
- They were trained in the skills the schools said they would train, but did not have mastery of all skill level 1 tasks required.
- 76Cs historically were not trained to standard. 90% failed to attain 70% at the on post PLL Clerk final exam.
- Disagree—Not enough hands on or battle drills. Need more system commander tending.
- Apache armament personnel (68J) not ready to work on all systems related to MOS.

- Barely competent.

Question 51


The NCO Corps had sufficient knowledge and ability to carry out its training responsibilities.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree


Analysis (Q. 51)

74% agreed or strongly agreed the NCO Corps had sufficient knowledge and ability to carry out training responsibilities. Of the 18.2% (54 battalions) that disagreed or strongly disagreed, 7.1% were CA, 4.8% CS, 5.4 % CSS, and 1% Other.

Statistical Data (Q. 51)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	8	2.6	2.7	2.7
Disagree	2	46	15.2	15.3	18.0
Neutral	3	21	7.0	7.0	25.0
Agree	4	195	64.6	65.0	90.0
Strongly Agree	5	30	9.9	10.0	100.0
.		2	0.7	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.643	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	0.948	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	2



Survey Comments (Q. 51)

- Most were willing, they just were not used to being held to standards. Varied widely.
- Improving but still has a way to go. CMD emphasis. Far better than 10 years ago.
- Generally, yes, however there was a lot of initiative and or time that distracted them from their training responsibilities. Not at the SGT level. SSG was the key rank, but only was effective if they had a motivated SFC over them.
- Not initially.
- Far too many NCO's were sent to Korea to punch a "troop" ticket. Often they came from extended tours in a TRADOC school or recruiting command and had to be retrained prior to them being an effective leader. Most often they were at the Plt /Sqd level. Unfortunately, most returned to their TRADOC school upon completion of the short tour.
- The successful NCO's were the ones who wanted more responsibility—gladly gave it to them and held them accountable.
- Midgrade NCO's were generally weak & tried to lead through "brute strength". Perception: they are intimidated by a better educated enlisted & junior NCO Corps.
- Only after serious effort to change attitude toward training (mission versus training syndrome).
- NCOs, especially SGT and SSG, lacked knowledge to prepare and execute effective performance-oriented training; generally did not know the training status of their soldiers.
- MI NCOs, the worse off for some reason—usually field station types.
- The problem was not in the NCO Corps, but in the officer Corps—in particular, the chain of command and its concern with numbers.
- With considerable coaching and preparation time.
- Had the knowledge—lacked the skills to train.
- NCOs/Jr. Officers indoctrination concerning training (via FM25-101) at branch school is woefully inadequate/nonexistent.
- AG Branch must review training, standards, and leadership roles of NCOs.

- The senior NCOs were better. The junior NCOs always needed additional counseling.
- Knowledge was probably there. But lack of time and people made it impossible to have control of the situation. I've seen one E7 PLT SGT with five UH-60 helicopters to fly/maintain and only one crew chief.
- Senior NCOs generally lack motivational skills and "inspiring" enthusiasm.
- Disagree—NCOs don't understand system employment nor their responsibility for conducting, planning and directing team or small unit training.
- Disagree. But there are some great NCOs who did most of NCO work.
- We pushed NCOs running the battalion. It was high risk, but it was pure gold.

Question 52


The Junior Officer Corps had sufficient skills and overall professional knowledge to carry out its training responsibilities.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 52)

75% agreed or strongly agreed the Junior Officer Corps had the skills and knowledge to carry out training responsibilities. Some weaknesses in technical skills were highlighted in the comments. Aviation lieutenant training identified as broken.

Statistical Data (Q. 52)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	5	1.7	1.7	1.7
Disagree	2	40	13.2	13.3	15.0
Neutral	3	31	10.3	10.3	25.2
Agree	4	197	65.2	65.4	90.7
Strongly Agree	5	28	9.3	9.3	100.0
.	.	<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.674	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.880	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 52)

- Tremendous young officers.
- Basic knowledge. Required extensive train up into NATO/SACEUR missions not taught in TRADOC.
- Some do not—and have or will be discharged; As in everything, some do better than others; Senior officers must help, guide, supervise the way it should be done.
- Much better than I was.
- Weakest at planning realistic training and supervising execution by NCOs.
- Leadership skills vary; technical skills take time on the job.
- With considerable coaching and preparation time.
- Needed more operational training; knew theory, not practical/field skills.
- Armor Lieutenants did not know the basic parts of a tank. The tank is a weapon—assy/disassy of the tank is therefore a critical skill. They're taught how to maneuver but not the technical skills.
- Land nav was weak.
- High on enthusiasm and willingness. Unprepared to execute. Did not know 25-101.
- Aviation lieutenant training is broken—I think Ft Rucker is trying to address the problem.
- Minority officers from predominantly black colleges were not prepared as leaders, as officers.
- Some did; others did not. Many junior officers acquired the knowledge themselves as they were trained by their company commander, 1SG, and PLT SGT.
- Agree—Need more hands on training at school in battle drills and system installations.
- Very satisfied with command experience; very high caliber NCOs and company grade officers.
- Except basic combat skills.

Question 53


The Junior Officer Corps was sufficiently grounded in doctrinal unit operations.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 53)

Only 46% agreed or strongly agreed Junior Officers were sufficiently grounded in unit doctrine, with 53% being neutral to strongly disagreeing. Of the 31% (92 battalions) disagreeing or strongly disagreeing, 12.6% were CA, 7.8% CS, 8.8% CSS, and 2% Other. Comments highlighted various deficiencies, but most indicated that after a major exercise or FTX, most of the Junior Officers were much better qualified. Schools need to do a better job of preparing officers for the challenges to confront them.

Statistical Data (Q. 53)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	8	2.6	2.7	2.7
Disagree	2	85	28.1	28.5	31.2
Neutral	3	67	22.2	22.5	53.7
Agree	4	125	41.4	41.9	95.6
Strongly Agree	5	13	4.3	4.4	100.0
.	.	4	1.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.168	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	298
Standard Deviation	0.981	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	4

Survey Comments (Q. 53)

- Acceptable level. Required most of ODP classes to upgrade.
- Knew mechanics of the system but not how to apply it and function in the NATO/tactical environment.
- An area that needs work at our service schools.
- Yes, and we used this as a basis for building ODP.
- We had to start from virtually scratch on mech opns at Co level and above.
- Application of doctrine is their one weakness.
- Do not understand practical/field art.
- Avn branch does not prepare LTs properly for the challenges about to confront them; the emphasis is on flying's administrative procedures.
- Junior Officers were of a very high quality; they may have lacked technical expertise early on, but motivation and great attitudes fixed that early.
- Have to be trained.
- After one major exercise they were.
- ALB, but not light infantry ops of ALB.
- None of my junior officers (O1-O3) had experiences with signal battalion operations in division or Corps.
- The best I've seen!
- Platoon leaders were not even taught how to do an aircrew mission briefing at Ft Rucker.
- If junior officers can't meet higher standards in Basic Courses—don't let them get commissioned.
- It usually took at least one FTX.
- Strongly disagree—School has not published a doctrine for EAC units.
- Little or no knowledge in Cavalry operations.
- Except basic combat skills.
- Insufficient doctrinal foundation in light infantry—too much mech!

Question 54


The Leavenworth portion of PCC provided an adequate “non-branch peculiar” background prior to your assumption of command. (Please discuss specific strengths or weaknesses in the comment section)

- 1. Strongly disagree**
- 2. Disagree**
- 3. Neutral**
- 4. Agree**
- 5. Strongly agree**

Analysis (Q. 54)

Although only 9% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the Leavenworth portion of PCC being adequate, the extremely large and wide-ranging number of written comments indicate strong feelings, both pro and con, regarding the course.

Statistical Data (Q. 54)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	7	2.3	2.3	2.3
Disagree	2	19	6.3	6.4	8.7
Neutral	3	62	20.5	20.7	29.4
Agree	4	194	64.2	64.9	94.3
Strongly Agree	5	17	5.6	5.7	100.0
.	.	3	1.0	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.652	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	299
Standard Deviation	0.781	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	3

Survey Comments (Q. 54)

- Great to be alone with wife. Not a great deal of help. Some but not much. Attended prior to TCDC. Heard many good comments @ TCDC.
- As CSS commander would have liked more training time discussions devoted to how to train with limited time (i.e., perform daily mission).
- It is definitely a worthwhile program. I just don't remember what or how often I specifically applied what was presented there.
- PCC excellent. Leavenworth phase needs more for wives on family support. I went through in 1988.
- Leavenworth PCC was very valuable, but I would have preferred to know less of Pentagon "In-Boxes" and more about life in a battalion.
- Too much warfighter focus.
- Above all, the information presented gave each of us freedom to put our thoughts about command in our own perspective.
- Leavenworth PCC was lecture mode with little application. Strong point was CSA guidance. Strength also for spouse orientation. Too long ago to remember!

- I remember very little about the Leavenworth PCC. However, the emphasis in bringing in heavy hitter speakers was good. The legal (UCMJ, etc.) presentation was exceptional.
- PCC was a gentleman's course which exposed us to the senior leaders' thoughts and gave us time to contemplate how we would do business. It didn't do much else nor should it.
- Leavenworth PCC could be dispensed with; nothing inspiring, nothing insightful—kind of felt like senior leaders just "had to see us off," like escorting your child to the first day of school.
- There needs to be more emphasis placed on the family and soldier support areas; the shortage of chaplains requires that commanders and spouses be able to handle the myriad of issues that soldiers and their families will encounter during an overseas tour.
- Good pump up—legal, philosophy of command; CSA was best part.
- PCC was an orientation class, but important in changing gears from being a staff officer to a commander.
- That two weeks was a waste; 99% of the guest speakers told us how great they were and what they did; they did not talk about Bn/Bde command.
- Non-branch peculiar PCC was good; would like more country unique training for OCONUS commanders; new concepts like "industrial fund" need more emphasis.
- Legal instruction was by far the most beneficial; guidance from the CofS was good (hearing it from the top); most of the rest could have been done with handouts/manuals.
- PCC did not teach anything new but did validate values and provide good refresher; senior leader talks and talking to the COLs in the class was extremely valuable to me.
- A great time to ask questions and pursue current events.
- Strong on interaction with other commanders, but weak on medical and legal orientations.
- Of particular value was (a) dealing with CSM and using NCOs effectively and (b) encouragement to publish a command philosophy (great advice).
- Leavenworth was a nice social event; guest speakers gave the party line—they need to unblouse their boots.
- Additional emphasis needs to be placed on UCMJ and logistics.
- I went to the two week course; well worth the money spent; especially beneficial to the spouses; it made the command team come to life.
- Good update on major Army issues; family support groups/command team training was superb—best part of the training.
- Need a "How To Smart Book" course not deputy high rollers blowing smoke up my ass about being hand-picked; my nose is hand-picked, but I don't brag about it.
- It was on target.
- Problem is that the lowest common denominator is the CSS guy, who hasn't been with troops in ten years and hasn't a clue what has occurred in his profession.
- Weakness—need to include Bde CDRs in overall scenario play—when I went thru, they did not attend the Training DEV Portion!

- 3 years ago guys. But I do remember it was a weak program. Maybe a function of having been with troops for immediately preceding 4 years.
- I could have used more time on how to use your CSM. Instead of bringing in 1 CSM to talk to class, bring in several to discuss their roles. I finally caught on but I allowed a weak CSM to get over while a super CSM taught me what a CSM should do.
- The FSG Program briefings/exercises were excellent. The personality profiles—presentation at US Army War College should be used as a model. Presentations by “key leaders” need to be more open and on an informal non-attribution basis. We need more insight into the decision making process and factors affecting the future of the Army, not just briefing on the Army’s published policies.
- Most important to me from the Leavenworth PCC was exposure to senior Army commanders in free discussions. I gained perspective and understood better some of the challenges I would face in command. I don’t remember most of the “platform” pitches...they couldn’t have had much impact. Simulation wargaming was good—tended to emphasize what was in vogue at the time—IPB and checklist synchronization of the staff.
- Great prep for CMD.
- I attended Leavenworth PCC in April 89. Light infantry ops received zero attention/comment, yet at least 5 CDRs were preparing to take CMD of light or ABN Bns. No lessons learned from JRTC were provided, yet at least two hours worth of NTC was discussed. I was extremely disappointed. Spouse integration was poor to nonexistent.
- Strengths—IG, Leadership, Training, Chief’s perspective, & Myers-Briggs. Weaknesses—Log/Maint.
- Too many “this is how I commanded briefings” from general officers.
- Of all the PCC elements, the senior officer legal orientation (SOLO) conducted at the JAG school was most useful.
- Strengths: refresher of UCMJ, USR reporting, training, and general updates.
- I felt it was nothing more than a 5 day review packed into 10 days.
- You don’t learn how to command in a classroom!
- Portions of the PCC have been improved. The attempt at Combined Arms synchronization was futile and a waste of time. TCDC now fills that void. Some time should be spent on fiscal management. In the tough times ahead it will be an increasingly important player. I feel I was effective in budget management (and able to justify additional funds) solely because I was a Brigade XO for 2 years prior to assumption of command in the same division; I knew the system.
- PCC was o.k.—but don’t separate the spouses—let the spouse “listen” to what the commander designee hears—will help understanding.
- If you don’t have leadership by this time, no PCC will teach it. PCC, I believe, was not needed.
- Heavy emphasis on combat arms, but little of a useful nature for CS/CSS units. Guest speakers pitched their lectures at DA/DOD level not at Bde/Div levels.
- Although the PCC did not relate directly to my command, I think it was a great way to round us out as professionals. It gave us the most up-to-date information from the DA staff level. I guess, in effect, it indirectly applied to us as commanders. I think that it is absolutely fantastic that the CSA would take

time out of his busy schedule every month to speak at PCCs. That meant a lot to all of us and shows the priority the CSA placed on the program I hope General Sullivan continues.

- Excellent organizational effectiveness training for family support program.
- Hearing guidance and policy from the CSA and DA staff was essential.
- PCC at Leavenworth exposed commanders to the same roadmap that the senior leadership was working from.
- It was not specific enough, e.g., the DCSPER didn't discuss senior rater profile formulation, he just said how important the profile is.
- The overall strength of both phases of PCC was the time spent allowed me the opportunity to get away from the present duty and begin focusing on taking command. Of particular note was the family support group seminar and the guest speaker program.
- PCC was not long enough to deal with hard issues faced in command, i.e., family care plans, deployment, human relations, mentoring subordinates (and art form that we do not do well).
- When I went to Leavenworth PCC, they were planning to add one week of wargaming for combat and combat support commanders. As a combat service support logistician, I believe that all members of the team should play exercises and contribute and learn. Most combat commanders at battalion and company level do not understand logistic operations.
- Best part—CSA's own presentation on his imperatives; no filters, no additions!
- TCDC excellent—needed CSS players.
- Need more specificity on Family Support Programs, including structures, conducting meetings, "cookbook," SOPs, building cohesion, based on Desert Storm. Need more specifics on inprocessing soldiers with regard to family preparation for deployments. Need heavy discussion on OER management, including what to avoid or do to prevent unintentionally ruining a young officer's career.
- PCC at Leavenworth was passive learning...6 hrs of sitting and listening. General Thurman added a tactics block that gets great reviews. Never took advantage of tremendous talent gathered in a seminar format to discuss anything (e.g., taking command, leadership, ethics, NTC/JRTC, logistics, etc.).
- Agree—especially philosophies of command.
- PCC (both phases) provide very little in practical preparation for command. The phase at Leavenworth was generic and gave a broad overview. The branch phase was a waste of time and money. No effort to preparing commanders for their type commands. (I believe it has improved since I went through).
- The Leavenworth portion of PCC was outstanding; it was good refresher & should be continued at all costs.
- Made us step back & look at the bigger picture.
- The Leavenworth portion of PCC provided some insight to issues above battalion level; however, this did little to influence how I commanded.
- As I remember, PCC was an excellent refresher.
- I thought the "command team" approach with the wives was wrong. They are not a part of a command team. Some O5/O6 wives came away thinking they were O5s/O6s.

- I fear that LIC will take a back seat to MIC as a result of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Army and JCS need to further develop doctrine for LIC and operations short of war. The ROE implications in LIC are awesome.
- All mech-oriented discussions. Little LIC and operations short of war. I assumed command in Panama during Operation Nimrod Dancer.
- I commanded a TDA HQ/Garrison battalion. I was required to attend TCDC because I was a combat arms officer even though I had no combat TO&E mission. I did have a TO&E MP company assigned but TCDC was overkill for that unit.

Question 55


The "branch peculiar" portion of PCC provided an adequate preparation for command. (Please discuss specific strengths or weaknesses in the comment section)

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree


Analysis (Q. 55)

Over 67% agreed or strongly agreed that Branch PCC was adequate. Of the 14% (40 battalions) that disagreed or strongly disagreed, the largest percent was CSS (5.9%), followed by CS (3.1%), CA (2.7%), and Other (2.1%). However, the large and wide-ranging number of written comments indicate strong feelings, both pro and con, regarding the quality of the course.

Statistical Data (Q. 55)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	9	3.0	3.0	3.0
Disagree	2	34	11.3	11.5	14.5
Neutral	3	54	17.9	18.2	32.8
Agree	4	166	55.0	56.1	88.9
Strongly Agree	5	33	10.9	11.1	100.0
.	.	6	2.0	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.608	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	296
Standard Deviation	0.936	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	6



Survey Comments (Q. 55)

- Waste of time. Completely restructured since I attended.
- Chief of FA school spent 3 hours discussing successful leadership techniques—this was most helpful.
- Ft Sill portion for artillery was perfect. Could use more NTC/Desert Storm type scenarios at both courses.
- Too much on branch update. Not enough command problems.
- Strength was flexibility to design PCC around weaknesses. Weakness was insufficient threat specific study and availability of threat analysis to provide answers.
- I attended the multi-functional PCC at Ft. Lee, Va. It was adequate to reacquaint me with CSS doctrine, etc. One thing that each attendee thought was great was bringing in former Co CDR's (out of Adv Class) to talk from Co CDR's view of leadership styles and relationships with Bn CDR, staff officers, NCO's, CSM. Branch PCC was too long. They brought us to Ft. Lee for ten days.

- Ft Sill PCC was great; allowed time to focus on areas that needed to be emphasized on individual basis.
- Branch provided important focus on mission and most current info on branch status, direction, etc.
- Some good handouts, but PCC changes nothing concerning preparation for command.
- Too much of the PCC program was devoted to doctrine and tactics.
- Benning was excellent.
- Unit particulars need more emphasis; for example, automation use, budgeting process, training constraints, host country problems were skimmed over making command transition a rough road.
- Typical 1 week crammed into 3; exchange with other students and branch leadership was most beneficial.
- Best part was talking to current LTC commanders.
- The Signal Center did a respectable job.
- More emphasis needs to be placed on equipment maintenance.
- Glad I'd been in a light division and was going to a light division.
- In general the 'branch peculiar' portion of PCC tried to cover too much in breadth and not enough in depth. Reduce the topics to the truly critical ones and spend more time with them. Need more involvement with the branch senior leaders.
- I felt it was important to touch base at my branch center. I appreciated exposure to entry training so that I knew what I could expect in the way of soldier skills from the young officers and enlisted soldiers. Also, I appreciated the views of the branch chief on the direction in which my branch was evolving. Professional development and counselling were more informed and hopefully better for my officers and NCOs because of this experience. My "equipment" experience was current, but for some who were with me the opportunity to lay hands on equipment again was obviously important.
- PCC at branch school longer than needed.
- I felt the logistical portion was the same material that was pitched at the advanced course, not sufficient to the task of preparing upcoming Bn CDRs. I think it would have been beneficial to get a briefing and overview of BNCOB/ANCOB/IOBC/AOBC on what's taught and what to expect from graduates.
- As a Forward Support Battalion Command designee, I attended the Ordnance, Transportation, and supply/services branch peculiar portions for my PCC. Sorely missing, and much needed, was a medical branch portion. As a Forward Support Battalion, I have an organic Medical Company. I received a 4 hour block of what we called medical updates, but was really a waste of time. PCC for Forward and Main Support Battalion designees must include a 2 to 3 day visit to Health Services Command. Topics of discussion should include organizational changes, doctrinal changes, current issues/concerns, etc. Learning medical support doctrine was my greatest challenge prior to assuming command. "Bottom Line"—Health Services needs to get into the PCC arena.
- 1989 Aviation at Rucker did well on tactics, especially combined arms; poor in maintenance. Knox—poor maintenance, good tactics and combined arms.
- The emphasis on warfighting, MTPs, etc., was very well done at Fort Benning.

- Branch PCC (SF) consisted of 1 week tag-along with Infantry and 1 week at Special Warfare Center (SWC). SWC portion consisted of a lot of briefings on what the school did. Needed a practical exercise in establishment and operation of the Forward Operating Base (FOB) to include OPCEN, SIGCEN, SUPCEN. Also helpful would have been more discussion on constraints and limitations for deployments, on resources, and on area orientations.
- Pre-Command courses at Leavenworth and Rucker were great!
- Special Forces Branch needs to revamp and improve—it was terrible.
- PCC at Logistics Center (CASCOC) was weak in '88. From what I am told now, by PCC attendees, it still is. It really needs work.
- The branch material portion did not help me as much as I thought it would. The orientation was more logistical in content.
- Strongly agree—especially training management.
- Good update on equipment fielding schedules (that never materialized) and doctrine. Was more beneficial than the Leavenworth phase.
- Branch PCC was a good update on the branch.
- Enjoyed it but it could be dropped without detriment.
- Knox had good balance of maintenance, operations, and hardware—SIMNET excellent.
- Emphasis at Fort Gordon was on tactical signal support, which bore no impact on my battalion assignment that had a 24 hr a day fixed communications mission.
- Branch PCC was not that great—primarily because there is such a diversity of commands and missions within the AG Corps that it is extremely difficult to put together a course which meets the needs of all attendees. Would be more beneficial if designees of like-type units were grouped to attend together.
- Fort Jackson had an excellent course to prepare battalion commanders for training battalions. Covered every aspect in great detail.
- AG Branch needs to focus PCC training; what, specifically, do they want us to know?
- Weapon peculiar training (FA) tactics.
- I was in the first class offered by this school (Finance). I hope they've improved over time.
- Good CG/current commander (O6 & O5) uninvolvement.
- Coming from TOE unit (specifically the same as I was going to command) I was tactically well prepared. My branch portion of PCC has little value.
- Did not attend branch portion of PCC—systems deficiency; my loss. Attended Leavenworth phase prior to both commands.
- Very good branch update needed to know more about resource material.
- At the time I went through in 1986 it seemed as if schools did not understand tactical logistics—FSB/MSB.

Question 56


Company grade officers understood organizational structure and relationships.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 56)

Although 83% agreed or strongly agreed company grade officers understood organizational structure and relationships, the comments emphasized that their understanding was limited to company level and below. It took quite a while for them to understand how battalion and above fit into the scheme of things. Of the few that disagreed, CA had the most with 11 battalions or 3.6% of the overall total.

Statistical Data (Q. 56)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	3	1.0	1.0	1.0
Disagree	2	22	7.3	7.3	8.3
Neutral	3	27	8.9	9.0	17.3
Agree	4	221	73.2	73.4	90.7
Strongly Agree	5	28	9.3	9.3	100.0
.	.	1	0.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.827	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.733	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 56)

- Battalions need to have prior battery commanders assigned to Bn staff; Bns have too many inexperienced LTs.
- It took 6-10 months to fully understand how the whole battalion fit into brigade/division scheme of things.
- Only at Plt level and below.
- Have to be trained.
- Company grade officers are taught about company level at basic & advanced courses. I needed trained staff officers & CDRs who understood staff ops. CAS³ comes too late to help Bns. When CPT arrives trained to command a company, before he commands he goes on the staff so I can evaluate him. By the time I get him to CAS³ he has been on post a year or more. Then he commands—now he is really ready for the staff, but of course is reassigned to recruiting command, ROTC, or readiness group. You figure it out!
- They understand battalion and below. Division level—they haven't a clue.

Question 57


The command climate on your post was satisfactory.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 57)

A strong percentage (84%) indicated a satisfactory command climate on post. However, specific comments clearly detail some extreme problems were encountered by some Battalion Cdrs.

Statistical Data (Q. 57)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	10	3.3	3.3	3.3
Disagree	2	20	6.6	6.6	10.0
Neutral	3	17	5.6	5.6	15.6
Agree	4	138	45.7	45.8	61.5
Strongly Agree	5	116	38.4	38.5	100.0
.	.	<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.096	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	1.000	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 57)

- TREMENDOUS
- Excellent—Second half of command tour.
- Command climate super within the unit (e.g. Division). At Ft. Hood, the garrison staff did not respond at all to battalion commanders. We were an ignored group by the Post.
- Terrible command climate on Post and at Brigade level. Within Bn was terrific.
- The community had problems because of the lack of direction on community affairs, but on the subinstallation, everyone knew the rules.
- Extremely supportive from CG down. A non-threatening environment. Allowed to make mistakes. Not expected to exceed Army standards in anything.
- CG let commanders operate.
- Under one Div Cdr it was supportive, but oppressive under the next one.
- Div Cdr was cold, aloof, and unapproachable; DISCOM Cdr was a micro-manager; DISCOM Cdr's wife wore his eagles and was a terrorist.
- Bde Cdr was unsat.
- I worked for the best GO leader in the Army.
- Totally outstanding!
- Personality dependent.
- I served at Riley from 85-91 for 4 world class CGs, 2 world class ADCMs, and 3 of my brigade CDRs were all first rate. All of these officers had vision and tolerated honest mistakes. I would gladly work for any of them again.
- Strongly agree—with the exception of my brigade, where due to the brigade CDR the command climate was terrible!
- Support from and follow through by Post CDR was weak. Town meetings were a sham. Civilian heirarchy had the upper hand. Post CDR was sympathetic to soldiers needs but wouldn't take steps necessary to deliver.
- Division—outstanding. Brigade—neutral to disagree.
- Started well, but change of Division Commander weakened decentralized execution. Too much detail/specificity.
- It was great!
- LTC sub-community commander was unsatisfactory. Person was outside rating chain/chain-of-command; person's authority impacted on training; person's subperformance reflected on other officers and adversely impacted on the unit.

- With 1st boss yes, with 2d boss—terrible!
- My immediate boss for 15 months was an absolute ass. He was hated by all subordinates and disliked/mistrusted by peers. His superiors didn't take him seriously, but I had to. He only screamed—never mentored. His 3 battalion commanders were happy away from him and miserable in his presence or on the phone with him. I discussed him with him, his peers, and the deputy CG (not his rater or my senior rater). Things got better but not comfortable. I never left his presence with any dignity intact. His boss, (the CG) and my senior rater, was a great leader and gave me freedom to exercise command, but unfortunately he gave the same freedom to my boss. When he finally retired (with urging) my new boss and the CG established a superior command climate.

Question 58


The chain of command supported honest reporting.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 58)

88% agreed or strongly agreed the chain of command supported honest reporting, with 50% strongly agreeing. Most comments were very positive.

Statistical Data (Q. 58)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Disagree	2	14	4.6	4.7	6.0
Neutral	3	18	6.0	6.0	12.0
Agree	4	114	37.7	37.9	49.8
Strongly Agree	5	151	50.0	50.2	100.0
.	.	<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.309	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.880	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 58)

- Never was pressured to do anything illegal or unethical.
- Second half of command tour.
- An absolute!
- Could not have been better.
- Honesty that conflicted with Division programs or objectives was suicide.
- Excellent.
- It is my perception that only good news was rewarded; he who was silent on the bad news was the more successful because chances were the truth would not come to light.
- They insisted upon it.
- The good thing about light Infantry is that we don't inspect and distrust ourselves.
- I subjectively downgraded to C3 more than once. Each time I had to defend my decision; but each time I was sustained by the Bde CDR and CG.
- Especially the General Officers.
- Disagree—OERs—wouldn't call a spade a spade.
- My division commander was afraid to allow any subjective upgrading. My battalion had 7 wreckers of two types (6 & 1). When the (1) one wrecker was down, he considered the battalion C-4, even if it was the only wrecker down; and properly the unit should be C-2.
- Training, budget, maintenance—yes; but not from the community standpoint.

Question 59


You received honest assessments and reports from your soldiers.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 59)

93% believed they received honest assessments and reports from their soldiers.

Statistical Data (Q. 59)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	2	0.7	0.7	0.7
Disagree	2	5	1.7	1.7	2.3
Neutral	3	13	4.3	4.3	6.6
Agree	4	191	63.2	63.2	69.9
Strongly Agree	5	<u>91</u>	<u>30.1</u>	<u>30.1</u>	100.0
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.205	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	0.655	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	0

Survey Comments (Q. 59)

- We did quarterly soldier feedback forums (old rap sessions) with volunteers. Sometimes too honest.
- Not sure my behavior contributed to totally honest reports; in a winner/loser environment who wants to admit they are a loser.
- A problem, NCOs tell you what they think you want to hear. Hard to break.
- Hard to overcome basic unwillingness to report bad news early on. Very important to protect the bearer of the news and actively participate in programs to fix problems and build subordinates.

Question 60


The NCO Corps possessed satisfactory moral and ethical standards.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree


Analysis (Q. 60)

Responses ranging from neutral to strongly agree totaled 93%. Of the 20 battalions disagreeing or strongly disagreeing, 6 were CA, 6 CS, 5 CSS, and 3 Other. There were isolated cases of problems but overall the comments reflect the NCO Corps has satisfactory moral and ethical standards.

Statistical Data (Q. 60)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	3	1.0	1.0	1.0
Disagree	2	17	5.6	5.6	6.6
Neutral	3	38	12.6	12.6	19.3
Agree	4	205	67.9	68.1	87.4
Strongly Agree	5	38	12.6	12.6	100.0
.	.	<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.857	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.741	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1



Survey Comments (Q. 60)

- Isolated problems. Clearly exception rather than the rule. Much, much better than early years (and mid years) of my career.
- In Garrison, NCO's did not show enough concern for soldiers and their families.
- Except in personal behavior after hours. Too many DUI's, adultery, and spouse abuse incidents.
- Civilian standards accept things and conduct which is still unacceptable in the Army; Some NCOs do not understand why our Army standards cannot be loosened.
- A number of my male NCOs had problems maintaining a professional relationship with their female subordinates.
- Bn Cdr sets the climate.
- Great NCOs and dedicated but they came from the US social background.
- (Strongly agree) I had some weak people, everyone does, but by and large I believe the Army has good NCOs. Both of my CSMs believed if we had a problem it was at the E6 level.
- CSM spent majority of his time coaching problem NCOs which took valuable time away from tending to the full spectrum of soldier training and personal needs. Took too long to get rid of the "unfixable" problem ones.
- Most NCOs had no problems in their areas. However, I did have several cases of trainer abuse and sexual harassment.
- (Ethical issue) problem for the young E-5 making the transition to SGT/leader from being a buddy.
- Always someone bad on board—but basically the corps was honest and held solid value system.
- Agree, but: big problem making them understand that DUI would ruin their careers despite Art 15 and reduction in every case!
- They drank too much and could not even define ethics.
- Agree—obviously, there are exceptions.

- Required quarterly NCOPD classes to keep them that way.
- Korea is the ultimate test of moral character!
- The issue of pregnancy, unwed and single parents who wind up as non-deployable is a major problem! I did not deploy—I was the G3 for the Corps Support CMD. We deployed 9 of 11 battalions. I changed command 1 Aug 90. The battalion I commanded deployed. Some views: CSS units are separate reporting units down to company/detachment level. Our CSS Bns did not deploy as Bn but as separate companies. Captains had to fight their own battles overseas. Families were left without info on their spouses' unit. Bn CMDRs' wives left holding the bag—Major Problem—not yet talked about.
- I'm neutral on this one. Some had them, some didn't. Frequently, though, standards were situational—particularly the junior NCOs (E5-E6). E7s & E8s were generally better grounded. My overall impression was that the NCO Corps went whatever way the commander went, and this is wrong. If a commander has no morals or is unethical, his NCOs must stand up!
- Ok. But bankruptcy cases were on the rise. Perhaps high cost of living at Ft Ord contributed to it.

Question 61


The Officer Corps possessed satisfactory moral and ethical standards.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 61)

Overall 94% agreed or strongly agreed the Officer Corps possessed satisfactory moral and ethical standards. Comments indicate Junior Officers require mentoring on some specific issues. Problems with Senior Officers were also mentioned.

Statistical Data (Q. 61)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	3	1.0	1.0	1.0
Disagree	2	4	1.3	1.3	2.3
Neutral	3	11	3.6	3.6	6.0
Agree	4	210	69.5	69.5	75.5
Strongly Agree	5	<u>74</u>	<u>24.5</u>	<u>24.5</u>	100.0
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.152	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	0.634	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	0

Survey Comments (Q. 61)

- We may go overboard on honesty; I kicked out two for lying but "false" info from organization level is not punished.
- Generation gap on standards; junior officers saw no problem with enlisted/officer social relationships and that sort of thing.
- The only problem I had with young officers is that they did not like being held to a standard. Once they knew they would meet standards they did.
- Regarding officer moral & ethical standards I answered strong agree based on my Bn's officers ethics and values. But my personal opinion of those officers above me was quite low in this area. My brigade CDR had a 15-6 investigation conducted toward him for an alleged impropriety with a female LT. He was exonerated & finished his tour in SWA. Back at Ft Bragg he was asked to retire because of a similar allegation with the same female LT. This entire incident which went on over six plus months had an incredible negative impact on brigade morale and marred the brigade's performance in SWA.
- Agree—with the exception of my brigade CDR who had very flexible ethics.
- I'm still assessing this issue. Most did, but I saw the trend of careerism rise among junior officers.
- With the exception of junior logistics warrants: they have trouble transitioning professionally (not necessarily morally) from NCO status.
- I had one case in which 2 officers had a major failing in ethics and honesty.
- (We) need to be careful when dealing with moral & ethical standards. Other than those outlined in the UCMJ—one has to be careful he is not making judgements from the basis of personally held concepts about right or wrong—good or bad. In a multi-ethnic & cultural Army—what is moral and ethical is not so clearly defined.

Question 62


Drug/Alcohol use among junior enlisted soldiers was a significant problem.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree



Analysis (Q. 62)

Alcohol was a problem, not drugs, when there was a problem. 68% disagreed or strongly disagreed drugs/alcohol was a significant problem. Of the 22% (65 battalions) that agreed or strongly agreed alcohol WAS a problem for Junior EM, 11.1% were CA, 6% CS, 4.4% CSS, and .4% Other. Additionally, of this 22%, 10% were located in CONUS, 7% in Europe, 1.7% in Korea, 1.3% in Panama, and less than 1% in Alaska, Hawaii, and Other.

Statistical Data (Q. 62)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	55	18.2	18.3	18.3
Disagree	2	150	49.7	49.8	68.1
Neutral	3	29	9.6	9.6	77.7
Agree	4	60	19.9	19.9	97.7
Strongly Agree	5	7	2.3	2.3	100.0
.	.	1	0.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.382	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	1.069	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1



Survey Comments (Q. 62)

- Problems surfaced but not many. Alcohol actually caused more problems.
- This is a loaded question. You need to separate drugs & alcohol. Drugs—not statistically significant. Alcohol—Yes, very big problem.
- Alcohol more than drugs.
- Almost no drug problem. Alcohol was a problem. Averaged 1 DUI/DWI each month.
- Alcohol, but not drugs.
- Alcohol (DUI, disorderly conduct) only. No measurable drug problem at all. Represented 1-2% of the soldiers & NCO's.
- Although only 1-2% of my soldiers/NCO's had alcohol related problems, that constituted 90% of the disciplinary problems I experienced. DUI spouse abuse

and adultery (the latter two all committed by NCO's) all involved alcohol. Alcohol is not a significant problem in gross terms, but when one realizes that alcohol was present during nearly every single NCO offense and most enlisted offenses it becomes significant.

- Alcohol was the drug of choice. Isolated Post, soldiers turned to alcohol for recreation.
- Alcohol more than drugs.
- Alcohol, not drugs.
- Alcohol was the problem.
- Alcohol abuse was biggest disciplinary problem.
- More alcohol than drugs.
- Alcohol is becoming a problem for concern but is not significant.
- Alcohol among soldiers was greater than drugs.
- They showed great discipline in an environment (USARSO) where cheap drugs were readily available.
- No better/no worse than the rest of Army.
- (Disagree) I did have some DUI problems: but that age group is susceptible. Crushing punishment under UCMJ seemed to have little deterrent effect.
- Both drugs and alcohol.
- Alcohol caused me some concerns—not drugs though.
- Too much alcohol use generally.
- No drug problems in 24 months; minimal alcohol-related problems.
- Disagree—when it appeared, it had to be dealt with quickly. Very helpful to establish harsh policy early so troopers can use policy to beat off peer pressures that might exist.
- Alcohol was the problem.
- It was a problem, but not significant. Drugs more than alcohol.
- I had some DUIs—soldiers simply wouldn't heed warnings.

Question 63


Drug/Alcohol use among the NCO Corps was a significant problem.

- 1. Strongly disagree**
- 2. Disagree**
- 3. Neutral**
- 4. Agree**
- 5. Strongly agree**

Analysis (Q. 63)


Alcohol was the problem, not drugs, in the cases where there was a problem. 70% disagreed or strongly disagreed there was a problem. Of the 15% (45 battalions) that agreed or strongly agreed alcohol was a problem for NCOs, 8% were CA, 5.1% CS, 1.3% CSS, and .7% Other. The only "strongly agree" responses were from 4 combat arms battalions. Additionally, of this 15%, 7.4% were in CONUS, 5% in Europe, 1.3% in Korea, 1% in Panama, and .3% in Alaska and Hawaii.


Statistical Data (Q. 63)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	61	20.2	20.3	20.3
Disagree	2	151	50.0	50.2	70.4
Neutral	3	43	14.2	14.3	84.7
Agree	4	42	13.9	14.0	98.7
Strongly Agree	5	4	1.3	1.3	100.0
.	.	1	0.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	

Mean	2.259	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.979	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1





Survey Comments (Q. 63)

- Again, alcohol was greatest problem.
- Problem yes—but manageable.
- Some for alcohol.
- There were a few incidents among NCO's but small in comparison to the number of NCO's.
- Not among the NCO Corps overall, however there were cases that caused significant problem.
- Alcohol more than drugs.
- Alcohol, not drugs.
- Alcohol was the problem.
- Alcohol abuse was biggest disciplinary problem.
- Alcohol is becoming a problem for concern but is not significant.
- Alcohol—more DUIs among NCOs than junior enlisted.
- No better/no worse than the rest of Army.
- I don't like the way we treat NCOs/soldiers. Off post DUI always treated more stringently than on post DUI offenders with administrative actions or top of UCMJ.
- Mostly alcohol abuse, especially with mid to senior NCOs.
- Some problems with some NCOs. I would not classify it as significant, although it was more of a problem than junior enlisted or officer.
- 3 NCOs in 30 months received a DWI (2 off-post; 1 on-post).
- Junior NCOs have a problem with DUI.
- Alcohol was the problem here too. Less so than with EM.
- Too much alcohol use generally.
- Drugs weren't an issue. Some alcohol abuse which was identified and treated.
- I had several E5s & E8s with problems requiring counseling.
- Problem with E5s! They were worse than junior enlisted.

Question 64


Drug/Alcohol use among the officers was a significant problem.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 64)

96% disagreed or strongly disagreed that there was a problem. Only 3 battalions, all combat arms, agreed or strongly agreed this was a problem. All comments indicated only alcohol was involved.

Statistical Data (Q. 64)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	163	54.0	54.0	54.0
Disagree	2	126	41.7	41.7	95.7
Neutral	3	9	3.0	3.0	98.7
Agree	4	3	1.0	1.0	99.7
Strongly Agree	5	1	0.3	0.3	100.0
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.520	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	0.640	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	0

Survey Comments (Q. 64)

- I had one LT receive 2 DUIs. He was my best LT—real stud! I discharged him. SAD CASE.
- Alcohol more than drugs.
- Alcohol, not drugs.

- None.
- Virtually all problems encountered with my officers involved alcohol, i.e., DUIs, job performance, zipper problems and marriage difficulties.
- Still a problem. In 2 years, 2 officers were in incidents. Both led to GO (General Officer) Article 15s.
- No incidents in 24 months.
- One officer in 30 months received a DWI (off-post).

Question 65


How many times per month did you take UCMJ action?

1. 0-5
2. 6-10
3. 11-15
4. More than 15

Analysis (Q. 65)

96% indicated they took 10 or less UCMJ actions per month. Only 8 battalions indicated they took more than 10 UCMJ actions per month (CA-4, CSS-3, Other-1).

Statistical Data (Q. 65)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
0 to 5	1	256	84.8	85.6	85.6
6 to 10	2	35	11.6	11.7	97.3
1 to 15	3	6	2.0	2.0	99.3
>15	4	2	0.7	0.7	100.0
	.	3	1.0	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.177	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	299
Standard Deviation	0.476	Maximum	4.000	Missing Cases	3

Survey Comments (Q. 65)

- I averaged less than one Art 15 per month during my command. I court martialed one soldier during my command.
- 90+% of my UCMJ actions involved alcohol.

Question 66


How often did your commander "mentor" you?

1. Daily
2. Weekly
3. Monthly
4. Quarterly
5. Annually
6. At OER time
7. Never


Analysis (Q. 66)

Although 68 % indicated they were mentored by their commander at least quarterly, it is significant that 25% indicated they were only mentored at OER time (9.9%) or NEVER.(15.6%). Of the 16% (47 battalions) that indicated they were never mentored, the largest percent were CA (8.1%) followed by CS (3.4%), CS (2.7%), and Othr (1.7%).

Statistical Data (Q. 66)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Daily	1	8	2.6	2.7	2.7
Weekly	2	65	21.5	21.7	24.3
Monthly	3	69	22.8	23.0	47.3
Quarterly	4	64	21.2	21.3	68.7
Annually	5	17	5.6	5.7	74.3
At OER Time	6	30	9.9	10.0	84.3
Never	7	47	15.6	15.7	100.0
.	.	2	0.7	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.983	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	1.793	Maximum	7.000	Missing Cases	2



Survey Comments (Q. 66)

- He was quick to point out errors or to make "on the spot" corrections. Provided excellent guidance and hints. But true mentoring may not have actually occurred.
- Only if I initiated the exchange.
- Bn was remote from HQ so times varied but he was very good about mentoring.
- My rater (DISCOM CDR) never did. The Bde CDR I supported mentored me weekly.
- My first Bde CDR mentored every chance he got. My second Bde CDR didn't know how.

- Informally whenever needed.
- Monthly session and I think a very successful program.
- Quality of mentoring was poor.
- Formally about four times.
- Not very often; in fact I seldom remember the occasion unless I asked for guidance on something.
- I was counseled at OER time.
- My experience is that quality mentoring is not taking place; commanders just do not put a priority on it.
- Good with one, but nonexistent with the other.
- This was the first time in 17 years that my boss did this.
- Roughly every six months, but generally when I approached him with a problem or requested clarification.
- I like it that way. By the time you reach Bn CMD—you shouldn't need much building up.
- I got formal mentoring quarterly; but informally weekly. I regarded my two brigade CDRs as friends and trusted agents. Neither booked sloppy performance but both were accessible, helpful, and wanted me to do well. Both of my CGs and ADCs also mentored CDRs.
- A very close relationship with both rater and senior rater.
- Monthly—Mentored me with threats!!
- Informally, during phone calls, meetings, etc.
- Formal? Really never. But I knew where we were going. A lot of discussions I considered mentoring on a very frequent basis.
- As required, but no less than weekly.
- Never—glad—I knew more than him anyway; he was too parochial for his branch.
- Never one on one!
- Usually in conjunction with the quarterly training briefing.
- Guidance & direction, yes, "mentoring"—never. I was way ahead of him.

Question 67


How frequently did you formally counsel soldiers you rated or senior rated?

1. Daily
2. Weekly
3. Monthly
4. Quarterly
5. Annually
6. At OER time
7. Never

Analysis (Q. 67)

79% formally counseled the soldiers they rated or senior rated at least quarterly. Comments indicate the effort is being made to counsel more frequently, but the time is not available.

Statistical Data (Q. 67)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Daily	1	1	0.3	0.3	0.3
Weekly	2	18	6.0	6.0	6.4
Monthly	3	52	17.2	17.4	23.8
Quarterly	4	168	55.6	56.4	80.2
Annually	5	22	7.3	7.4	87.6
At OER Time	6	34	11.3	11.4	99.0
Never	7	3	1.0	1.0	100.0
.	.	4	1.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.027	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	298
Standard Deviation	1.034	Maximum	7.000	Missing Cases	4

Survey Comments (Q. 67)

- Planned to do it more often. Time and events kept causing problems. You got the top and bottom 10-15%; the middle suffered.
- I tried to formally counsel my company commanders & CSM quarterly, but never averaged this. It was more like semi-annual. Also, I counseled in writing when there were problems so some commanders were counseled more frequently than others. Of course, I had many "footlocker" sessions that were not recorded in writing. These happened weekly.
- Those I rated I counselled approximately semi-annually. I didn't formally counsel those I senior rated.
- At least weekly.
- Rated about monthly; Senior rated at OER time.
- Counseling is the strength of any organization.
- The OER support form was the counseling tool I used.

- Started with a 1/4-1/2 rule. Quickly lost standard. Counselling became "given opportunity" (which proved often enough) & OER time.
- Counselling was not formal. Relied on interaction at work and other times.
- Soldiers I rated quarterly. Soldiers I senior rated at OER time. Informally I counselled both much more often.
- Formally at OER time and quarterly. Informally whenever I saw them we talked about some professional issue which was intended to broaden and enhance them.
- Weekly or monthly for officers I rated. Quarterly for officers I senior rated.
- All as required. Those I rated—monthly; those I senior rated (Quarterly).
- CSM (Quarterly; XO/S3—daily; commanders—weekly; PLT LDRS (Quarterly/at OER time.
- I counseled (formally) at OER Spt Form time, thereafter as needed and at OER time.
- Semi-annually.
- Quarterly—in writing.
- After end of each 8 week training cycle.
- Every chance I got. Informal counselling on all unit visits.
- Very difficult to maintain. Fell off toward last 8 months.
- Formally rarely—did frequent foot locker counselings. Ensured each knew his standing.
- Quarterly with some regrettable exceptions. This is tough to keep up with, given numerous deployments,etc.
- More like semi-annually.

Question 68


Rate your freedom to command.

1. Low
2. Moderate
3. High

Analysis (Q. 68)

Over 98% indicated their freedom to command as moderate (18%) to high (80%). Most comments were positive. This is the same as the results (97.6%) on the AY91 Survey.

Statistical Data (Q. 68)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Low	1	5	1.7	1.7	1.7
Moderate	2	55	18.2	18.2	19.9
High	3	242	80.1	80.1	100.0
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.785	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	0.450	Maximum	3.000	Missing Cases	0

Survey Comments (Q. 68)

- Excellent opportunity—great fun.
- Great command environment.
- I worked for a self-centered, obnoxious Brigade Commander who took pleasure in "ruling" by fear and intimidation—he was rewarded for it!
- Much interference by DISCOM Cdr—had to brief and justify every innovation or departure from his directives.
- As Bn CDRs we could not take cbt vehicles out of the motorpool without Div CDR's approval.
- I consider myself extremely fortunate in having the autonomy allowed to me during my command.
- Exceptionally high.
- The command climate was the best I've ever seen. The boss let commanders command.

Question 69


Rate your junior commanders' freedom to command under you.

1. Low
2. Moderate
3. High

Analysis (Q. 69)

Over 98% indicated they gave their junior commanders moderate (34%) to high (64.6%) freedom to command.

Statistical Data (Q. 69)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Low	1	2	0.7	0.7	0.7
Moderate	2	103	34.1	34.3	35.0
High	3	195	64.6	65.0	100.0
	.	2	0.7	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.643	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	0.494	Maximum	3.000	Missing Cases	2

Survey Comments (Q. 69)

- Depended on the individual.
- I truly believe they felt like they commanded their units. If anything, I gave them too much freedom.
- I gave it a 3 for high. Of course they would say 2. I always explained to them that there is a reason for battalions.
- I would like to say "high", but I'm sure they felt I was too directive.
- Some commanders virtually had total freedom, some had very little depending on their maturity and experience—they got more freedom as they earned it.

Question 70

How important were statistics in your command?


1. Of no importance
2. Not important enough
3. About right
4. A little too important
5. Entirely too important

Analysis (Q. 70)



68% indicated the importance of statistics in their command was about right, but 26% rated them as a little too important to entirely too important. Of the 26%, 11% were

CA, 6.3% CS, 6.4% CSS, and 2% Other. Additionally, of the 26%, 15% were in CONUS, 8.4% in Europe, 2% in Korea, and .3% in Panama, Alaska, and Other.

Statistical Data (Q. 70)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
No Importance	1	11	3.6	3.6	3.6
Not Enough	2	6	2.0	2.0	5.6
About Right	3	206	68.2	68.2	73.8
A Little Too Much	4	61	20.2	20.2	94.0
Entirely Too Much	5	18	6.0	6.0	100.0
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.228	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	0.745	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	0



Survey Comments (Q. 70)

- I was really held accountable for stats; more so than for NTC results; I held my cdrs responsible for training stats only.
- We used them as possible indicators but never got a "numbers orientation".
- Don't want to overstate this. I was never threatened w/statistics, but I knew they were there and represented a type of measure.
- Within the battalion, statistics were used as an aide or an indicator (at times) but the emphasis was not on the numbers as a focus.

- Our DISCOM was nicknamed the "10th Statistical Command."
- We used them as indicators, not weapons or shields.
- We had monthly meetings about statistics. The minimum standard for most was an unobtainable zero or 100% i.e., immunizations, reenlistment rate, etc. Everything was #1 priority. Too much authority at division level. I was astounded at the amount of time I was office bound doing paperwork.
- (A little too important) Some training statistics like weapons qualification CTT & SQT scores are important. But most stats are administrative (SIDPERS, safety, crime). Administrative stats occupy too much briefing time & therefore get too much attention! Post commanders and above see more stats on bonds, AER, reenlistment, DUIs, etc. than they do on the things that win wars. They pay 'lip service' to training. They call subordinates about other issues. The wrong emphasis is driven from top down. If you want your subordinates to focus on training, you spend more time on training stats than admin stats, and "no notice"—General Inspections will focus on unit "roll outs", setting up TOCs, and providing OPODs within time limits, live fire tests, APFTs, CTTs, etc.(not energy conservation, SIDPERS...etc.)

Question 71


Did you inform your subordinates of your senior rater profile?

1. Yes
2. No

Analysis (Q. 71)

Almost 95% indicated they informed their subordinates about their senior rater profile. Comments reflect strong feelings that this must occur.

Statistical Data (Q. 71)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Yes	1	285	94.4	94.7	94.7
No	2	16	5.3	5.3	100.0
	.	1	0.3	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.053	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.225	Maximum	2.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 71)

- Always posted by Adjutant's desk.
- But only where my center of mass was; not the exact numbers.
- Frequently, including my rating philosophy.
- Posted on the bulletin board.
- Yes, from day 1 thru my departure.
- Always.
- Only from the standpoint of my use of blocks and their meanings.
- I published it.
- Yes—kept it posted in S1. Explained it in OPD session once per quarter.
- Yes—as an open book held by the adjutant.

Question 72


Did you discuss your ratings with subordinates prior to forwarding their OER?

1. Yes
2. No

Analysis (Q. 72)

Almost 97% indicated they discussed their ratings with their subordinates. Again, comments strongly endorsed this occurring.

Statistical Data (Q. 72)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Yes	1	292	96.7	96.7	96.7
No	2	10	3.3	3.3	100.0
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.033	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	0.179	Maximum	2.000	Missing Cases	0

Survey Comments (Q. 72)

- W/O exception. Not always open for negotiation, but we did discuss.
- Yes, especially those at both ends of the performance spectrum.
- Always; important to provide feedback on their strengths, weaknesses and how to improve.
- 100% of the time.
- Always.
- For officers I rated.
- I showed them where I would have rated them at each quarterly counseling.
- Absolutely ironclad rule.
- Always—planned for a 1 hour career counseling session with OER reviews.
- Yes—I also gave them a copy.

Question 73


Did you know your senior rater's profile?

1. Yes
2. No

Analysis (Q. 73)

Over half (56%) stated they did not know the profile of their senior rater. Of this 56%, CA had the largest percent (24%), followed by CSS (12.5%), CS (12.3%), and Other (6.3%) Comments indicate this is a problem. This is almost the same as the results (58.1%) on the AY 91 Survey.

Statistical Data (Q. 73)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Yes	1	133	44.0	44.0	44.0
No	2	169	56.0	56.0	100.0
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.560	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	0.497	Maximum	2.000	Missing Cases	0

Survey Comments (Q. 73)

- Never
- Never made available to us; never counseled me.
- Philosophy yes—actual profile no.
- Only because I asked.
- Because I went and found out what it was—he never told me.
- It was always a surprise—I was disappointed when I saw it.
- Generally speaking, no. One case—yes. I had 3 senior raters due to operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
- No—not prior to rating period but after rating was completed.

Question 74


Did your rater discuss your rating before forwarding your report?

1. Yes
2. No


Analysis (Q. 74)

Over 75% responded their rater discussed their OER before it was forwarded. Of the remaining 25% who did not have their OER discussed, 11.1% were CA, 7% CS, 4.7% CSS, and 2.3% Other.

Statistical Data (Q. 74)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Yes	1	227	75.2	75.2	75.2
No	2	75	24.8	24.8	100.0
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.248	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	302
Standard Deviation	0.433	Maximum	2.000	Missing Cases	0



Survey Comments (Q. 74)

- No, I knew I would be well treated.
- Sometimes.
- Without fail.
- Long distance between me, Sr Rater & Rater.

Question 75


Did your senior rater discuss your senior rating before forwarding your report?

1. Yes
2. No

Analysis (Q. 75)

Over 82% responded their Senior Rater did not discuss their rating before forwarding their report. Of this 82%, the largest percentage was CA (36.4%), followed by CS (18.5%), CSS (16.8%), and Other (8.9%). Comments clearly indicate this is a problem. This trend continued from the AY91 Survey in which 79.5% indicated their senior rater did not discuss OER prior to forwarding it.

Statistical Data (Q. 75)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Yes	1	52	17.2	17.3	17.3
No	2	248	82.1	82.7	100.0
	.	<u>2</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.827	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	300
Standard Deviation	0.379	Maximum	2.000	Missing Cases	2

Survey Comments (Q. 75)

- Got it in the mail. Never counseled/mentored 1:1 .
- No, I knew I would be well treated.
- One out of three.
- I served under three CGs—none ever counseled me on my OER; I received each OER in the mail; the last CG confessed he was unaware of his senior rater profile and professed a complete misunderstanding of the OER as a snapshot in time with respect to the date of the report; during two years in command, the CG visited my unit in the field once annually; strongly recommend CSA direct all CGs to counsel bde and bn cdrs at least annually (OER); my last senior rater stated he did not counsel subordinate commanders on OERs because no one ever counseled him; I find that attitude intolerable. I only received one senior rater counseling—and I sought it out.
- General officers are the worst offenders of this. No counselling given.
- Only one of three (the MG did—the 2 BGs did not).
- Received 3; on all occasions I was unavailable to be present for discussion (TDY or deployed).
- No—Additionally, having sat on promotion board—general officer performance in this arena is generally poor (e.g., ill-defined centers of mass, use of profile to get some officers a prize—at expense of system).
- One did and one didn't.
- I have never had a senior rater discuss a rating with me.
- Never really knew where I stood!

Question 76


Were you satisfied with the support you received from your higher headquarters?

1. Very dissatisfied
2. Dissatisfied
3. Borderline
4. Satisfied
5. Very satisfied

Analysis (Q. 76)

Over 67% were satisfied or very satisfied with the support they received from higher headquarters. 20% indicated it was borderline. Comments discuss typical problems with "higher headquarters." This is down when compared to the results (72.2%) on the AY91 Survey.

Statistical Data (Q. 76)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Very Dissatisfied	1	14	4.6	4.7	4.7
Dissatisfied	2	21	7.0	7.0	11.6
Borderline	3	62	20.5	20.6	32.2
Satisfied	4	155	51.3	51.5	83.7
Very Satisfied	5	49	16.2	16.3	100.0
	.	1	0.3	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.678	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.983	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 76)

- Division staff not responsible to battalion commanders. Too busy with in-house matters. Battalion commanders had to get Brigade Commander to call Division Staff on mundane matters, believed they existed only to support the CG.
- In many cases, their statistics became the tail wagging their dog. G4 was outstanding.
- Bde, not Div.
- Brigade CDR was deceitful, petty and self-serving. The CSM's were the saving grace. Bde staff was concerned with their own survival vice support to subordinate Bn CDRs—especially the two battalions located at other posts. My greatest frustration, shared with my CSM, was not getting responsive

support from brigade and post CDRs to improve the soldier-family living and support activities at our post. Promises for improvements rarely materialized and those that did took far too long even when resources were readily available. We can all say what we want about caring for our soldiers and their families, but unless we deliver, the chain of command's credibility across the board is weakened. Our soldiers deserve the very best in facilities and support we can give them. When resources are available we must cut through the BS and deliver!!

- Satisfied—except the S3 was an idiot that required us to work around him; the rest of higher HQ was o.k.—but this one guy could screw up the whole thing if we weren't careful. Higher commander could not see the problem.
- First half of tour, improved to SAT in second half (new Bde Cdr).

Question 77


Were you satisfied that the commanders above you knew how your unit was performing?

1. Very dissatisfied
2. Dissatisfied
3. Borderline
4. Satisfied
5. Very satisfied

Analysis (Q. 77)

Over 76% were satisfied or very satisfied the commanders above them knew how their unit was performing. There was some concern about only looking at statistics and not being visited in the field.

Statistical Data (Q. 77)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Very Dissatisfied	1	14	4.6	4.7	4.7
Dissatisfied	2	22	7.3	7.3	12.0
Borderline	3	35	11.6	11.6	23.6
Satisfied	4	155	51.3	51.5	75.1
Very Satisfied	5	75	24.8	24.9	100.0
.	.	<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.847	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	1.028	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 77)

- I really didn't care and never gave it much thought. I tried to get newspaper coverage of the soldiers but didn't do anything to advertise to higher commanders.
- They observed training very infrequently, but they knew their statistics very well.
- DISCOM Cdr knew fairly well—Div Cdr did not have a clue—visited my unit once in 2 years.
- Relied too much on briefings which were sanitized by the HQ staff to avoid controversy and protect the guilty.
- Bde, not Div.
- Brigade CDR rarely visited. Often at brigade command & staff meetings mixed up units and commanders. He essentially focused on the negative, rarely acknowledged or rewarded success.
- Neither Brigade nor post commander liked to visit training. When MG "C" took command, he was eager to visit soldiers in the field.
- Brigade Commander and CG—yes. Intermediate commander—no.

Question 78


How frequently did your immediate commander visit?

1. Never
2. Weekly
3. Monthly
4. Quarterly
5. Semi-annually
6. Annually
7. Less than once per year

Analysis (Q. 78)

Over 91% indicated their immediate commander visited them at least quarterly, with the most frequent response being monthly (37.4%).

Statistical Data (Q. 78)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Never	1	2	0.7	0.7	0.7
Weekly	2	89	29.5	29.6	30.2
Monthly	3	113	37.4	37.5	67.8
Quarterly	4	71	23.5	23.6	91.4
Semi-Annually	5	19	6.3	6.3	97.7
Annually	6	4	1.3	1.3	99.0
Less Than Annually	7	3	1.0	1.0	100.0
.	.	<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.133	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	1.037	Maximum	7.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 78)

- Monthly, second half of command tour. First half—never.
- Monthly—or by my invitation to do so!
- He was usually at a meeting.
- Annually—My Bde HQs was 2 blocks from my Bn HQs.
- Rarely visited (like go to motor pool). I felt he was not really there. The battery commanders never had a one on one conversation with him.
- (Monthly) Last commander—less than once per year—first commander twice in five months; both times in last month.

Question 79


Your senior commanders would support you in difficult times,

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 79)

Over 82% believed their senior commanders would support them in difficult times. However, respondents who took the time to write comments voiced strong doubt on this subject.

Statistical Data (Q. 79)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	9	3.0	3.0	3.0
Disagree	2	17	5.6	5.6	8.6
Neutral	3	27	8.9	9.0	17.6
Agree	4	122	40.4	40.5	58.1
Strongly Agree	5	126	41.7	41.9	100.0
		<u>1</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.126	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	0.995	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1

Survey Comments (Q. 79)

- Felt very confident they would back me.
- Second half of command tour. First half—no.
- Bde Cdr only; 2d Div Commander was very negative.

- Senior Cdrs were on a fast track to General or were relieved for adultery.
- Star gazing verses taking an unpopular stand is the biggest problem with Colonels in command today.
- Were open to bad news and helpful in tough situations.
- Neutral—Depends on what you mean by support !
- Installation level—yes.
- Strongly agree—with the exception of my brigade CDR.
- Mostly through rhetoric but rarely in deed.
- Especially Division CDR.
- Not if it meant putting their a— on the line!

Question 80


Your higher headquarters established a satisfactory command climate.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree


Analysis (Q. 80)

Although over 76% agreed or strongly agreed, respondents who wrote comments clearly questioned their freedom to command and the motives of higher commanders. Of the 14.5% (43 battalions) that disagreed or strongly disagreed, 7.1% were CA, 3% CS, 2% CSS, and 2.3% Other.

Statistical Data (Q. 80)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	3	1.0	1.0	1.0
Disagree	2	41	13.6	13.6	14.6
Neutral	3	25	8.3	8.3	22.9
Agree	4	135	44.7	44.9	67.8
Strongly Agree	5	97	32.1	32.2	100.0
.	.	1	0.3	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.937	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	301
Standard Deviation	1.019	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	1



Survey Comments (Q. 80)

- CMD group gave me the freedom to command—true mission guidance.
- Bde, not Div.
- Installation level—yes, Bde—no.
- My brigade CDR was insane. Virtually little trust and confidence in the brigade CDR. I felt sorry for my brother CDRs located at BDE HQs.
- Bde—OK. Division—superb.
- Division was UNSAT.
- Very positive, supportive climate.
- All commanders (2 @ Bde & 2@ 2 stars) would unhesitatingly sacrifice this or any other battalion on issues rather than lose face in the eyes of their raters—the intense competition for their promotions were predominant; drove frequency of their visits to units; issues/content of reports to higher; everything. I was rated very high, but I cannot fail to note this very disturbing climate.

- Ref Command Climate: Most of my time was under a supportive brigade commander and a great division commander. A short time was under an oppressive, dishonest brigade commander and a good division commander whose involvement in subordinate unit activities was limited. The latter situation really cramped my style (successful by all accounts to that point in time) and drastically impacted soldiers and family morale. I've never seen a more graphic illustration of the intangible benefits of command climate and the negative impact which a caustic domineering brigade commander can have. Sour grapes? Yes; our soldiers and families deserved better.
- Neutral—1st half of end tour/strongly agree 2d half.
- Command climate changed 180° with change of senior rater. Hard to answer a single question.

Question 81


Did you feel the chain of command was fair to you and/or other commanders?

1. Yes
2. No


Analysis (Q. 81)

Over 90% felt the chain of command was fair to them and other commanders. However, some comments indicate favoritism was obvious in certain instances. Of the 10% (30 battalions) that disagreed, 4.1% were CA, 2.8% CS, 2.1% CSS and 1% Other.

Statistical Data (Q. 81)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Yes	1	265	87.7	90.1	90.1
No	2	29	9.6	9.9	100.0
	.	8	2.6	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.099	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	294
Standard Deviation	0.299	Maximum	2.000	Missing Cases	8



Survey Comments (Q. 81)

- Answers ought to be like ques 80. Making this yes/no may not provide the correct picture. Majority of the time yes. One isolated incident left a very bad taste.
- I answered yes and I am overall satisfied. But there is one exception. I feel that my best commander got screwed on both his senior ratings. He got good reports, but only center of mass due to changes in senior raters.
- DISCOM CDR had commanded my Bn. I felt he was more critical of my Bn's performance and my Co CDR's (on their OER's) than he was of the other Bn's. DISCOM CDR told me after I gave up command that he was harder on me, because I had been frocked to take command and because I had just come from the 82d ABN—he didn't like BZ promotions and airborne guys.
- Yes—overall; but there were times I was afraid of the process they used to judge a commander's performance.
- On my first CMD OER I received a top block rating. The SR rater's profile was 35 top block and 40 2nd block. On my 2nd Bn CMD OER I received a 2 block where the SR profile was 39 top and 34 2nd block, 14 in 3rd block. I was never once counselled by him, spoke to him once during the rating period. Also he never showed me this OER even though my Branch tells me it ended my career.
- Yes—with the exception of my brigade CDR.
- There was obvious preferential treatment toward one battalion CDR, but it neither hindered my ability to lead nor assessment of command as "successful".
- Absolutely not. I knew of three promising company commanders who eventually resigned their commissions, primarily because of their disaffection with the profession owing primarily to the brigade CDR.
- No. XO at Brigade had far too much influence; more than the squadron commanders.
- I was naive to the various agendas of my bosses (raters and senior raters). They were often concerned with their historical (links to DA staff, LOG Center, etc.) ties or with their relationships to their bosses, and had positions/platitudes to protect which I did not recognize. I was out of step and they were so politically involved. They didn't have/take the time to refocus me. I occasionally hung with my own rope.
- Our commander was frequently "beaten up" in public.

Question 82


Do you feel as positive about an Army career now as you did when you first decided to make it a career?

1. Much more positively
2. More positively
3. About the same
4. Less positively
5. Much less positively


Analysis (Q. 82)


Just over half (55%) responded that they were more positive or much more positive about their Army career now. However, almost 20% were negative on this subject. Of this 20% (59 battalions), 8.1% were CA, 5.5% CS, 4.8% CSS, and 1.4% Other. Additionally, of this 20%, 12.9% commanded in CONUS, 5.1% in Europe, 1% in Korea, and less than .7% in Panama and Alaska. For comparison purposes, last year's survey results indicated an overall 53.7% more positive or much more positive, 32.2% neutral, and only 14.1% less positive or much less positive about their career. Comments ran the gamut from very positive to very negative.

Statistical Data (Q. 82)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Much Less Positively	1	12	4.0	4.0	4.0
Less Positively	2	48	15.9	16.2	20.2
About the Same	3	70	23.2	23.6	43.8
More Positively	4	99	32.8	33.3	77.1
Much More Positively	5	68	22.5	22.9	100.0
.	.	5	1.7	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.549	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	297
Standard Deviation	1.129	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	5





Survey Comments (Q. 82)

- (Less positively) The force reductions we face are far more massive than the post Vietnam RIF that my generation experienced. We are going to cut lose a whole lot of quality officers & probably enlisted who answered the call when we needed a volunteer Army.
- I have always been exceptionally positive.
- Profession wise—yes, what a great job With cut back, etc....less positive.
- I have always felt very positive; things did not change.
- The Army is a much more professionally competent force today than it was 20 years ago.
- Bn Cmd was a good experience; a good unit doing our job.
- I love the Army.
- I am still having fun but could use more money.
- Never really committed; took one day at a time; seriously considered getting out at the 10 year mark.
- Tough, perhaps too ambiguous a question. I'm having less "fun", but I feel more dedicated by far. Responsibilities are weighty, but personal fulfillment is high.
- More positively—true from perspective of why I soldier. Fearful for Army, given political pressures to downsize.
- Yearly SERBs trouble me greatly! One disagreement with the wrong boss, over a minor item, may result in a "nick" which is enough to be a discriminator for elimination. I'm afraid we'll be growing an officer Corps full of "yes-men." A seven month or less notice of unemployment will weigh heavy on the minds of many as we balance our professional and personal lives. I know we've got to cut back, but yearly trips to the edge of the cliff is an extremely negative factor in overall motivation and dedication to one's profession.
- Less positive. Due to downsizing! Plus 2 years in USAREC.
- Less positively—The higher in rank, the less senior leaders understand that mission came first, not community, or other non-readiness issues.

- General officers do not mentor, counsel or develop subordinates. Generally (pun intended) they are not even truthful about how they are rating you (if they even discuss your rating). I know one general who I greatly respect & admire; he retired in 1979 as LTG. COLs only interested in own progression, not unit/soldier welfare.

Part I: Separate Question A


How do you view your spouse's opinion of her/his role as a member of the "command team"? (Check one or more as applicable)

- ☐ 1. Important to unit
- ☐ 2. Important to my career
- ☐ 3. "Expected" by seniors (i.e. obligatory)
- ☐ 4. Not recognized adequately for time and effort involved
- ☐ 5. Spouse dislikes role
- ☐ 6. Spouse likes role
- ☐ 7. Not applicable

Analysis (Q. A)

Despite what the range of percentages may imply on this multiple response question, the numerous written comments reveal that there are many negative emotional and high-concern issues associated with the "command team" concept and the roles of "the Army spouse." 91.1% of the survey respondents had their spouses accompany them during the command tour. Using this group, as could be anticipated, 80% believed that the spouse of a battalion commander plays a role that is "important to the unit." The next three categories were rated almost equally—"important to the battalion commander's career" (53%); "expected by seniors (i.e., *obligatory*)" (50%); "not recognized adequately for time and effort involved" (48%). Of possible special concern to Army leadership would be the lack of a clear majority of spouses who "like" their roles (43%), and the relatively large number who "dislike" their roles (26%). Though not extensively mentioned, perhaps one of the most insightful written comments dealt with the perception that the Army may be out-of-touch in not recognizing the economic necessity for two income families (i.e., working spouses) while still "expecting" the battalion commander's spouse to be part of the "command team." When we look again at survey questions 10 and 11, we find that 58.2% of the spouses work either full or part time outside the home (up 10.9% from last year's survey!). Still, 80.3% participated "frequently" or "almost always" to support unit activities (down only slightly, 2.2%, from last year). As the comments reflect, the demands upon these spouses are viewed as extensive, and apparently there is some resentment toward the Army's concept of the "command team" and the spousal obligations or responsibilities implied.

Statistical Data (Q. A)



	91 Survey	92 Survey	Δ
Spouse Employment			
(All Respondents)			
Part Time	26.7%	22.9%	-3.6%
Full Time	20.5%	35.2%	+14.7%
Total	47.2%	58.1%	+10.9%

Spouse Participation in Unit Activities			
(All Respondents)			
"Frequently"	20.9%	22.3%	+1.4%
"Almost Always"	61.6%	58.0%	-3.6%
Total	82.5%	80.3%	-2.2%

Total Population Surveyed: 302
 Total Surveyed Population Married: 291
 Spouse Accompanied on Tour: 275

Survey Comments (Q. A)

- (Expected)—Because it was good for soldiers and their families or for the installation.
- (Expected, Spouse dislikes role)—This conflict has caused many personal problems in my marriage. Its one of the reasons my spouse did not accompany me overseas for command.

- Multiple responses all of coequal value. The level of expectations of today's Army spouse in Europe is unbelievably high. The "pressure", I think, is much higher today than it was in the mid-70's. The changing roles of spouses is recognized on paper but not in fact. A CMD TM is an unspoken REQMT not a voluntary support mechanism. Bn CMD has soured my wife on the U.S. Army!!
- She was perfect for her role in family support group !
- She "liked" the role because she felt she was contributing during some difficult times—during extended unit deployments and Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
- The "command team" is the commander and the CSM, not a spouse!
- My ROTC sweetheart and Army wife of 22 years terminated our marriage while I was on a short tour in Korea. There were, of course, many reasons; however, the inconsistency between DA and TAPA tour policies and 2ID "voluntary command tour extensions" was the straw that broke the camel's back. She felt that the Army wants 2 for 1. She felt that "The Army Family" years were a propaganda ploy to keep wives out of the work place and in volunteer programs.
- The Army, I believe, has got to come to grips with the volunteerism required/expected from spouses. Dual income families are a near reality now days. 60% of my company grade officers had working spouses. All of my commanders had working spouses, or were bachelors. All my field grades had working spouses. My wife worked. When Brigade or Division had a social affair for the wives, we usually had the poorest turn out. Does that reflect a poor family support group or a socio-economic indicator of a stressed economy? In fact, we had a great wives' organization, but their relationship with luncheons and other spouse-oriented functions was nearly non-existent due to the reality of wife employment.
- Spouse dislikes role—spouse did not feel she had a role, did not get involved, did not care about it. It didn't affect anything or my career.
- Spouse dislikes role—in Europe, commander's wife is tough role. Family problems are all consuming.
- Frustrating—high community expectations—no resources.
- Expected by senior wives more so than by senior male officers.
- Spouse dislikes role—too much expected.
- Spouse likes role—kept it in perspective; she wasn't the Queen of Sheba, had fun, ladies respected her and participated.
- With a full time job, kids and a mother in the house, this "duty" was not easy. But, there was tremendous contribution to be made and support given during difficult periods.
- No one questions the importance or effectiveness of the increase in attention to families and the "command team" in recent years. However, it often appears that we have gone over the line to the point where families were going to get some "family caring" whether they wanted it or not. In addition, most of the programs assume a willingness on the part of the leaders' spouses—at all levels—to provide free labor needed to make these programs work. I sensed a growing amount of resentment on many wives' part about this expectation that the spouses would provide the labor and resources to make "family care" work. If we are really serious, perhaps we should look at better resourcing—in both dollars and manpower spaces—to make family programs work at unit level.

- Most wives (90% of officer wives in my battalion) work. Yet, the senior leaders expected attendance at coffees, teas, volunteer programs, and other functions held during the day. At the battalion level, with so many working wives, the battalion commanders must look inward, as should the company commanders' wives. External functions are, for the most part, a pain to those that must attend. Especially hard in Germany with Brigade HQs located, in some cases 1 1/2 hours away.
- I seek her input and value her judgement.
- Spouse dislikes role with higher HQs—likes role within battalion.
- Recognized and appreciated by higher commanders in the division. Taken for granted by "the Army."
- Not expected—but greatly enhances effectiveness of uniformed spouse. A dedicated spouse is a blessing to the unit; but a blessing we cannot come to "expect" or take for granted.
- Wives can and should be an important part of the command team. However, they should not be expected to participate. This should be a clearly articulated distinction.

Part I: Separate Question B

On a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) rate the following groups for competence.


- ☐ a. General officers
- ☐ b. Other field grade officers
- ☐ c. Company grade officers
- ☐ d. Warrant officers
- ☐ e. CSMs
- ☐ f. MSG/1SGs
- ☐ g. SFCs
- ☐ h. SSG/SGTs
- ☐ i. PVT-SPC

Analysis (Q. B)

"Competent" leaders—do battalion commanders believe this "*imperative*" has been met? Generally, YES. But like the "Enthusiasm" and "Ability" questions which follow, there is apparently more to the responses beyond the statistics. Responses to all three questions should be compared. Respondents were asked to rate the above nine rank groupings on a scale of 1(low) to 10 (high). On the issue of "Competence" by itself, the results were positive with scores following a general trend of increasing as military rank increased (e.g., General Officers rated *higher*, Junior Enlisted grades rated *lower*). Two exceptions: 1. Of the group "Commissioned Officers" (including Warrants), Company Grade Officers were rated *lowest*. Obviously, among this group, "Company Grade" is generally where we would find the least time in service and military experience. Then again, if time in service was a significant variable in determining the perception of "competence," we might expect CSMs to be rated much higher. 2. The "SSG/SGTs" category was rated the lowest of the enlisted grades. One explanation for this, as reflected by some comments on this and other related questions, may be attributed to the difficulty of junior enlisted to transition to their new

roles as NCO leaders. Except for this latter anomaly, the results from this year's survey were remarkably similar to last year's. The mean scores for each group continued to be in the upper third of the scale (6.7 or better).

Statistical Data (Q. B)



Overall Mean	7.334	Maximum	1.000
		Minimum	10.000

Survey Comments (Q. B)

- Always isolated guys who have slipped through. (SSG/SGT) Greatest problem.
- CSMs. I had two, one was worthless the other was an absolute superstar.
- (General Officers—8) Depends on the individual. Lot of bad 07's.
- CSMs, for the most part, are of little value to the Army—many are even detrimental to progress. I have had many negative experiences with several CSMs which have resulted in ill feelings and lost confidence. What's even worse is how much they can get away with before something is done.
- (Warrant officers—5) This used to be different. Lately, my experience with WO's has been increasingly negative.
- Biggest problem was E5s with over 10 yrs service, E6s over 16 yrs. They were just hanging on, meeting standards. They impacted others.
- Young E5s/E6s were terrific. Their older counter parts could really drag a unit down.
- CSM rated lowest—of two, one was great, one was a disloyal, lazy, SOB.
- General Officer competence is probably the most disappointing among groups listed. Some lack common sense and some lack concern for the individual. Some drive their soldiers hard, and not necessarily for the good of the Army, but it appears, for another promotion. I would only want to go to war with 1 of the 3 I closely observed. Maybe they have gone thru the system too fast.

- (General Officers rated lowest)—includes 1 and 2 stars—out of touch.
- (CSMs rated next to lowest)—wasted position ! Few, if any, understand their job.
- All very good—very competent. All meet the standard—the expectation. Warrants vary more than they should. Too many (still only a few) lack expected competence or drive. An occasional CSM (always conspicuous) seems to lack drive.
- (PVT-SPC rated highest)—outstanding soldiers who challenge their leaders to keep up with them.
- (General Officers—9)—during my command tour, not during subsequent Pentagon assignments; about a 6 or 7 there.
- General officers are too political; they only address topics with party line.

Part I: Separate Question C

On a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) rate the following groups for enthusiasm or drive


- ☐ a. General officers
- ☐ b. Other field grade officers
- ☐ c. Company grade officers
- ☐ d. Warrant officers
- ☐ e. CSMs
- ☐ f. MSG/1SGs
- ☐ g. SFCs
- ☐ h. SSG/SGTs
- ☐ i. PVT-SPC

Analysis (Q. C)

"Enthusiasm or drive," often equated with motivation, can also be perceived as a measure of job satisfaction, dedication to mission, or as a means of augmenting "competence" or "ability." Whatever their interpretations, battalion commanders continue to view the force overall as "enthusiastic." Nine groups (as noted above) were rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high). In the officer ranks, company grade officers were rated the highest (8.417). This is similar to last year's AY91 Survey results for this group (8.64)—the highest rating. (Note: General officers were not included in the rated groups in the AY91 Survey). While warrant officers received one of the lower scores in the AY91 Survey (rated just above "SSG/SGT" and "SFCs") they did not fair as well in the AY92 Survey, receiving the *lowest* score overall. Using an excursion analysis methodology, which accounts for the fact that respondents to the Survey use different scales in rating (e.g., some score in the 6 to 8 range, some in the 1 to 9 range, some in the 7 to 10 range, etc.), we also find warrant officers received significantly more scores below the mean score (7.423), and in score blocks 1-6, than any other group. For the group "enlisted grades" specifically, "SFCs" received the lowest scores on "enthusiasm" in both the AY91 and AY92 Surveys. The lowest enlisted ranks "PVT-SPC" received the highest "enthusiasm" ratings in this group. "CSMs" fared slightly worse than in the AY91 Survey, moving from second place among the enlisted ranks to third place this year. Other survey questions dealing with soldier, NCO, and officer

performance and behavioral attributes should be reviewed and compared by the reader in conjunction with this question.

Statistical Data (Q. C)



Overall Mean	7.4225	Maximum	1.000
		Minimum	10.000

Survey Comments (Q. C)

- (Warrant Officers) Significant problem especially among aviation warrants. Great pilots but little else. Too cocky and unmilitary. Don't like to work too hard. PA's very good.
- (General Officers—7)—When it concerned proper use of aviation—especially attack helicopters.
- Most were always enthusiastic, some became more so during deployments. In almost every case when there was a mission to be accomplished, enthusiasm peaked to ensure accomplishment. SFC was again a weak area. Squad leaders (E6-E5) became the motivators and led their squads enthusiastically despite (E7) plt sgts.
- Some 15% of SFCs lack drive.
- (General Officers)—enthusiastic but incompetent.
- Note low ratings for E8/E9. The message is that we have too many who are retired on active duty.
- Clearly the finest group of young officers I have seen in 22 years.

Part I: Separate Question D


On a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) rate the following groups for ability to learn?

- ___ a. Other field grade officers
- ___ b. Company grade officers
- ___ c. Warrant officers
- ___ d. CSMs
- ___ e. MSG/1SGs
- ___ f. SFCs
- ___ g. SSG/SGTs
- ___ h. PVT-SPC

Analysis (Q. D)

As with the previous two questions on "competence" and "enthusiasm", "ability to learn" was rated according to the same scale, 1 (low) to 10 (high). The "General Officer" category was not included on this question. "Company Grade" officers continued to be rated highest (both AY91 and AY92 Surveyss). Unfortunately, CSMs continued to be rated the lowest overall from one year to the next. Warrant officers dropped from 5th place (AY91) to 7th place (AY92). Other rankings remained essentially the same in both surveys. The reader should compare the responses to this question with other survey questions dealing with performance and personal behavior attributes.

Statistical Data (Q. D)



Overall Mean 7.350

Maximum 1.000
Minimum 10.000

Survey Comments (Q. D)

- Ability to learn is the incorrect question. Desirability is the correct question.
- Change "ability" to "willingness" to learn—other field grades and CSMs are rated the lowest.

Additional Statistics (Q. B,C,D)

Group	Aggregate Rankings Questions B, C, D					
	Ranking "Competence"		Ranking "Enthusiasm"		Ranking "Ability to Learn"	
	AY91	AY92	AY91	AY92	AY91	AY92
General Officers	N/A	<u>1</u>	N/A	2	N/A	N/A
Field Grade	<u>1</u>	2	2	3	2	3
Company Grade	4	4	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Warrants	2	3	6	<u>2</u>	5	7
CSMs	3	5	4	6	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
MSG/1SGs	5	6	3	5	6	6
SFCs	6	7	<u>2</u>	8	7	5
SSG/SGT	7	<u>2</u>	7	7	4	4
PVT-SPC	<u>2</u>	8	5	4	3	2

* Highest

* Lowest

PART II

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM OR PROVIDE COMFORT

Question 83


How long was your battalion deployed in the Persian Gulf?

1. Less than 1 month
2. 1-2 months
3. 3-4 months
4. 5-6 months
5. More than 6 months

Analysis (Q. 83)

Of 302 responses overall to the Survey, 70 Battalion Commanders indicated their units had deployed to Southwest Asia during the Gulf conflict; 68 actually commanded units there. 54.3% of the battalions were deployed for longer than 6 months; 45.7% for 6 months or less. The breakdown of the 70 deployed units represented in this Survey is COMBAT ARMS (35); COMBAT SUPPORT (17); COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (17); one unit category unknown.

Statistical Data (Q. 83)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
1-2 Mo	2	1	0.3	1.4	1.4
3-4 Mo	3	8	2.6	11.4	12.9
5-6 Mo	4	23	7.6	32.9	45.7
>6 Mo	5	38	12.6	54.3	100.0
.		232	76.8	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.400	Minimum	2.000	Valid Cases	70
Standard Deviation	0.750	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	232

Question 84


How long were you in command of the battalion in the Persian Gulf?

1. Less than 1 month
2. 1-2 months
3. 3-4 months
4. 5-6 months
5. More than 6 months

Analysis (Q. 84)

68 Survey respondents indicated they had commanded battalions in the Persian Gulf (35 Cbt Arms, 17 Cbt Spt, 17 Cbt Service Spt, one unit category unknown). 48.5% commanded there for more than six months, 51.5% for six months or less.

Statistical Data (Q. 84)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
<1 Mo	1	1	0.3	1.5	1.5
1-2 Mo	2	3	1.0	4.4	5.9
3-4 Mo	3	8	2.6	11.8	17.6
5-6 Mo	4	23	7.6	33.8	51.5
>6 Mo	5	33	10.9	48.5	100.0
.		<u>234</u>	<u>77.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.235	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	68
Standard Deviation	0.932	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	234

Question 85


How much training time did your battalion have from deployment notification to the start of the ground campaign (24 February 1991)?

1. Less than 1 month
2. 1-2 months
3. 3-4 months
4. 5-6 months
5. More than 6 months

Analysis (Q. 85)

68 units were included in this response. After being notified to deploy, 94% had more than 30 days to train prior to the start of the DESERT STORM ground campaign; 72% actually had more than 90 days to train.

Statistical Data (Q. 85)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
<1 Mo	1	5	1.7	7.4	7.4
1-2 Mo	2	14	4.6	20.6	27.9
3-4 Mo	3	14	4.6	20.6	48.5
5-6 Mo	4	20	6.6	29.4	77.9
>6 Mo	5	15	5.0	22.1	100.0
.		<u>234</u>	<u>77.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.382	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	68
Standard Deviation	1.246	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	234

Survey Comments (Q. 85)

- My unit had little time to actually train initially. The first 45 days (8 Nov-24 Dec) was taken up with new equipment fielding, all equipment painted desert sand,

and railloading. Once deployed and we were forward deployed, we were able to train.—The only training we were able to do prior to deploying was weapons familiarization, NBC chamber and PT.

- (5-6 months) Because, we deployed in Sep and continued to train in Saudi.
- Prior to deployment, completed a GTA & HTA rotation.
- Focused training in the NBC area.
- CSS Battalions began mission performance immediately on arrival in SWA; in many cases, mission included deploying the Corps.
- 3-4 months—This is the time between notification and start—most of it was execution vice training.

Question 86


This training time was critical to my battalion (question 85) considering my battalion's SWA mission.

- 1. Strongly agree**
- 2. Agree**
- 3. Neutral**
- 4. Disagree**
- 5. Strongly disagree**


Analysis (Q. 86)

Written responses generally indicated commanders believed they had well trained units prior to their participation in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. However, the additional training time made available during the time-frame from notification to deployment, as well as the focused training time used in-country were considered important and were apparently well used. For many units this may have been a new geographical mission area requiring specialized orientation/familiarization training (e.g., 28% of the battalions included in this portion of the survey were from Europe). Of the 68 applicable survey responses, 66.1% of the Battalion Commanders "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that training time prior to DESERT STORM was critical to the unit based on the SWA mission. There were, however, some differences in assessing the value of this training among the three categories of units (i.e., CA, CS, CSS). CS and CSS commanders tended to be "neutral" or "disagree" more than CA commanders, who had the highest overall percentage of responses in "agree" and "strongly agree" values (i.e., CA-78.8%, CS-58.9%, CSS-47.1%).

Statistical Data (Q. 86)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	2	0.7	2.9	2.9
Disagree	2	12	4.0	17.6	20.6
Neutral	3	9	3.0	13.2	33.8
Agree	4	26	8.6	38.2	72.1
Strongly Agree	5	19	6.3	27.9	100.0
.		<u>234</u>	<u>77.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.706	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	68
Standard Deviation	1.147	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	234



Survey Comments (Q. 86)

- No! We were well trained when we departed in Aug 90. (Granted we were superbly trained by Feb 91. We got away from the administrative focus of a CONUS post. The distractors to training were minimized.)
- As a tactical Signal Bn we were performing our mission from the day we arrived in country. The war changed nothing in the way we operated.
- Unit was trained well prior to deployment.
- All training time is critical, but prior to deployment we had just come back from the NTC, so we were ready to fight in the desert.
- Agree—to integrate PROFIS physicians; otherwise felt we had been training to do the mission.
- Because of last minute personnel fill and development of some new techniques, 2 weeks to 1 month would have sufficed—we kept polishing a fine edge and hoped we wouldn't peak too early!
- My battalion could have fought effectively without it, but it helped us adapt to a new environment.
- Strongly disagree—Unit was well trained before deployment. We always worked on Team Battle Drills and system maintenance procedures. Soldiers' skills were integrated into daily team drills.
- Training—I shipped a COHORT battery to Korea in September 90, received the new soldiers 23 Oct, and was alerted for deployment 8 Nov. That battery fired only 350 live artillery rounds prior to deployment—no battalion collective training. We did that in-country. The COHORT business is a GFI that gets lost in the shuffle on a major deployment. DCSOPS, FORSCOM showed no concern: I report C5, then C-3 on my 2715—it was my challenge to train the

unit. In retrospect they did an outstanding job! Point is: GFIs need to be looked at from a readiness viewpoint—not to ease the personnel job.

Question 87


Did your battalion fight the way it trained?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always

Analysis (Q. 87)

A clear majority of commanders believed their units "frequently" or "almost always" fought as they were trained—in the aggregate, 83.8%. As with Question 86, once again there were some differences between CA, CS, and CSS commanders: CA commanders "frequently" (18.2%) or "almost always" (75.8%) agreed—total 94.0%; CS (29.4%) and (52.9%)—total 82.3%; CSS (29.4%) and (35.3%)—total 64.7%. The lower scores for CS and CSS units could be related to some of the issues identified in written comments from commanders of these units. Several highlights: unlike most CA units, CS and CSS units do not get to train as "units" as frequently—peacetime missions/support requirements may preclude this (e.g., a signal battalion running several 24-hour-a-day signal centers); CS and CSS units do not get to train as "units" at national training centers; no matter what we say, CS and CSS units cannot afford to abandon peacetime missions to "train as they would fight," the realities of real world missions (e.g., commo support, intel support, maintenance and equipment repair, etc.) simply will not permit such units to go to the field every month like a CA battalion to practice wartime unit and individual skills; the CSS "slice" as part of combined arms training does not equate to a CSS battalion functioning in the area of C2, for example, like a CA battalion fully participating in an exercise; compared to CA units, MTPs for CSS and CS units are not as developed, or relevant, on what training they can conduct in peacetime; etc. As one comment noted, "...a tank battalion 'trains' for a living. A maintenance battalion provides 'maintenance support' for a living and 'trains' as a secondary mission, if there's time."

Statistical Data (Q. 87)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Seldom	2	4	1.3	5.9	5.9
Sometimes	3	7	2.3	10.3	16.2
Frequently	4	16	5.3	23.5	39.7
Almost Always	5	41	13.6	60.3	100.0
.		<u>234</u>	<u>77.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.382	Minimum	2.000	Valid Cases	68
Standard Deviation	0.898	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	234

Survey Comments (Q. 87)

- Logistics doctrine breakdown. My battalion frequently pulled supplies from the rear. The push distribution system didn't work. Class IV & maint problems required us to do a lot that we normally wouldn't have (i.e., fabrication/local purchase/substitution/modification of procedures).
- Trained to fight a Central European War. Required significant change in the TTP to fight an offensive covering force battle in SWA...doctrine was sound. The Avn Center fighting in the desert manual was a good guide.
- * We fought in daylight only—wanted and trained for night raid missions ! That's what Apache's do best ! We did train at night as much as possible.
- (Almost always) But training was tougher.
- Yes, only much more bunched-up—no air threat!
- Basic principles from Europe remained the same. Once we made adaptations to the desert we stuck with the new procedures throughout the ground war.
- We made some modifications based on commo systems available.

Question 88

Did Army doctrine for your battalion prove to be correct during the employment of your battalion in Desert Storm?

1. Almost never
2. Seldom
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Almost always


Analysis (Q. 88)

While a clear majority of commanders (83.8%) felt their units fought the way they were trained—"frequently" and "almost always" categories (Question 87), fewer overall believed that "doctrine" for their battalions was correct for their roles and missions in SWA (67.7%). However, the lower overall percentage is attributable to the significantly fewer positive responses of CS and CSS commanders. Responses for CA were the same as in question 87 (94.0%). But CS and CSS dropped—from 82.3% to 58.9% for CS, from 52.9% to 47.1% for CSS (see graph b below). Written comments

on this and related questions and issues (e.g., Q.87, training, organization) reflect some possible explanations for the lower CS and CSS scores: related training manuals and MTPs are not available, or are obsolete and not keeping pace with doctrinal and organizational changes, e.g., conversion to FSBs; limited ability to train in peacetime according to wartime doctrine; major equipment changes that require a new way of doing business—once again ahead of doctrinal changes; infusion of reserve units into the structure—units that have not trained together previously, are equipped differently, etc., are now asked to fight together (CA units also raised this issue); peacetime support missions interfere with doctrinal wartime training; more CSS activity was done *ad hoc* in SWA than by any doctrinal standard; training as “slices” of the combined arms team detracts from overall battalion training; large scale training areas are generally unavailable to CS and CSS units; such units must rely on “infrequent” large scale exercises (e.g., at Corps-level) to employ doctrinal concepts; etc.

Were there differences between units by “type” ? As reflected by graph c below, there were more responses by commanders of corps and EAC level units in the categories “almost never,” “seldom,” and “sometimes” than by commanders of division and below level units (which had no responses in these categories). Considering that a larger percentage of CS and CSS than CA battalions are type EAC and above, these figures should not be surprising.

Statistical Data (Q. 88)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Almost Never	1	4	1.3	5.9	5.9
Seldom	2	6	2.0	8.8	14.7
Sometimes	3	12	4.0	17.6	32.4
Frequently	4	22	7.3	32.4	64.7
Almost Always	5	24	7.9	35.3	100.0
	.	<u>234</u>	<u>77.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.824	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	68
Standard Deviation	1.184	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	234

Survey Comments (Q. 88)

- Army needs to review "push vs pull" doctrine.
- Exception was weak doctrine for breaching obstacles and logistics.
- My CONUS maintenance battalion was deployed in total. Alerted in mid August, deployed late September—early November and all subordinate units reassigned to other battalions. My HQ having trained as an EAC asset was assigned to a Corps Support Group and further assigned 8 new multifunctional CSS companies. Original battalion had 500 personnel (3 Companies incl HQ & 2 separate detachments). New battalion was over 1300 personnel (with 9 Companies incl HHC). Completely new mission with completely new people. HHC structure & manning unchanged to convert from EAC Maint Bn to COSCOM Multifunctional Bn. Army wants to fight multifunctional but hasn't enough CSS assets in the right places to organize & train that way in peace.
- Maneuver—yes. Log sustainment—definitely not.
- All except FA movement techniques.
- Basics of doctrine were applicable.
- Almost never—There is no Army Doctrine for my type battalion.

Question 89


Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, changes are required to your units TOE/TDA.

- 1. Strongly agree**
- 2. Agree**
- 3. Neutral**
- 4. Disagree**
- 5. Strongly disagree**

Analysis (Q. 89)

Overwhelmingly, battalion commanders believe "**changes**" are needed in the TOE/TDA structures (84.1% overall either "agree" or "strongly agree"). As anticipated from analyses of previous questions and comments, the most responses in these categories came from CSS (100%), next CS (89.3%), then CA (73.5%) (see graph b below). Comments from respondents on this question, as well as the data and comments from question 90, indicate potential areas where changes are generally viewed as needed most by battalion commanders—equipment and organization.

Statistical Data (Q. 89)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	2	0.7	2.9	2.9
Disagree	2	8	2.6	11.6	14.5
Neutral	3	1	0.3	1.4	15.9
Agree	4	22	7.3	31.9	47.8
Strongly Agree	5	36	11.9	52.2	100.0
	.	<u>233</u>	<u>77.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.188	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	69
Standard Deviation	1.115	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	233

Survey Comments (Q. 89)

- TOE for FSB totally inadequate. BSA responsibility expanded two fold w/additional units. Require more staff for C2. S-3 shop needs intel NCO/officer. A Co woefully undermanned.
- Forward support battalions need organic transportation assets (at least a truck Plt, preferably a truck Co)—need HET's in FSB—more radios (C2) capability. An additional ten 5,000 gal fuel tankers for a total of 20 to support a heavy Bde.
- Aviation—must plus up by at least 35+ personnel—especially in maintenance, combat service support MOS's ! Critical to long duration requirements.
- Need battalion level automated management system for ammo—battalion has ammo support mission.
- Had insufficient logistical support; wheeled vehicles were at a premium.
- Particularly: Mass casualty EVAC capability; increase in GPS; more radios—particularly AN PRC 126 and 127; swap-out M548 for modern ammo carrier; Bradley or FAASV chassis vice 577 command tracks.
- Disagree—only to make the scout platoon more effective: long-range commo gear and better vehicles.

- Strongly agree—Better fuel handling, vehicle recovery equipment; higher grade level in signal repair MOSs.

Question 90


My battalion's TOE/TDA requires changes (question 89) in (mark as applicable):

1. No change required
2. Equipment
3. Personnel
4. Organization

Analysis (Q. 90)

Recalling the high number of responses to Question 89 (84.1% of the respondents "agreeing" or "strongly agreeing" that unit TOE/TDA changes were needed), what major areas did respondents identify most? In the aggregate, the rankings were "equipment" (46.4%); "organization" (31.9%); "personnel" (13%); "no changes" (8.7%). There were percentage differences in areas of emphasis by type unit, and as reflected by written comments. CSS units ranked "organization" as the area needing the most change/revision; CS and CA units ranked "equipment" as the highest area. Comments were most specific on "equipment" needs (e.g., more vehicle mobility, better commo, more ground lift/transportation equipment, GPS, night vision, automation).

Statistical Data (Q. 90)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
No Change Required	1	6	2.0	8.7	8.7
Equipment	2	32	10.6	46.4	55.1
Personnel	3	9	3.0	13.0	68.1
Organization	4	22	7.3	31.9	100.0
	.	<u>233</u>	<u>77.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.681	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	69
Standard Deviation	1.022	Maximum	4.000	Missing Cases	233

Survey Comments (Q. 90)

- Change 21/2 T trucks to 5 T, add 3 HMMWV's per firing btry, add 2 HMMWV's to HHB for CSM and S4.
- Must have more CPT's in the S3 section for LNO's, shift work, and to man three C2 nodes. Personnel are also needed in Support Platoon and S1. In combat there are many more tasks needing attention then in peacetime. Bottom line is the TOE has no robustness or resiliency regarding personnel strengths. Equipment: We all understand the mobility differential between the M113 FOV and Bradleys/Abrams. More protective masks are needed by TOE. More HUMMWV's for CSM, Chaplain and LNO's. Night vision & laser range finders for Scouts. More reliable radios.
- Both equipment and personnel.
- Bn HQ needs automated ammo mgt system for wartime ops. In SWA my Bn provided ammo support for all of XVIII ABN Corps. We used ad hoc spreadsheet system on locally purchased PC. System worked pretty well for management of up to 45,000 tons of ammo. When Bn was cut from XVIII ABN Corps to 22d SUPCOM, it could not handle management of 150,000+ tons of ammo. Also need engineer equipment for preparation of defensive positions.
- Equipment—New 5 tons; replacement for M88; Saudi HETs (made in Wisconsin) for our engineers; GPS to platoon level; and TACSAT to Bn level.
- In order of priority, M1A1 tank battalions need: (a) IFF on every combat vehicle (b) GPS on every combat vehicle and selected wheels (c) SINGCARS (d) to replace the M88A1 with an advanced recovery vehicle (e) to replace the older vintage wheels with modern wheels; the older wheels cannot keep up; the support battalion and field trains were as much as 100K behind in a 250K push (f) to replace the M106 and M577 with the M113A3 vintage tracks (the M113A3 is a great little vehicle) (g) to buy HETTs in sufficient quantity to preclude extended towing of downed vehicles and to provide operational mobility over extended distances; it was a shame the Egyptians had to move us on HETTs when we could not move ourselves (h) to convert to the M1A2 when feasible.
- Need night vision goggles for each signal team so they can displace at night.
- Apache (AH-64) force structure inadequate to perform 24 hour per day maintenance operations.

Question 91


My battalion was prepared to fight effectively in an NBC environment at the start of the ground campaign (24 February 1991).

- 1. Strongly agree**
- 2. Agree**
- 3. Neutral**
- 4. Disagree**
- 5. Strongly disagree**


Analysis (Q. 91)

Survey respondents rated their units' NBC preparation above average at the start of the DESERT STORM ground campaign (78.2% overall "agreeing" or "strongly agreeing" that the unit was prepared to fight effectively in an NBC environment). CS and CSS units were rated lower than CA units in these two value categories—CS (64.7%); CSS (76.4%); CA (88.3%). However, though above average, these scores combined with the written comments might raise some general questions about NBC preparation for actual conflict. Given the extreme visibility of the Iraqi NBC threat and capabilities, and the high emphasis in-theater placed upon NBC training of U.S. forces, is even a perception of 88.3% "prepared" acceptable? Why are CS and CSS units rated so much lower than CA units? Does this lower score support some written contentions of CS and CSS commanders that their peacetime missions often preclude or interfere with opportunities to do wartime training? Is the fact that many more CS and CSS units than CA units are EAC have an impact on their opportunities to do basic soldier skill training? Written comments reflect some perceived or actual NBC equipment and training shortfalls (e.g., BDOs, decon equipment, night NBC training, sustained MOPP 4 operations).

Statistical Data (Q. 91)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Disagree	2	8	2.6	11.6	11.6
Neutral	3	7	2.3	10.1	21.7
Agree	4	31	10.3	44.9	66.7
Strongly Agree	5	23	7.6	33.3	100.0
.	.	233	77.2	Missing	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.000	Minimum	2.000	Valid Cases	69
Standard Deviation	0.955	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	233



Survey Comments (Q. 91)

- Personnel trained but we were short BDO's & detectors!
- Aviators masks will kill people because of the significant distortion especially in a no terrain feature environment.
- I really don't know. We were trained with the equipment and doctrine intel the Army gave us. If this would have been adequate in real chemical ops I was never sure.
- But not in Oct/Nov or early Dec—ready in January.
- I question a unit's ability to perform effectively in a chemical environment, in MOPP 4; we need better, more comfortable CPOGs and protective masks.
- We trained hard and were confident but I think chemical war would have been not only tough to fight in, but extremely demoralizing.
- NBC stuff is scary; self protection and withdrawal are all I ever felt comfortable with, but we were proficient and could decontaminate as required; CSS cannot work in persistent NBC environment.
- Agree, as well as our equipment allows. I believe we, as the Army, overrate our capability to function in NBC gear—it sure is not effectively. There was not sufficient decon equipment.
- Agree—Army needs to include MOPP & mask drills, day & night.
- We had all the gear and were trained in the tasks. Our NBC equipment is out of the Dark Ages. We need new modern "lightweight" gear.

Question 92


While deployed to SWA, which *one* of the following areas posed the greatest difficulties for your command?

1. Logistics support
2. Communications
3. Intelligence support
4. Other (expand on comment sheet)

Analysis (Q. 92)

Without question, both in data responses (60% overall) and written comments, "logistics support" was noted as the area of "greatest difficulty". "Communications" was next with 30% of the responses. The two areas were ranked the same by CS and CA commanders ("logistics" first, "communications" second), though the percentages of each differed. As could be anticipated, CSS units ranked "communications" ahead of "logistics" as the biggest problem area.

Statistical Data (Q. 92)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Logistics Spt	1	42	13.9	60.9	60.9
Communications	2	21	7.0	30.4	91.3
Intelligence Spt	3	2	0.7	2.9	94.2
Other	4	4	1.3	5.8	100.0
	.	233	77.2	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	

Mean	1.536	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	69
Standard Deviation	0.815	Maximum	4.000	Missing Cases	233

Survey Comments (Q. 92)

- CSS needs commo equipment desperately to conduct logistics over vast areas. Also need navigational devices!
- Extremely slow Class IX resupply.
- Logistics was clearly the worst. There is no push doctrine. Co supply Sgts had to go all the way to the DIV Rear to sign for Class II, IV or VIII. FSB's didn't have the trucks to bring regular supplies forward. If we wanted it we had to go get it. PLL has to be raised to 300 lines during peacetime because that is what you need to have in war and you must learn how to store, transport and account for it. It is expensive but must be done or you train in a dream world thinking you have enough trucks & parts when you don't.
- Logistics problems in SWA. In my opinion, the parts/PLL, replacement uniforms, etc. we needed were in country. The system, to identify who needed

- what, was broken. My artillery battalion survived largely by scrounging and through very smart buys by our field ordering officer.
- (Logistics support)—Due to frequent moves.
 - Internal sustainment in SWA was difficult due to frequent moves and changes in supporting units. NG maint units often had no repair parts due to unwillingness of states to release ASLS.
 - The users constantly unable to understand the comm system, e.g. alternate means, abuse of phone precedence, message precedence, etc., the same old stuff that always frustrates Signal officers.
 - Batteries/repair parts for night vision equipment.
 - No dedicated support for Corps Arty Bde—changed DSUs 5 times.
 - Shortages of radios and the outdated VRC-12 series in combat arms battalions are the biggest problems in the force.
 - Logistics system broken; could not push items forward to the fighters; had to go to the rear to find things stockpiled and bring it forward.
 - Log support was sad, very very sad; turns my stomach when I keep reading articles about the “great” log planners, etc.; intelligence support was nonexistent.
 - LTF concept for echelons above Division is totally inadequate
 - Readiness...I deployed to Saudi in a C4 status. The battalion was totally committed (I mean every piece of equipment—no back up!). We still did our mission. The USR is just not a good system. The troops were great. I owe everything to them!
 - Transportation and communications were the greatest challenges.
 - Maintenance.
 - Corps Arty moving from one Corps to next, treated like a stepchild.
 - Logistics support—just did not have supplies, parts, etc., to take care of soldiers and equipment. There was no system.
 - Logistics support—of 20,000 parts requested we received less than 25%; no WF-16 in system.
 - (Logistics)—Bn personnel authorizations for maintenance personnel are tremendously inadequate. (Other)—30mm on Apache (AH-64) unreliable (jams & accuracy).
 - Mail.

Question 93

Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, rate your freedom to command.


1. Low
2. Moderate
3. High

Analysis (Q. 93)

95.6% of the respondents rated their freedom to command as “moderate” to “high”. The preponderance of responses were in the “high” category—76.8%.

These results substantially correspond to those for the same question in Part I of the Survey (Question 68)—98.3% overall, 80.1% in the “high” category.

Statistical Data (Q. 93)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Low	1	3	1.0	4.3	4.3
Moderate	2	13	4.3	18.8	23.2
High	3	53	17.5	76.8	100.0
	.	<u>233</u>	<u>77.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	2.725	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	69
Standard Deviation	0.539	Maximum	3.000	Missing Cases	233

Survey Comments (Q. 93)

- Extremely high...only shortfall was ability to influence logistics matters.

Question 94

Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, were you satisfied with the support you received from your higher headquarters?


1. Very dissatisfied
2. Dissatisfied
3. Borderline
4. Satisfied
5. Very satisfied

Analysis (Q. 94)

66.7% of the respondents were either "satisfied" (49.3%) to "very satisfied" (17.4%) with support received from higher headquarters. These results substantially correspond to those for the same question in Part I of the Survey (Question 76)—67.8% were either "satisfied" (51.5%) to "very satisfied" (16.3%). Responses by type unit for this portion of the Survey indicate that CSS commanders were significantly less satisfied with support from higher headquarters than CA and CSS commanders.

For the same two value categories the percentages were CSS 47.1%, CS 76.5%, CA 70.6%.

Statistical Data (Q. 94)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Very Dissatisfied	1	8	2.6	11.6	11.6
Dissatisfied	2	4	1.3	5.8	17.4
Borderline	3	11	3.6	15.9	33.3
Satisfied	4	34	11.3	49.3	82.6
Very Satisfied	5	12	4.0	17.4	100.0
.		<u>233</u>	<u>77.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.551	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	69
Standard Deviation	1.195	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	233

Survey Comments (Q. 94)

- Except for intelligence, but the Bde S2 was incompetent and trying to work a system that operates bottom-up with no regard for intelligence flowing down.
- REGT was superb operationally & logistically (non avn log); above REGT was beyond my worst expectations.
- Logistics support stunk; but my brigade CDR & his staff did their best as did the FSB CDR.
- My battalion was unique in the COSCOM and the Corps. Senior commanders cared very much, but did not have the knowledge and experience to be truly supportive. I now realize that I should have played a greater role in their education.

Question 95


Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, were you satisfied that the commanders above you knew how your unit was performing?

1. Very dissatisfied
2. Dissatisfied
3. Borderline
4. Satisfied
5. Very satisfied


Analysis (Q. 95)

81.1 % of the respondents were "satisfied" or "very satisfied" that their senior commanders knew how their unit was performing during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. This is above the percentage of responses for these value areas from the same question in Part I of the Survey (Question 77). The total there was 76.4%. Among the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM commanders responding, those in CSS units rated this less positive (76.4%) than their counterparts in CA (82.4%) or CS (82.3%) units.

Statistical Data (Q. 95)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Very Dissatisfied	1	5	1.7	7.2	7.2
Dissatisfied	2	4	1.3	5.8	13.0
Borderline	3	4	1.3	5.8	18.8
Satisfied	4	31	10.3	44.9	63.8
Very Satisfied	5	25	8.3	36.2	100.0
	.	233	77.2	Missing	
	Total	302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.971	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	69
Standard Deviation	1.150	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	233



Survey Comments (Q. 95)

- Relied on sanitized briefings by staff designed to gloss over problems and controversy rather than focus on issues.
- The Commanding General and supported Brigade Commander knew—my immediate commander, I'm not sure.

Question 96

Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, your senior commanders would support you in difficult times.


1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 96)

78.3% of the respondents to this part of the survey "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that their senior commanders would support them in difficult times. This was *below* the ratings for the same question in Part I of the Survey (Question 79), in which the total for these same values was 82.4%. DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM CSS


commanders rated this more positive (86.4%) than their counterparts in CA (79.4%) or CS (76.5%) units.

Statistical Data (Q. 96)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	2	0.7	2.9	2.9
Disagree	2	5	1.7	7.2	10.1
Neutral	3	8	2.6	11.6	21.7
Agree	4	28	9.3	40.6	62.3
Strongly Agree	5	26	8.6	37.7	100.0
.		<u>233</u>	<u>77.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	

Mean	4.029	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	69
Standard Deviation	1.029	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	233



Survey Comments (Q. 96)

- And they did!!
- Again it depends on what you mean by support !
- In my opinion my brigade CDR and ADC-M were even more supportive. The CG did get a bit crazy from 24-28 Feb.
- They did!!
- Disagree—Support based on performance, if you are doing well things are fine, when things start going wrong senior support becomes less visible. Too much finger pointing and not enough help in fixing the problem.
- Absolutely!

Question 97


Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, your higher headquarters established a satisfactory command climate.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 97)

75.4% of the respondents to this portion of the Survey "agreed" or "strongly agreed" that their higher headquarters established a satisfactory command climate. This was slightly below the percentage for the same question from Part I of the Survey (Question 80), which totaled 77.1%. There were no substantial differences by type unit—CA (76.5%), CS (76.4%), and CSS (70.6%). CS did have a significant percentage of responses in the "strongly disagree" area (23.5%), compared to CA (2.9%) and CSS (0%). Overall, CSS had a higher percentage at or below the "neutral" line than the other branches.

Statistical Data (Q. 97)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	5	1.7	7.2	7.2
Disagree	2	5	1.7	7.2	14.5
Neutral	3	7	2.3	10.1	24.6
Agree	4	30	9.9	43.5	68.1
Strongly Agree	5	22	7.3	31.9	100.0
.		<u>233</u>	<u>77.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.855	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	69
Standard Deviation	1.167	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	233

Survey Comments (Q. 97)

- It sounds hokey but a bond of brothers is what we became. In 1 ID the climate was first rate.
- A tendency towards overcentralization.
- Intimidation and humiliation—poor leadership example; Bde Cdr did not handle the stress.
- Disagree—The brigade I supported had an aggressive hostile leadership and my higher headquarters gave too much emphasis to staff relations instead of commander to commander. With all this we succeeded.

Question 98

Based on my (and my spouse's, if applicable) Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, Army family support programs are an essential aspect of maintaining a quality force.


1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Analysis (Q. 98)

As the written comments reflect, this appears to be one of the more emotionally charged issues of this Survey (responses to Question 99, and Part I Separate Question A, touch on many of the same themes). The statistical data from this part of the Survey leaves little doubt that battalion commanders, at least those who participated in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, firmly believe family support programs are very important to maintaining a quality force. 94.3% of all respondents "agreed" or "strongly agreed" on the essential value of these programs—71.4% of the responses were in the "strongly agree" category alone. The spread of ratings based on type unit for these two value categories are CS (100%), CA (94.1%), CSS (88.9%).

There were no responses in the "neutral" or "disagree" categories, though there were some in the "strongly disagree" category (CA 5.9%, CSS 11.1%). These responses may indicate that there are either strong pro or con views on this topic (i.e., family support programs-FSPs) and not much fence-straddling. Despite the favorable data, the written comments reflect a preponderance of negatives, not necessarily toward the conceptual validity of the programs, but rather toward their use, administration, resourcing, emphasis by the leadership, etc. Question 99 addresses FSPs further, and contains extensive written responses that should be read by anyone interested further in this topic.

Statistical Data (Q. 98)



<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>	<u>Cum Percent</u>
Strongly Disagree	1	4	1.3	5.7	5.7
Agree	4	16	5.3	22.9	28.6
Strongly Agree	5	50	16.6	71.4	100.0
.		<u>232</u>	<u>76.8</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
Total		302	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.543	Minimum	1.000	Valid Cases	70
Standard Deviation	0.973	Maximum	5.000	Missing Cases	232

Survey Comments (Q. 98)

- But it must be viewed as an Army not a spouse problem!! With adequate resources and command attention applied to it.
- My family support groups were extremely important to the battalion. Early in command, were established when we deployed to NTC. During SWA same. Many problems were solved by family support groups. Absolutely Need: (1) Formal training for wives starting at the Advanced Course. (2) Senior enlisted wives, E-7 and above, need formal training. (3) Our recognition system for wives is poor. Helping Hand type awards extremely hard to get. Certificates are poor substitute. As an artillery battalion commander, we used Molly Pitcher Awards, but had to pay out of pocket. (4) Family Support Programs are developed at each battalion level—there is no standardization and poor guidance. (5) Army should provide some funding for family support groups at battalion level. (6) Most "free" services such as printing or mailing are too

bureaucratic.—Based on what we ask the wives to do, the Army does a poor job of providing support!

- Our family support program worked well primarily because the company commanders' wives took the time to get to know the wives of the 1SGs. The establishment of those critical relationships was central to dependent confidence in the Army training program and the ability of their spouses to accomplish their missions safely. Healthy Co CDR/1SG wife relationships also had a tremendous positive impact on soldier morale and quality of life; wives got involved in bake sales, XMAS parties, etc., for benefit of troops.
- The published Bn Family Support Plan was a good reference for new families and for all dependent spouses during deployments. Bns in our Brigade shared these plans so that we could all capitalize on everyone's good ideas. Ft Campbell units (as part of the contingency Corps) execute family support plans very well.
- But not those established by higher headquarters. Those were for show only and not interested in supporting the unit or the family. The support agencies (Red Cross, ACS, AER, etc.) were vital and helped the unit programs. The Division Support Program/System was a distractor and major cause of friction.
- They are totally broken—family support programs are critical, but totally inefficient. A paper program that put an unbelievable pressure on Command Team spouses.
- FSGs are indispensable elements for successful units in either combat situations or training deployments.
- Call it what you wish, bottom line is caring. We were doing that prior to "family support groups".
- Family Support: This was painful; too many Field Grade officers were never separated; most had experienced a field problem like Graf or Reforger, but not a short tour or long deployment; too many Senior Officer wives got into the act—probably good for the Bns that had no experience, but there was too much direction given units that were doing just fine—not only fine—but better than any others; nothing works better than experience; we now have a lot of wives that have at least a 6 month deployment under their belts and know some of the problems they might face in the future; we must ensure that soldiers are required to make their spouses self sufficient; this we (the Army) have failed to do; someone always has to take care of them. The program is to the point of the Commander having to take responsibility for things families should take themselves; too much coddling.
- Based on my before, during, and post-Operation Just Cause experience, strongly agree family support programs are an essential aspect of maintaining a quality force; many of the highest level still do not know or they downplay the relative significance of the presence of dependents during Operation Just Cause.
- Agree—but they tend not to work...more lip service than substance.
- Agree, but many soldiers' wives work and the support programs create an additional workload. This was especially true during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
- After three deployments, I firmly believe that the Army must do better in the area of family support. We are depending on the spouses to volunteer and take care of each other. This may or may not work. The installation, after a

short period of time, forgets about the family. The only deployment that I felt comfortable that my soldiers' families were being cared for was the one that I left my XO behind. The commander's spouse should not be expected to carry this load.

- Army Family Support Program depends upon the attitude of the Bn Cdr regarding his people. Many say they care, but don't. Many rely upon spouses to carry all the program. Few Bn Cdrs & no Bde or higher Cdrs (I have observed) truly care or take part. My family was not assisted in any way, in eight months.
- Although not a Bn Cdr during Desert Storm, etc., my wife did head up the Corps G3 Section's family support group.

Question 99

Based on my (and my spouse's, if applicable) Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, Army family support programs (Check one or more as applicable):


- ☐ 1. Are not given enough policy emphasis by Army leadership
- ☐ 2. Are underfunded
- ☐ 3. Rely too much on unit commander's program initiatives
- ☐ 4. Are given proper emphasis by Army leadership
- ☐ 5. Rely too much on volunteerism
- ☐ 6. Are adequate

Analysis (Q. 99)

The data responses and written comments provided on this question were clearly more negative than positive. Written comments were provided by almost all respondents. It is probably reasonable to presume that spouses of those battalion commanders who deployed to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM likely played a more active and perhaps different role with greater responsibilities in Family Support Programs than prior to the Gulf War. Consequently, this recent experience may have prompted more written responses on this topic in this year's Survey; in any event, the comments may express some fresh perspectives on the issues associated with FSPs during challenging times.

There were multiple responses possible on this question. As reflected by the data below, the most heavily weighted responses reflect that respondents perceive that Family Support Programs are "underfunded," "rely too much on unit commander's program initiatives," and "rely too much on volunteerism." FSPs appear to be "adequate" overall, and accorded "enough" and "proper" policy emphasis by Army leadership. The data reflects significant gaps between these positive and less positive views.

Statistical Data (Q. 99)



Survey Comments (Q. 99)

- Most important was a central information source that shared concerns with a unified effort; greatest deficiency was difficulty of integrating parents of single soldiers.
- The family support system did work under very trying circumstances—the deployment of the entire Brigade to the Persian Gulf; essentially, the community was run by the wives for the benefit of the family members, with able supervision from the rear detachment commander; the community (Garlstadt) bears further study since unlike most others it was isolated in Europe, totally deployed (virtually all the men left), and carried on through a school year.
- If anything happened, the ad hoc family support system had to make it happen; there was no sustaining American civilian community or larger military community to fall back on.
- Family support plans/Army guidance totally inadequate for situation such as Desert Storm; who is expected to be social worker, baby sitter, chauffeur? Government should provide resources to assist Family Support Groups; level of effort expended by wives was astonishing; as one of the lead elements deployed (8 Aug) single soldiers were inadequately prepared (close out apts, resolve bills, cars repossessed).
- The most important aspect of a family support program is to have it up and running effectively before alert notification; ours worked so well because it has

been in place, and given command emphasis for over six years; you have to use it, train with it, check it frequently to ensure that all participate, if only with accurate phone numbers and addresses; if squad leaders and up are sold on it, it will work.

- Family support is looked upon as calling families together and briefing them on medical, dental, legal and financial activities on post; it is much, much greater; it is personally caring for soldiers and families; many commanders I have spoken with only concentrate on officer families and leave enlisted issues to the NCOs; this is wrong.
- Some aspects of the family Support Program caused my wife her biggest heartburn and she is still bitter although she has been actively involved for 18 years; something as simple as getting funds to mail newsletters I wrote in the desert to families in the states was finally accomplished by her buying stamps; the system remaining was overwhelmed and often provided little assistance in working thru the system.
- Most important—gave families who were already overseas a sense of caring and role as part of unit; deficiencies—some dependents expect too much; a few become a burden to the group; Sr NCO wives are largely non-supporters, but most outspoken.
- Important aspects were (a) strong rear detachment which kept in contact with the families and were proactive in problem solving and (b) contact persons (command group wives, battery commanders wives, 1SG wives and CSM's wife) very active in family problem solving situations and information distribution.
- Family support programs are totally broken; casualty notification procedures need briefed to family support groups; tremendous ambiguity exists in use of government transportation in support of FSG operations.
- The most important aspects of the unit's family support program were tracking family location and problems and providing continuous information to maintain the morale of families. In terms of support, the financial status of families and dealings with finance officers posed greatest challenges. The knowledge about the total resources and support structure available was not uniformly known or available to all units.
- Family Programs are adequately resourced; however, soldiers and their families need to take more responsibility.
- The key to family support during Desert Shield/Desert Storm was communication with the family. A start point is names, addresses, and telephone numbers. The TACCS computer is no help in this regard but certainly should be. Additionally, current TACCS applications do not permit adding rosters from Ft Stewart/Ft Campbell to the HQs TACCS at Ft. Bragg. Bottom line, the most elemental and essential information had to be key stroked into another computer.
- Regarding Family Support, I served as the rear-detachment commander for the Brigade from Aug-Dec 90. At Fort Bragg, the installation mobilized in total support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm deployed forces. In talking with officers from other posts where only partial deployments departed, family support was not as focused.
- The best solution to the FSG problem was full integration of the military staff in the rear (profiles, etc.) into FSG programs and assistance.

- They work, but each unit must do its own program. I did not understand everything I needed to do in PCC. More developed plans would help.
- Most important aspect—give the spouse the knowledge someone is there if needed. People care. Deficiency—soldiers not leaving their spouses properly prepared financially prior to deployment.
- The most important aspect of my unit's program was the continued reliance on a sub-unit-based wives/family system. My battalion was located on a small installation in Europe. It had developed a sound and functional battery-level support structure that supported all aspects of life in a European battalion. It involved officer, NCO, and enlisted men's wives. Its structure mirrored the chain of command, however, a wife could opt not to participate and the next in line could assume the responsibilities. The key was that this system met the needs of the battalion during deployment as well as normal operations. The greatest deficiencies of my unit's program was the inability to adequately deal with disruptive wives. It appeared that some wives took their frustrations out on the rear detachment and wives' organization. Our family support system didn't have the expertise to deal with these women, and accepted too much of their bitterness personally. The structure was there, however, such a situation had not been adequately planned for. No one had anticipated the malicious behavior some wives would resort to.
- Not given enough emphasis; Community support before war was poor to none.
- My battalion did not deploy but I sent 1 permanently assigned company and all RC units through Bliss were assigned to me enroute. All family support group and stay-behind/non-deployable soldiers from deployed Brigade/ACR/Battalions were assigned to me and all Family Support activities became mine. Our program concentrated on having spouses support each other using senior spouses (3 wives, 1 husband) to develop support needed and how it was provided. The entire post staff was totally involved. No, was never the answer unless the CG reviewed it and agreed. The CG held weekly update for all senior commander and CSM spouses and he personally hosted and briefed. He cared and they knew it. His staff provided info papers every week so these spouses could go back to their support groups armed with facts to fight rumors. Only deficiency was—some spouses came to believe they could ask for anything and if the initial response appeared to be negative, tears could turn the tide.
- Soldiers and their families were taken care of by other families. ACS put a structure in place at the installation, but the battalion POCs made it happen. Funds were not available for coffee, cookies, etc.—mailing and printing were available, but very bureaucratic. As soon as the division redeployed—the plug was pulled. No mailing, printing, welcome center was shut down! The welcome center (Family Action Center) should be a full-time deal.

PART III

GENERAL COMMENTS

Family Support Programs

- Greatest deficiency was that roles/responsibilities could not be established for a spouse based upon husbands position in the organization. Most effective when positions are filled based upon interest and talent.
- Most important aspect of Family Support Group (FSG) in my unit was the trust and cohesion in a stressful environment. The families learned to depend on each other for facts and important information, not to listen to rumors. Hard work and genuine chain of command concern paid big dividends. Deficiencies—Agencies such as DPCA & ACS, did not adequately support the FSG. The resources needed from higher command levels were lacking. We had to draw on internal resources and funds to make flyers and other material essential for FSG functions.
- The most important aspect is having contacts with the post-level support activities—JAG, finance, AER, Red Cross, Medical, Mental Health, etc. The greatest deficiency is the ability to bring in spouses to the group—to know them and understand their problems—before the alert. Complacency by the unit and distrust by the spouses is an unfortunate byproduct of peace. Even long training deployments are often not sufficient to surface the problems families face in war. I wish I had the solution, but I don't.
- Army's greatest deficiency is the expectation of free labor to make support program work.
- Ft Bliss provided superb support to families while the battalion was deployed. The battalion had a good program with limited participation before Desert Shield. The battalion and company groups as well as the rear detachment did a superb job keeping soldiers families informed and solving problems. For much of the time initially it was difficult keeping in contact with Ft Bliss from due to frequent moves/attachment of peacetime subordinate units to other units in SWA.
- I could go on for pages and pages about this. The Div tried to do it right; but the Army provides no resources at Bn! Regulations, bureaucracy and soldiers generally made it hard for the FSGs. Spouses were all regarded as hysterical and kept in the dark. If we are serious about this we need contact persons and coordinators to have "official" status when a unit deploys.
- Most important aspects—1. Providing timely and accurate information to family members via meetings, letters, telephone, etc. Telephone call trees absolutely essential for passing information, stopping rumors and gaining feedback from family members. 2. Support and active involvement of young NCO (E5-E6) spouses. 3. Identifying family members with special needs and creating individual plans to support them. 4. Close cooperation with support agencies on post, especially the Chaplain's office, ACS, and G1 staff. Greatest deficiencies—1. Lack of support from spouses of senior NCOs. 2. Soldiers not wanting their families to get involved with family support program. These families often had the most problems during Desert Shield/Storm.

(Family Support Programs cont.)

- The greatest asset of the FSG was the ability of the spouses to get information from the group's leadership during Desert Shield/Storm. There was extensive feedback from the spouses that this showed "we cared". The greatest deficiency was the FSG's leadership training gap in bridging the group's social, cultural, ethnic, and educational differences. (Which were dramatic and significant.)
- My challenge was with young soldiers. Based on a telephone call from a SGM at DA my battalion had the highest loan assistance rate in the Army. A LARGE AMOUNT OF TIME WAS TAKEN UP WITH FAMILY PROBLEMS. A big problem—no one received any training to handle family problems. The S1 is so small they cannot do admin—its a need that must be considered if the Army is serious about taking care of soldiers and their families. (TRADOC TDA Bn CDR)
- We better start learning that spouses often want/need careers too and quit counting on them for active participation; need to refocus—if it really needs doing, then soldiers and DACs will have to do it; volunteers (spouses, retirees, etc.,) are welcome, but should not be expected or relied on.
- Our situation in Panama put my wife thru an emotional roller-coaster; she performed critical functions at her initiative; she preserved the soldier force thru her tremendous hard work; while I have decompressed from command, she still carries the emotional baggage from the tremendous pressure of the situation.
- Either the Army should recognize the semi-official nature of FSGs as prescribed in the regulations/pamphlets or make it fully clear that they have no standing whatsoever—the Army cannot have it both ways.
- Many fellow battalion commanders tried to check blocks but didn't implement creative, effective family support programs.
- The Army must relook the issue of spousal support peacetime and war. My wife was committed—there was not an option to work or not support command. The reasons are obvious—more families have interpersonal problems indicative of society at large. More funding is required for programs; possibly financial reimbursement to wife...Generally superb command climate at Fort Campbell...quarters were deplorable (I added with personal funds a \$3500 addition to 1200 square feet of quarters; other commanders did the same). Soldiers lived in even worse conditions...squalid, "roach infested" trailers off-post...civilians, which stonewalled each attempt to build efficient low-cost housing. We should not treat "great Americans" this way.
- During my 18 years in the Army, quality of soldiers, equipment, and training has constantly been improving. I can not say the same for quality of life. As my wife says "I'm on the A list for promotions but the D list for housing." I lived better as a lieutenant than as a LTC. It really hurt when I talked to sergeants with children, whose wives depended on food stamps to make ends meet. We demand tough, realistic training with the best equipment in the world and we get it, because our soldiers are truly professional. Our divorce rate and cost of living is high and family priorities low. It's a cost we should not have to pay. We preach the "command team" concept and "chain of concern" as being important, but mention it on an OER and it must be erased—something isn't

(Family Support Programs cont.)

right. We keep funding club systems that are not profitable and we make our child care centers show a profit. As we downsize the Army maybe we need to relook some of these issues too. The Army is a great place to be and I'm not complaining but as the economy gets better we had better start looking at our retention factors. We talk about the whole man concept, how about the whole environment too!

- The concept of Family Support Groups is good...but they are broken. We need to do two things to have effective FSGs. 1) Pay the people! It could be a nominal amount (i.e., \$200/month). 2) Train the people! While volunteers mean well, they are not trained to handle the requirements of FSGs. Not even Battalion Commanders' wives. Nothing is free. No matter how well-meaning wives may be, with few exceptions they are ill-prepared and minimally motivated to fulfill the needs of a FSG. Its time we quit leeching off of the few who always volunteer, and start treating FSGs as an official part of the Army. That means paying and training.
- In Europe (Germany) Family Support Program shortcomings were: no transportation for dependents; no low cost child care; lack of responsiveness of post services.
- We had an excellent Family Support Program. Fortunate to have had several wives who were involved in the FSP at their former organizations. They carried over some of the traditions in my unit. Wives met twice a week; produced a newsletter to keep other wives informed. Had several pot luck dinners and picnics. Went on trips. Greatest deficiency: 20% of the wives did a majority of the planning.
- Although my unit was not deployable, we nevertheless had a strong family support program and chain of concern for both officers and enlisted. In many respects, our unit was an essential part of all deployed units' family support programs. Most important aspects: monthly meetings and activities, monthly newsletter, great friendship builder to unit cohesion. Deficiencies: not everyone participated, greatest need among Jr. enlisted families but couldn't coax them into participating on a regular basis.
- Cdrs wives don't have to baby-sit for young wives; treat them as adults and they will respond.

Command

- I only caution that these were not normal times, especially for units like mine. I took command in July 89 and things were relatively normal until notification on Jan 30, 1990 that our brigade was going to be downsized and reorganized. For the next seven months, that reorganization effort was our primary focus. Just as I was putting together a combined arms task force and had a years worth of training planned with the 101st Air Assault Div, Desert Shield began. That scrapped all my plans for the next 10 months. All I did was support Desert Shield/Storm in a multitude of ways. We lived day to day. Be careful with your statistics. There are other battalions who had other similar experiences. My command was not during normal times. Example: Quicksilver cancelled my first rotation to NTC and Desert Shield/Storm cancelled my 2d NTC rotation.

(Command cont.)

- I enjoyed command and felt I was in a very good division. The training tempo was fast—aimed at NTC preparation. I was constrained by time available more than any other resource. The downside of a high degree of operations capability was cost to family time.
- I had a great command and wouldn't trade a nanosecond of experience. However, if I could change or emphasize a couple of things so the next guy could do better, they would be: BUDGET—Stop disguising the issues. We can make a better science of this, but we have to call a spade a spade! TM-10/-20 standards cost big damn dollars on M1's & Bradleys. Lets pay them now and forever more—then we'll manage training better. Training time & facilities are available, but \$ get wasted. Personnel—Cut turbulence and keep quality as high as possible. People are everything. Tough realistic training doesn't happen without quality people.
- After 18 1/2 years of TO&E troop duty, I was selected to command in TRADOC and received a great letter from General Vuono, TRADOC Commander. I had learned from my previous superiors that such a distinction was viewed as playing ball in the Triple A system. When anyone inquired where you were commanding...the response was universal—o.k. I had six companies and four training programs (Ranger, LRS, Infantry Leader, Agency—DEA, Customs, Department of Interior, Counternarcotics). Thoroughly enjoyed it. I was promoted and selected for SSC which is the norm for those who do well and is more than appropriate recognition. Nonetheless, all warriors want that faint glimmer of hope to continue to serve in the line, or at least the opportunity to compete to serve there. TDA battalion commanders, in the main, don't serve as G3s, Chiefs of Staff or Brigade Commanders (at least in the infantry). Privately, the PERSCOM folks know and admit this. Selection for TDA is viewed as automatic cut to the farm team. By the way—not one question on TDA command in this survey.
- The issue of command selection of Major(P)s and frocking is one that should be examined. We put many commanders on the fast track too early. It gives off a bad signal to the eligible and deserving LTCs who are passed by and sorely missed, due to Army pressure to go deep into the "zone" and get the "young" Major(P) battalion commander. This also shows the true reason for selection based on careerism versus competence and experience. Also, no concern for soldiers. With a small army with limited command opportunities and ever smaller number of command billets, why do we put a major in a LTC's slot and bypass all the outstanding LTCs who have been tested, experienced, and matured with that subtle edge that only time in grade provides to a seasoned officer. It shows up on the soldiers who either miss or benefit from the maturity, confidence and stability. The discouraging effect of command selection of the "young" has caused many serious attitudes and feelings at the LTC level. Why the hurry to put majors in command? Where are we going? Who has measured the effective difference between a frocked major and a solid LTC in command? The consequence is mostly beneficial to the Major(P) selected to benefit and keep moving a "promising career." Self-interests and career competitiveness are more important than competent authorized personnel. One could argue that all battalion command slots be reduced to the

(Command cont.)

authorized rank of major and thereby justify all majors for the job—go ahead and make it official.

- I have left a number of questions blank because they did not apply to my unit—a training battalion, infantry. But I have answered the rest as best as possible. This questionnaire, however, was mostly directed toward a maneuver battalion. Perhaps I got the wrong survey by mistake; perhaps not. If not, it illustrates a major institutional bias against TDA commands. In the infantry, for example, of the 51 officers selected for battalion command on the last board, only 1 had commanded a training company. On the last brigade command board, of 20 officers selected, none had commanded a TDA battalion. This same thing permeates the whole TDA structure. This caused a tremendous lowering of morale at precisely the place it should be highest. Further, it robs the Army of the services of many fine officers because they are eliminated following service in TRADOC. As TRADOC demands its share of quality coming in, it should similarly take care of them going out.
- I commanded a tank battalion in a CONUS Mechanized Division from May 88 to May 90. We were well resourced in personnel (except armor lieutenants in 1988, and maintenance personnel throughout the tour); adequately resourced in P2 mission funds (given reasonable conservation measures); adequately resourced in ammunition in gross quantity (type-mixture: SABOT versus HEAT was never correct).
- At age 43 when I assumed command, I was frequently (2-3 times a month) sought out for advice by the other four battalion commanders in Okinawa—all of whom were between 38-41—regarding solutions to “people problems.” I felt then, and feel now, that our soldiers are ill-served by a policy that puts younger officers into battalion command billets before they develop a sufficient background for dealing with these exceedingly difficult issues.
- Anything to do with the “Command Team.”—If there is anything the Army has screwed-up or that is negative towards the junior officer, it is the “Command Team.” While its intent is super—chain of concern, taking care of the soldiers/spouses problems, etc.—the way it comes across leads a young officer to feel suspect. Of course, it is also personality dependent. But “Command Team” and the implications that the spouse is part of the chain of command does not work in today’s Army. It did not work in my father’s Army either.
- I assume this will be read by somebody. I do not expect changes to occur as a result of what follows as I fully understand that there may be differing opinions.

I served in Korea for almost 20 months of bn cmd. It was not my first tour of duty in ROK. I am infantry. All of my service was unaccompanied. I took leave with my wife every 6 months.

I worked extremely hard. Every day was a work day. I chose to serve unaccompanied because 99% of my officers and soldiers were in the same boat. Most of my contemporaries did not. Having no children made this possible...but a big personal sacrifice.

I made some mistakes, but never were they attributable to stupidity or lack of care in performing my duties. I was not a great bn cmdr in my first year; afterwards, I am quite certain none were better in this Army thru my sheer

(Command cont.)

effort and reasonable degree of intelligence. I was lucky on most days and a couple days I would rewrite if I could. My awes— usually occurred when I was exhausted.

I came to command with hundreds of articles from Infantry Journal/Magazine from WWII to the present. Mostly from the Korean War. 500 copies were printed and passed to my leaders. I published 10 other rainbow manuals (different colored cover) on how to prepare for DMZ duty and EXEVALs and policies, etc which were the basis for Idr professional development program. I did it to overcome my ignorance of Korea War history. It made a big difference because people turnover was brutal. Unless you've tried to keep the pace of service in Korea while you sustain 10% turnover each month...one has no idea what this is about.

By the end of my last year, 80% of my officers had extended. I wasn't especially popular. I have to believe my leaders thought they would profit by staying.

I didn't screw around in the vil'. My leaders didn't either, to my knowledge. Surprisingly, only about 30% of my soldiers even cared about the prostitution system therein. I printed my policy against married leaders playing patty-cake and it was reviewed by SJA beforehand.

I was able to attend the SJA course for O-6 Cdrs. It made a big difference. I took notes and kept them. I know others, including GOs, who would have profited by studying the same.

My peers probably viewed me as aloof. I didn't BS on the telephone with them. I have no idea what was happening in the rumor mill.

I had 3 different CGs. The one I served longest with was talented and hard-working. He had high standards but did some really goofy things, e.g marching the division to a mandatory religious revival and putting out a gag order that officers could not call MILPERCEN. But the truth is he was good for the division in many things he made us do. I think he left command embittered by hard feelings he knew many of us had. After a 18-month cool-off period to sort my feelings out, I wrote him a letter telling him that he was right in what he did. He never answered the letter.

With this as background, I believe the Army makes some terrible mistakes in Korea.

a. Especially since 1985, 2ID has been a horribly immoral place to serve. You have tolerated CGs and other senior leaders who could not resist the temptation of screwing off. The rumors abound. Quite frankly, it is amazing that most went on to 3-stars. The perception and toleration of this at such a high level is tragic.

b. I am fed up with seeing the Army send a BG/P to Korea for 11 months as an ADC/M...then pulling him back to the Pentagon where he can keep punching tickets. This GO had never served in Korea and was in the learning mode. It was evident he and his family detested their service with us. That he came to us at all is an example of a "touch and go" philosophy that I thought the Army was against.

c. There is considerable debate on this. I grew tired of the disasters and AR 15-6s I had to do for my CG concerning commanders who screwed up...and

(Command cont.)

sometimes killed soldiers. The common thread was lack of prior service in Korea.

d. Korea is terribly dangerous...the weather, the threat, the turnover which deprives a cdr of support and surrounds him with ignorance, the uniqueness of KATUSAs and the country, etc. Terrible things happen there and it is important to serve an apprenticeship under someone else so that one can at least avoid the pitfalls he sees his boss step in. I am fed up with soldier drownings, cold weather injuries, hemorrhagic fever, using a shield behind Claymores, etc. The Army screws soldiers and leaders by placing neophytes in charge...from O-5 and up. By the way, it is obvious the Army doesn't care anymore about whether or not CGs or Bde Cdrs or Bn Cdrs have ever served there.

e. I could write a long paper, begging my soldiers to pay attention to a number of issues which were important. I had 3 full rotations of soldiers and did not lose 1 to serious injury or death. We were lucky but then not so lucky in other measurements.

f. If the Army wanted to, it could deadline 90% of all the heavy trucks (2 1/2 Ton and up) in 2ID on any given day. With horrible traffic, steep hills, congested highways, pedestrians all over the place... it's a terrible accident waiting to happen.

g. I understand the importance of heavy forces. But ask an enlisted tanker how comfortable he is in his tank in a narrow valley. Is Korea infantry country of tank country?

h. Over a 5-yr period, what is the SSC attendance rate for O-5s who served in 2ID? Why aren't former 2ID bn cdrs going on to GO?

Those who serve in Korea don't get much credit for it...it's a long way off and most of the Army hasn't been there. It's only 1 point of risk in a spectrum of high-adventure activities. Maybe the US will be out of Korea by the Turn of the century. Until then, I figure the Army could make a few changes that would help.

Training

- This survey does not account for or address the unique nature of CSS missions & challenges. Our product is not only a trained soldier but providing support on a day-to-day basis, i.e., a tank battalion "trains" for a living. A maintenance battalion provides "maint support" for a living and "trains" as a secondary mission if there's time. All CSS battalion responses need to be viewed in this light. Additionally, battalions with numbered companies (TC, OD, QM) operate, train & report differently from Divisional CSS Bns with lettered companies.
- We were evaluated on NATO/SACEUR mission at least weekly. TRADOC could not teach/train the way it was conducted (required) in Europe.
- Some CSMs don't have the needed experience to be effective "troop leaders;" they cannot demonstrate "lead by example" in the motor pool on the equipment; some are SUPER; selection for CSM must be from the front line,

(Training cont.)

- not senior NCOs who have sped through the ranks in "odd" jobs; they do not have the required skills; units are greatly influenced by the CSM either in a positive or negative way.
- Desert Shield was more demanding than any other period I have experienced; performance of soldiers, NCOs and Officers confirmed basic quality of force, of the programs and education; professionalism of all who I observed reflect great credit on our service.
 - NTC experience was the key to successful deployment and combat in SWA; however, NTC is also a huge distractor in that results on any one rotation are so important that it significantly degrades readiness and training in other units.
 - The FMs 25-100 and 25-101 attempt to provide definitive guidance for unit training programs and assessments, however, I definitely had to make modifications to get it to work.
 - All or part of my battalion was deployed (off post) 584 days out of my 2 years in command. All my "training" was "real world." Training schedules/plans were impossible to maintain and would have been of little use.
 - We really need to do better with NBC training and doctrine right from the start. Soldiers arrive from service schools ill-prepared and with little understanding of the danger and actions required.
 - In Combat Service Support leaders don't know how to train and don't understand the language of training. Literally no one applies the training doctrine well and I suspect those that do well in units do not go to the service schools. If they do, they probably end up in doctrine development with little or no platform time. Need to send CSS Service School reps out to the better trained units to see how it's done. Send them back to Blackhorse. A lot of innovative things for them to cut their teeth on.
 - My answers did not exactly match your questions as I commanded a basic and advanced training battalion, or one station unit training battalion. My training schedule was essentially inflexible with guidance coming from TRADOC on subjects, times, and standards. I had no problem with budget, training ranges, ammo, etc., as the post always seemed to provide the resources. I had good officers and drill sergeants; we trained lots of fine soldiers, separating those that did not meet standards.
 - Main Support Battalions in Europe have limited training opportunities. MSB's are a bear to command with 1200 soldiers. It makes counseling difficult and training tough.

Leadership

- Seldom do you find a quality CSM or 1SG; I've commanded 3 TOE companies and 2 TOE battalions and have found two quality NCOs at that level; as platoon sergeants they are excellent.
- With a couple of exceptions, I was very disappointed in the professionalism, dedication, and motivation of the CSMs that I observed.
- Climate above Bn level was cold, aloof, impersonal and high threat-low confidence; there were no rewards, only punishment.

(Leadership cont.)

- DISCOM Cdr knew little about people or management skills; universally disliked by his staff and commanders; his wife was the terror of the organization; "do not p— off the woman I sleep with" he told us and he meant it; his wife made our lives, especially the "Bn Moms" a living Hell; her wish became the DISCOM Cdr's order.
- The Senior Rater system in the Army is broken. Senior raters do not communicate their profiles nor do you get feedback on where you are until your OER is on its way to TAPA; cdrs across the board are not making the hard profile choices.
- During 24 months in command I had 4 CSMs (1 relieved for sexual misconduct; 1 retired on AD—left after 3 months; 2 had no soldier leadership skills).

Personnel

- Do away with SSG rank—make up or out policy—make SFC by 12 years or walk!

Logistics

- Need to standardize the length of all S&P trailers and containers, one size container. Many divisions had containers they could not move because they were too long, thus requiring longer trailers from Corps transportation units. Look at 1ID, they had trailers for all containers.
- The logistics system CL IX is in bad shape; the automated system did not work, it was built for peacetime operations.
- Logistics commands had a lot of parts, however they did not have the capability to locate and distribute, shameful!

Other

- I was a TDA Commander and questions 13, 31, 32, 35 & 36 did not have a proper answer for my type of battalion.
- Your questionnaire is too long. You overlooked the TDA Battalions. Many LTC's commanded Basic Training or AIT Units. Your focus is too slanted to maneuver battalions in discussion. There is a big Army out there, and it is not all part of the TOE warfighting Army.
- You ought to address the question of whether the Army possesses a viable, controlled Awards program. DA and other higher headquarters must get the awards policies under control. Not too many commanders at Bn and higher levels appear to be able to say no. In order to solve the problem, we probably need to have a DA mandated/scrutinized program. People in the Gulf got silver stars for doing their job just because they were in the position. We the officer Corps lost this mission of faith with our soldiers...they know it was a joke.

(Other cont.)

- Excellent survey. It asked the right questions. I hope that my input assists in your project.
- This survey was not written with a basic training Bn in mind. Some questions needed to have a N/A as a choice, so I was forced to use neutral.
- Little of this survey, I feel, is relevant to the two battalions I commanded. This survey is a great example of the ignorance and misunderstanding that exists in the Army. Two of the imperatives (Quality soldiers and a trained and ready force) are centered in TRADOC and Recruiting Command. Few of your questions get at the requirements, work loads, and output of battalion commanders in these commands. I was raised in the TOE Army until battalion command. I can say, without reservation, commands in these organizations out-strip any challenge the TOE Army ever met.
- Army aviation is unique; it is the only branch expected to perform CBT, CBT SPT, and CSS roles/missions—often all at the same time; it is under resourced in terms of maintenance personnel and pilots, often required/expected to operate well beyond prudent limits; the majority of the Army does not understand maintenance, not even mech or tankers who believe they spend most of their careers in the motor pool.
- The USR is a 1950 approach to readiness; it does not take a rocket scientist to figure out non-combat readiness in NBC during the days before Nov 91; pull out all those great USRs that say combat ready then pull out all the requests for NBC equipment; a lie is a lie and the USR must reflect a true "go" status; we need readiness, not the old form over substance.
- Little of this survey, I feel, is relevant to the two battalions I commanded.
- This survey is not applicable to the type of battalion I commanded.
- I commanded a Defense Contract Management Area Operation which is staffed primarily by civilians
- I commanded an AIT Bn. Many of the questions on this survey were not applicable to such a unit, but were answered to the best of my ability.
- I commanded a TDA TRADOC unit—this survey doesn't fit very well—could skew answers.
- The survey should include up-front a question about size (troops, equipment, area) and type of the battalion. I commanded a 2000 troop battalion comparing it to a 500 man battalion in a subject such as UCMJ is illogical.
- What about Just Cause? We have more Just Cause battalion commanders than you would think!
- Four things need to be fixed in order to help the battalion commander be more effective: 1) Budget—You cannot plan viable, realistic training if your budget says you'll be broke by July! Battalions need to be realistically funded at the start of the FY. 2) Tempo—The training tempo is too fast!! Particularly for CS & CSS units. By the time they support the maneuver commander's training events, there is either no time or money left to conduct unit specific training. Also, the tempo does not allow for genuine reflection on lessons-learned and retraining because you have already started the next event. Slow down and get max benefit from each event. 3) Ammo—Not enough to meet STRAC standards. Demolitions, 40mm, grenades, 90mm. 4) Training Aids—Too little or no training aids for non-maneuver types. Need more mines, demolition etc.

(Other cont.)

- I am surprised that you all did not get into other areas that impact on a battalion's good health—hospital care for families, housing problems, deployability of pregnant soldiers, etc., etc.

Appendix A

Survey Cover Letter

Survey Questionnaire

Scantron Sheet

28 October 1991

Memorandum For Former Battalion Commanders

1. Your assistance is needed! We are requesting your help in completing the enclosed 1992 Battalion Commander Survey. The purpose of this research is to provide input to the Chief of Staff of the Army regarding the implementation of the Army's imperatives, doctrinal issues, command challenges, and a variety of other matters relating to your experiences as a battalion commander. You are one of a relatively small number of former battalion commanders and **your** input is very important. Only you and others in your unique group of former battalion commanders have the information and perspectives needed to provide an accurate assessment of the field. Your candid, insightful, and **complete** responses will provide valuable data for analyzing the concerns of battalion commanders, both positive and negative. The results of this **non-attribution** survey will be presented to senior Army leaders for required corrective actions. You will also get a copy of the final report.

2. The survey questions encompass a wide range of command issues (resources, readiness, quality of life, command climate, etc.). It consists of three parts:

Part I: General survey questions **for all**;

Part II: Complete only if you commanded in SWA during Desert Shield/Desert Storm/Provide Comfort;

Part III: Comment section **for all**. This is a very important section—it may take some time to comment, but this gives you a chance to express some personal and professional views on issues most important to you. These are **non-attribution comments**. You can also write-in comments on the survey sheet.

3. Some simple but important instructions:

- a. Use the enclosed scantron sheet to mark appropriate responses (unless indicated otherwise on the survey).
- b. Make comments on the survey sheets.
- c. Complete the survey by **22 November 1991**.
- d. Mail the completed survey and scantron sheet in the enclosed, pre-addressed and franked envelop.

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

4. If you have any questions, suggestions, etc., please feel free to contact any one of us at the address or phone number listed below.

5. Again, we greatly appreciate your time and efforts in completing this survey. Thank you.

Benjamin Farquhar
Colonel, US Army
Project Manager

POC's: Colonel Benjamin Farquhar
LTC(P) Barry D. Miner
LTC(P) Paul Roach

PO Box 552, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA,
17013-5050. Phone: (717) 245-4025/4220.

Data Required by Privacy Act of 1974, mandatory or voluntary disclosure:

Participation in this research is voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete information in the interest of research. There will be no effect on individuals for not providing information. All responses are non-attributable. Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

Part I

Former Battalion Commander Survey

1. What type of battalion did you command?
 1. Combat Arms
 2. Combat Support
 3. Combat Service Support
 4. Other
2. Your age when you assumed command was:
 1. Under 35
 2. 35-37
 3. 38-40
 4. 41-43
 5. 44-46
3. Your battalion was part of a:
 1. Separate brigade
 2. Division
 3. Corps
 4. Echelons above Corps
 5. Other
4. How long were you in command?
 1. 12 months or less
 2. 13-18 months
 3. 19-24 months
 4. 25-30 months
 5. 31 or more months
5. What percentage of your soldiers (officers and enlisted) were women?
 1. No women in unit
 2. Less than 10%
 3. 10-19%
 4. 20-29%
 5. 30% or greater
6. Was your unit coded to preclude the assignment of women to any positions?
 1. Yes
 2. No
 3. Don't know

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

7. In your battalion, what impact did female soldiers have on mission accomplishment?
1. Strongly negative
 2. Negative
 3. Neither positive nor negative
 4. Positive
 5. Strongly positive
 6. N/A, no women
8. Where was your command's permanent duty station?
1. CONUS
 2. Europe
 3. Korea
 4. Panama
 5. Alaska
 6. Hawaii
 7. Other
9. Was it an accompanied tour?
1. Yes, my spouse/family accompanied me
 2. Yes, but my spouse/family did not accompany me
 3. No
 4. N/A, I am not married
10. To what extent did your spouse participate or lead activities to support you while in command?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
 6. N/A, not married
11. Did your spouse work outside the home for pay while you were in command?
1. Yes, full time
 2. Yes, part time
 3. No, did not work outside the home
 4. N/A, not married
12. What portion of your command time did budget management require?
1. 10% or less
 2. 11-20%
 3. 21-30%
 4. 31-40%
 5. 41-50%
 6. More than 50%

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

13. Was ammunition available for you to meet STRAC standards?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
14. Did you have sufficient training funds?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
15. What was the average personnel turnover rate (per month) during your command?
1. Less than 10%
 2. 10%-15%
 3. 16%-20%
 4. 21%-25%
 5. 26%-30%
 6. More than 30%
16. How often were training resources (i.e. ranges, training areas, etc.) readily available?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
17. How often were unit unfinanced requirements significant inhibitors to training and operations?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
18. To what ALO was your unit organized?
1. 1
 2. 2
 3. 3
 4. N/A

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

19. Your assigned Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) constrained your unit's mission readiness.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
20. Did your senior headquarters cross level critical resources between subordinate units?
1. Don't know
 2. Not at all
 3. Slightly
 4. Moderately
 5. Greatly
21. To what extent did facility unavailability degrade unit operations and training?
1. Not at all
 2. Slightly
 3. Moderately
 4. Greatly
 5. Don't know
22. To what extent did MOS shortages degrade unit effectiveness?
1. Not at all
 2. Slightly
 3. Moderately
 4. Greatly
 5. Not applicable
 6. Don't know
23. How frequently did you defer repair parts requisitioning due to lack of funds?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
24. Was your budget based on projected training events or last year's expenditures?
1. Projected training events
 2. Last year's expenditures
 3. Other

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

25. Sufficient resources were provided to accomplish:
1. All the training I desired
 2. Most of the training I desired
 3. Only required training
 4. Less than required training
 5. Much less than required training
26. Training was developed IAW the 25 Series of Manuals.
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
27. Senior headquarters provided clear training guidance.
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
28. Training guidance supported the CSA intent for tough realistic training.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
29. Repetitious return to the same training areas degraded training.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
30. How frequently were off post training events an integral part of your training program?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

31. Your unit trained using Mission Training Plans (MTP) developed by TRADOC proponent schools.
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
32. MTPs provide the basis for tough realistic training.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
33. Higher headquarter's taskings, schedule changes, etc. hindered your ability to conduct training.
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
34. Higher headquarters directives enhanced your ability to conduct training.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
35. How often did you conduct combined arms training?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
36. How often did your training include joint service representation?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
 6. Not applicable

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

37. The NCO Corps was able to plan and conduct individual training to standard.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
38. Your unit would have been able to handle an increased individual training requirement if AIT were cut back.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
39. BNCOC / ANCOC improved the training capability of the NCOs who attended.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
40. Junior officers were able to plan and conduct small unit collective training.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
41. The scenarios at the combat training centers supported the Air-Land battle concept.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
42. Your unit's performance at NTC / CMTC / JRTC was reflected on your OER?
1. Yes, explicitly referenced in the report
 2. Yes, implied by the quality of the rating
 3. No, was not reflected in the rating
 4. N/A

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

43. How many NTC / CMTC / JRTC rotations did you experience while in command?
1. None
 2. 1
 3. 2
 4. 3
 5. 4 or more
 6. Not applicable
44. How frequently were quarterly Training Briefs IAW FM 25-100 conducted with your senior rater?
1. Never
 2. Annually
 3. Semi-Annually
 4. Quarterly
 5. More frequently than quarterly
45. Did your unit attain standards concerning the frequency of individual marksmanship training?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
 6. Not applicable
46. How frequently did you require your units to conduct physical training (per week)?
1. <3 times
 2. 3 times
 3. 4 times
 4. 5 times
47. How long was the normal garrison unit training day?
1. Less than 8 hours
 2. 8-9 hours
 3. 10-11 hours
 4. 12 hours
 5. Greater than 12 hours
48. Your unit had a sufficient number of training days available to it.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

49. Newly arrived soldiers had basic mastery of soldier skills.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
50. Newly arrived soldiers were trained to standard in their MOS related skills.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
51. The NCO Corps had sufficient knowledge and ability to carry out its training responsibilities.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
52. The Junior Officer Corps had sufficient skills and overall professional knowledge to carry out its training responsibilities.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
53. The Junior Officer Corps was sufficiently grounded in doctrinal unit operations.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
54. The Leavenworth portion of PCC provided an adequate "non-branch peculiar" background prior to your assumption of command. (Please discuss specific strengths or weaknesses in the comment section)
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

55. The "branch peculiar" portion of PCC provided an adequate preparation for command. (Please discuss specific strengths or weaknesses in the comment section)
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
56. Company grade officers understood organizational structure and relationships.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
57. The command climate on your post was satisfactory.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
58. The chain of command supported honest reporting.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
59. You received honest assessments and reports from your soldiers.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
60. The NCO Corps possessed satisfactory moral and ethical standards.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

61. The Officer Corps possessed satisfactory moral and ethical standards.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
62. Drug/Alcohol use among junior enlisted soldiers was a significant problem.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
63. Drug/Alcohol use among the NCO Corps was a significant problem.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
64. Drug/Alcohol use among the officers was a significant problem.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
65. How many times per month did you take UCMJ action?
1. 0-5
 2. 6-10
 3. 11-15
 4. More than 15
66. How often did your commander "mentor" you?
1. Daily
 2. Weekly
 3. Monthly
 4. Quarterly
 5. Annually
 6. At OER time
 7. Never

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

67. How frequently did you formally counsel soldiers you rated or senior rated?

1. Daily
2. Weekly
3. Monthly
4. Quarterly
5. Annually
6. At OER time
7. Never

68. Rate your freedom to command.

1. Low
2. Moderate
3. High

69. Rate your junior commanders' freedom to command under you.

1. Low
2. Moderate
3. High

70. How important were statistics in your command?

1. Of no importance
2. Not important enough
3. About right
4. A little too important
5. Entirely too important

71. Did you inform your subordinates of your senior rater profile?

1. Yes
2. No

72. Did you discuss your ratings with subordinates prior to forwarding their OER?

1. Yes
2. No

73. Did you know your senior rater's profile?

1. Yes
2. No

74. Did your rater discuss your rating before forwarding your report?

1. Yes
2. No

75. Did your senior rater discuss your senior rating before forwarding your report?

1. Yes
2. No

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

76. Were you satisfied with the support you received from your higher headquarters?
1. Very dissatisfied
 2. Dissatisfied
 3. Borderline
 4. Satisfied
 5. Very satisfied
77. Were you satisfied that the commanders above you knew how your unit was performing?
1. Very dissatisfied
 2. Dissatisfied
 3. Borderline
 4. Satisfied
 5. Very satisfied
78. How frequently did your immediate commander visit?
1. Never
 2. Weekly
 3. Monthly
 4. Quarterly
 5. Semi-annually
 6. Annually
 7. Less than once per year
79. Your senior commanders would support you in difficult times,
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
80. Your higher headquarters established a satisfactory command climate.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
81. Did you feel the chain of command was fair to you and/or other commanders?
1. Yes
 2. No

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

82. Do you feel as positive about an Army career now as you did when you first decided to make it a career?

1. Much more positively
2. More positively
3. About the same
4. Less positively
5. Much less positively

Please mark your answers to questions A to D on *this* questionnaire—NOT on the answer sheet.

A. How do you view your spouse's opinion of her/his role as a member of the "command team"? (Check one or more as applicable)

- ☐ 1. Important to unit
- ☐ 2. Important to my career
- ☐ 3. "Expected" by seniors (i.e. obligatory)
- ☐ 4. Not recognized adequately for time and effort involved
- ☐ 5. Spouse dislikes role
- ☐ 6. Spouse likes role
- ☐ 7. Not applicable

B. On a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) rate the following groups for competence.

- ☐ a. General officers
- ☐ b. Other field grade officers
- ☐ c. Company grade officers
- ☐ d. Warrant officers
- ☐ e. CSMs
- ☐ f. MSG / 1SGs
- ☐ g. SFCs
- ☐ h. SSG / SGTs
- ☐ i. PVT-SPC

C. On a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) rate the following groups for enthusiasm or drive

- ☐ a. General officers
- ☐ b. Other field grade officers
- ☐ c. Company grade officers
- ☐ d. Warrant officers
- ☐ e. CSMs
- ☐ f. MSG / 1SGs
- ☐ g. SFCs
- ☐ h. SSG / SGTs
- ☐ i. PVT-SPC

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

D. On a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) rate the following groups for ability to learn?

- ☐ a. Other field grade officers
- ☐ b. Company grade officers
- ☐ c. Warrant officers
- ☐ d. CSMs
- ☐ e. MSG / 1SGs
- ☐ f. SFCs
- ☐ g. SSG / SGTs
- ☐ h. PVT-SPC

Please use the remainder of the survey to answer questions requiring written responses, amplify any of your short responses, or to address any area relating to the validity of the Army imperatives at Battalion level. Thank you for your time and effort.

**If you commanded a battalion deployed in support of
Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort,
please continue to answer questions 83-99
in Part II on your answer sheet.**

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

Part II

Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort

If you commanded a battalion deployed in support of
please continue to answer questions 83-99
in Part II on your answer sheet.

83. How long was your battalion deployed in the Persian Gulf?
1. Less than 1 month
 2. 1-2 months
 3. 3-4 months
 4. 5-6 months
 5. More than 6 months
84. How long were you in command of the battalion in the Persian Gulf?
1. Less than 1 month
 2. 1-2 months
 3. 3-4 months
 4. 5-6 months
 5. More than 6 months
85. How much training time did your battalion have from deployment notification to the start of the ground campaign (24 February 1991)?
1. Less than 1 month
 2. 1-2 months
 3. 3-4 months
 4. 5-6 months
 5. More than 6 months
86. This training time was critical to my battalion (question 89) considering my battalion's SWA mission.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
87. Did your battalion fight the way it trained?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

88. Did Army doctrine for your battalion prove to be correct during the employment of your battalion in Desert Storm?
1. Almost never
 2. Seldom
 3. Sometimes
 4. Frequently
 5. Almost always
89. Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, changes are required to your units TOE/TDA.
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
90. My battalion's TOE/TDA requires changes (question 92) in (mark as applicable):
1. No change required
 2. Equipment
 3. Personnel
 4. Organization
91. My battalion was prepared to fight effectively in an NBC environment at the start of the ground campaign (24 February 1991).
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Neutral
 4. Disagree
 5. Strongly disagree
92. While deployed to SWA, which *one* of the following areas posed the greatest difficulties for your command?
1. Logistics support
 2. Communications
 3. Intelligence support
 4. Other (expand on comment sheet)
93. Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, rate your freedom to command.
1. Low
 2. Moderate
 3. High

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

94. Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, were you satisfied with the support you received from your higher headquarters?
1. Very dissatisfied
 2. Dissatisfied
 3. Borderline
 4. Satisfied
 5. Very satisfied
95. Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, were you satisfied that the commanders above you knew how your unit was performing?
1. Very dissatisfied
 2. Dissatisfied
 3. Borderline
 4. Satisfied
 5. Very satisfied
96. Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, your senior commanders would support you in difficult times.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
97. Based on your Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, your higher headquarters established a satisfactory command climate.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree
98. Based on my (and my spouse's, if applicable) Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, Army family support programs are an essential aspect of maintaining a quality force.
1. Strongly disagree
 2. Disagree
 3. Neutral
 4. Agree
 5. Strongly agree

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

Please mark your answer(s) to question 99 on *this* questionnaire—**NOT** on the answer sheet.

99. Based on my (and my spouse's, if applicable) Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Provide Comfort experiences, Army family support programs (Check one or more as applicable):

- ☐ 1. Are not given enough policy emphasis by Army leadership
- ☐ 2. Are underfunded
- ☐ 3. Rely too much on unit commander's program initiatives
- ☐ 4. Are given proper emphasis by Army leadership
- ☐ 5. Rely too much on volunteerism
- ☐ 6. Are adequate

Please provide your opinions (on the comment sheet) regarding the *most important* aspect(s) of your unit's family support program and its greatest deficiencies. **Comment Sheet Part III on page 20.**

Write *brief* comments next to question and *expanded* comments on Survey Comment Sheet (Part III).

Part III

Survey Comment Sheet

Survey
Question
Number

Comments

AWC GENERAL CODING FORM

4326

Former Battalion Commander
Survey—1992

Use a Number 2 pencil. Mark your answers by drawing a horizontal line through the number in the appropriate column which corresponds to your desired response.

Do Not Staple This Form

Please return the completed answer sheet *NLT 22*

November 1991 to:

Colonel Benjamin Farquhar
LTC(P) Barry D. Miner
LTC(P) Paul Roach II

PO Box 552
US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050.

Phone: (717) 245-4025/4220.

Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Former Battalion Commander
Survey—1992

SCAN-TRON

FORM NO. 20177-USA 830117

FEED THIS DIRECTION

DAF 5-37

1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
6	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
7	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
8	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
11	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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16	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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23	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
24	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
25	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
26	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
27	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
28	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
29	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
30	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
31	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
32	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
33	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
34	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
35	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
36	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
37	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
38	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
39	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
40	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
41	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
42	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
43	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
44	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
45	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
46	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
47	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
48	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
49	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
50	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
51	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
52	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
53	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
54	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
55	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
56	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
57	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
58	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
59	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
60	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
61	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
62	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
63	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
64	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
65	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
66	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
67	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
68	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
69	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
70	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
71	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
72	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
73	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
74	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
75	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
76	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
77	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
78	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
79	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
80	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

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Appendix B

Combat Arms

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q02 AGE ASSUMED COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
35-37	2	8	5.9	5.9	5.9
38-40	3	69	50.7	50.7	56.6
41-43	4	54	39.7	39.7	96.3
44-46	5	5	3.7	3.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.412 Std dev .661 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q03 TYPE UNIT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SEPARATE BRIGADE	1	28	20.6	20.6	20.6
DIVISIONAL	2	75	55.1	55.1	75.7
CORPS	3	16	11.8	11.8	87.5
EAC	4	6	4.4	4.4	91.9
OTHER	5	11	8.1	8.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.243 Std dev 1.085 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q04 LENGTH OF COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
12 MO OR LESS	1	1	.7	.7	.7
13-18 MO	2	6	4.4	4.4	5.1
19-24 MO	3	81	59.6	59.6	64.7
25-30 MO	4	39	28.7	28.7	93.4
31 OR MORE MO	5	9	6.6	6.6	100.0
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.360 Std dev .706 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q05 PERCENT WOMEN SOLDIERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NONE	1	101	74.3	74.8	74.8
<10%	2	23	16.9	17.0	91.9
10-19%	3	9	6.6	6.7	98.5
20-29%	4	1	.7	.7	99.3
>30	5	1	.7	.7	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.356 Std dev .707 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q06 UNIT CODED TO PRECLUDE WOMEN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	115	84.6	84.6	84.6
NO	2	16	11.8	11.8	96.3
DO NOT KNOW	3	5	3.7	3.7	100.0
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.191 Std dev .479 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q07 IMPACT FEMALE SOLDIERS ON MISSION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEG	2	6	4.4	4.4	4.4
NEITHER	3	11	8.1	8.1	12.6
POS	4	12	8.8	8.9	21.5
STRONG POS	5	7	5.1	5.2	26.7
N/A	6	99	72.8	73.3	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 5.348 Std dev 1.199 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
CONUS	1	81	59.6	59.6	59.6
EUROPE	2	40	29.4	29.4	89.0
KOREA	3	5	3.7	3.7	92.6
PANAMA	4	3	2.2	2.2	94.9
ALASKA	5	2	1.5	1.5	96.3
HAWAII	6	5	3.7	3.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.676 Std dev 1.160 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q09 ACCOMPANIED TOUR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES WITH SPOUSE	1	127	93.4	93.4	93.4
YES WITHOUT SPOUSE	2	2	1.5	1.5	94.9
NO	3	4	2.9	2.9	97.8
N/A	4	3	2.2	2.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.140 Std dev .560 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q10 SPOUSE PARTICIPATION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	2	1.5	1.5	1.5
SELDOM	2	1	.7	.7	2.2
SOMETIMES	3	11	8.1	8.1	10.3
FREQUENTLY	4	28	20.6	20.6	30.9
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	89	65.4	65.4	96.3
N/A	6	5	3.7	3.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.588 Std dev .839 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q11 SPOUSE EMPLOYMENT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
FULLTIME	1	50	36.8	36.8	36.8
PARTTIME	2	37	27.2	27.2	64.0
NOT OUTSIDE HOME	3	45	33.1	33.1	97.1
N/A	4	4	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.022 Std dev .906 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q12 PERCENT TIME ON BUDGET MANAGEMENT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<10%	1	88	64.7	64.7	64.7
11-20%	2	40	29.4	29.4	94.1
21-30%	3	6	4.4	4.4	98.5
31-40%	4	1	.7	.7	99.3
41-50%	5	1	.7	.7	100.0
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.434 Std dev .685 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q13 ENOUGH AMMUNITION FOR STRAC

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	11	8.1	8.1	8.1
SELDOM	2	8	5.9	5.9	14.1
SOMETIMES	3	14	10.3	10.4	24.4
FREQUENTLY	4	32	23.5	23.7	48.1
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	70	51.5	51.9	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.052 Std dev 1.266 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q14 SUFFICIENT TRAINING FUNDS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	4	2.9	3.0	3.0
SELDOM	2	6	4.4	4.4	7.4
SOMETIMES	3	17	12.5	12.6	20.0
FREQUENTLY	4	36	26.5	26.7	46.7
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	72	52.9	53.3	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.230 Std dev 1.029 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q15 AVERAGE PERSONNEL TURNOVER RATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<10%	1	55	40.4	40.4	40.4
10-15%	2	64	47.1	47.1	87.5
16-20%	3	11	8.1	8.1	95.6
21-25%	4	3	2.2	2.2	97.8
>30%	6	3	2.2	2.2	100.0
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.809 Std dev .947 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q16 AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING RESOURCES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	9	6.6	6.7	6.7
SOMETIMES	3	28	20.6	20.7	27.4
FREQUENTLY	4	55	40.4	40.7	68.1
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	43	31.6	31.9	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.978 Std dev .893 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q17 UFRS INHIBITED TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	38	27.9	28.4	28.4
SELDOM	2	53	39.0	39.6	67.9
SOMETIMES	3	31	22.8	23.1	91.0
FREQUENTLY	4	10	7.4	7.5	98.5
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	2	1.5	1.5	100.0
.	.	2	1.5	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.142 Std dev .967 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 134 Missing cases 2

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q18 ALO

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1	1	91	66.9	67.4	67.4
2	2	33	24.3	24.4	91.9
3	3	3	2.2	2.2	94.1
N/A	4	8	5.9	5.9	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.467 Std dev .809 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q19 ALO CONSTRAINED READINESS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	55	40.4	41.0	41.0
DISAGREE	2	43	31.6	32.1	73.1
NEUTRAL	3	17	12.5	12.7	85.8
AGREE	4	13	9.6	9.7	95.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	6	4.4	4.5	100.0
	.	2	1.5	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.045 Std dev 1.156 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 134 Missing cases 2

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q20 CRITICAL RESOURCES CROSSLEVELED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DONT KNOW	1	1	.7	.7	.7
NOT AT ALL	2	14	10.3	10.3	11.0
SLIGHTLY	3	53	39.0	39.0	50.0
MODERATELY	4	49	36.0	36.0	86.0
GREATLY	5	19	14.0	14.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.522 Std dev .886 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q21 FACILITY AVAIL DEGRADED TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT AT ALL	1	36	26.5	26.7	26.7
SLIGHTLY	2	60	44.1	44.4	71.1
MODERATELY	3	26	19.1	19.3	90.4
GREATLY	4	13	9.6	9.6	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.119 Std dev .915 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q22 MOS SHORTAGES DEGRADED EFFECTIVENESS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT AT ALL	1	10	7.4	7.5	7.5
SLIGHTLY	2	60	44.1	44.8	52.2
MODERATELY	3	47	34.6	35.1	87.3
GREATLY	4	16	11.8	11.9	99.3
NOT APPLICABLE	5	1	.7	.7	100.0
.	.	2	1.5	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.537 Std dev .829 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 134 Missing cases 2

Q23 REPAIR PARTS REQUISITIONS DEFERRED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	64	47.1	47.4	47.4
SELDOM	2	30	22.1	22.2	69.6
SOMETIMES	3	26	19.1	19.3	88.9
FREQUENTLY	4	12	8.8	8.9	97.8
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	3	2.2	2.2	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.963 Std dev 1.109 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q24 BASIS FOR BUDGET

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
PROJECTED EVENTS	1	92	67.6	68.1	68.1
PRIOR EXPENDITURES	2	27	19.9	20.0	88.1
OTHER	3	16	11.8	11.9	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.437 Std dev .698 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q25 SUFFICIENT RESOURCES FOR TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MUCH LESS	1	1	.7	.7	.7
LESS THAN REQUIRED	2	16	11.8	11.9	12.6
ONLY REQUIRED	3	17	12.5	12.6	25.2
MOST I DESIRED	4	80	58.8	59.3	84.4
ALL I DESIRED	5	21	15.4	15.6	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.770 Std dev .880 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q26 TRAINING DEVELOPMENT BASED ON 25 SERIES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	1	.7	.7	.7
SOMETIMES	3	12	8.8	8.9	9.6
FREQUENTLY	4	33	24.3	24.4	34.1
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	89	65.4	65.9	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.548 Std dev .720 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q27 CLEAR TRNG GUIDANCE FROM SENIOR HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	1	.7	.7	.7
SELDOM	2	12	8.8	8.8	9.6
SOMETIMES	3	16	11.8	11.8	21.3
FREQUENTLY	4	53	39.0	39.0	60.3
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	54	39.7	39.7	100.0
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.081 Std dev .967 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q28 TRNG GUIDANCE SUPPORTED TOUGH TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	5	3.7	3.7	3.7
DISAGREE	2	2	1.5	1.5	5.1
NEUTRAL	3	14	10.3	10.3	15.4
AGREE	4	43	31.6	31.6	47.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	72	52.9	52.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.287 Std dev .973 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q29 SAME TRNG AREAS DEGRADED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	11	8.1	8.2	8.2
DISAGREE	2	48	35.3	35.8	44.0
NEUTRAL	3	23	16.9	17.2	61.2
AGREE	4	43	31.6	32.1	93.3
STRONGLY AGREE	5	9	6.6	6.7	100.0
	.	2	1.5	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.933 Std dev 1.132 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 134 Missing cases 2

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q30 FREQUENCY OF OFF POST TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	9	6.6	6.7	6.7
SELDOM	2	13	9.6	9.6	16.3
SOMETIMES	3	29	21.3	21.5	37.8
FREQUENTLY	4	60	44.1	44.4	82.2
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	24	17.6	17.8	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.570 Std dev 1.096 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q31 TRNG BASED ON MTPS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	20	14.7	15.0	15.0
SELDOM	2	12	8.8	9.0	24.1
SOMETIMES	3	27	19.9	20.3	44.4
FREQUENTLY	4	42	30.9	31.6	75.9
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	32	23.5	24.1	100.0
.	.	3	2.2	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.406 Std dev 1.349 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 133 Missing cases 3

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q32 MTPS PROVIDED BASIS FOR TOUGH TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	7	5.1	5.2	5.2
DISAGREE	2	14	10.3	10.4	15.6
NEUTRAL	3	39	28.7	28.9	44.4
AGREE	4	57	41.9	42.2	86.7
STRONGLY AGREE	5	18	13.2	13.3	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.481 Std dev 1.021 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q33 HIGHER HQ CHANGES HINDERED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	4	2.9	3.0	3.0
SELDOM	2	27	19.9	20.0	23.0
SOMETIMES	3	69	50.7	51.1	74.1
FREQUENTLY	4	30	22.1	22.2	96.3
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	5	3.7	3.7	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.037 Std dev .832 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q34 HIGHER HQ DIRECTIVES ENHANCED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	8	5.9	5.9	5.9
DISAGREE	2	35	25.7	25.7	31.6
NEUTRAL	3	35	25.7	25.7	57.4
AGREE	4	51	37.5	37.5	94.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	7	5.1	5.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.103 Std dev 1.035 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q35 TRNG INCLUDED COMBINED ARMS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	11	8.1	8.1	8.1
SELDOM	2	13	9.6	9.6	17.8
SOMETIMES	3	22	16.2	16.3	34.1
FREQUENTLY	4	64	47.1	47.4	81.5
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	25	18.4	18.5	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.585 Std dev 1.142 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q36 TRNG WAS JOINT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	38	27.9	28.1	28.1
SELDOM	2	32	23.5	23.7	51.9
SOMETIMES	3	37	27.2	27.4	79.3
FREQUENTLY	4	17	12.5	12.6	91.9
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	7	5.1	5.2	97.0
N/A	6	4	2.9	3.0	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.519 Std dev 1.321 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q37 NCOS ABILITY TO PLAN AND CONDUCT TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	1.5	1.5	1.5
DISAGREE	2	17	12.5	12.6	14.1
NEUTRAL	3	14	10.3	10.4	24.4
AGREE	4	77	56.6	57.0	81.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	25	18.4	18.5	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.785 Std dev .941 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q38 OK TO TRNSFR INDIV TRNG FROM AIT TO UNIT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	40	29.4	29.9	29.9
DISAGREE	2	41	30.1	30.6	60.4
NEUTRAL	3	12	8.8	9.0	69.4
AGREE	4	31	22.8	23.1	92.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	10	7.4	7.5	100.0
.	.	2	1.5	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.478 Std dev 1.330 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 134 Missing cases 2

Q39 BNCOC/ANCOC IMPROVED CAPABILITY TO TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	2.2	2.2	2.2
DISAGREE	2	6	4.4	4.4	6.6
NEUTRAL	3	4	2.9	2.9	9.6
AGREE	4	79	58.1	58.1	67.6
STRONGLY AGREE	5	44	32.4	32.4	100.0
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.140 Std dev .845 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q40 JR OFF ABLE TO PLAN, CONDUCT TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	2.2	2.2	2.2
DISAGREE	2	9	6.6	6.7	8.9
NEUTRAL	3	7	5.1	5.2	14.1
AGREE	4	93	68.4	68.9	83.0
STRONGLY AGREE	5	23	16.9	17.0	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.919 Std dev .829 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q41 SCENARIOS AT CTC SUPPORTED ALB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	2.2	2.3	2.3
DISAGREE	2	6	4.4	4.6	6.9
NEUTRAL	3	21	15.4	16.0	22.9
AGREE	4	56	41.2	42.7	65.6
STRONGLY AGREE	5	45	33.1	34.4	100.0
.	.	5	3.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.023 Std dev .948 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 131 Missing cases 5

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q42 CTC PERFORMANCE ON OER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES, EXPLICITLY	1	46	33.8	34.6	34.6
YES, IMPLIED	2	25	18.4	18.8	53.4
NO	3	13	9.6	9.8	63.2
N/A	4	49	36.0	36.8	100.0
.	.	3	2.2	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.489 Std dev 1.300 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 133 Missing cases 3

Q43 NUMBER OF CTC ROTATIONS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NONE	1	38	27.9	28.4	28.4
1	2	39	28.7	29.1	57.5
2	3	19	14.0	14.2	71.6
3	4	12	8.8	9.0	80.6
4 OR MORE	5	10	7.4	7.5	88.1
N/A	6	16	11.8	11.9	100.0
.	.	2	1.5	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.739 Std dev 1.686 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 134 Missing cases 2

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q44 FREQUENCY OF QTBS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEVER	1	3	2.2	2.2	2.2
SEMI-ANNUALLY	3	8	5.9	5.9	8.1
QUARTLERY	4	121	89.0	89.0	97.1
MORE THAN QUARTERLY	5	4	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.904 Std dev .529 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q45 ATTAIN STDS FOR INDIV MARKSMENSHIP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	5	3.7	3.7	3.7
SOMETIMES	3	7	5.1	5.1	8.8
FREQUENTLY	4	20	14.7	14.7	23.5
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	104	76.5	76.5	100.0
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.640 Std dev .747 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q46 FREQUENCY OF PT PER WEEK

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<3 PER WEEK	1	9	6.6	7.0	7.0
3 PER WEEK	2	38	27.9	29.7	36.7
4 PER WEEK	3	38	27.9	29.7	66.4
5 PER WEEK	4	43	31.6	33.6	100.0
.	.	8	5.9	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.898 Std dev .954 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 128 Missing cases 8

Q47 LENGTH OF GARRISON DUTY DAY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<8 HOURS	1	2	1.5	1.5	1.5
8-9 HOURS	2	39	28.7	28.7	30.1
10-11 HOURS	3	75	55.1	55.1	85.3
12 HOURS	4	12	8.8	8.8	94.1
>12 HOURS	5	8	5.9	5.9	100.0
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.890 Std dev .814 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q48 HAD SUFFICIENT TRNG DAYS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	6	4.4	4.4	4.4
DISAGREE	2	22	16.2	16.2	20.6
NEUTRAL	3	14	10.3	10.3	30.9
AGREE	4	72	52.9	52.9	83.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	22	16.2	16.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.603 Std dev 1.077 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q49 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC SOLDIER SKILLS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	4	2.9	3.0	3.0
DISAGREE	2	21	15.4	15.7	18.7
NEUTRAL	3	24	17.6	17.9	36.6
AGREE	4	78	57.4	58.2	94.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	7	5.1	5.2	100.0
	.	2	1.5	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.470 Std dev .923 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 134 Missing cases 2

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q50 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC MCS SKILLS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	5	3.7	3.7	3.7
DISAGREE	2	38	27.9	28.4	32.1
NEUTRAL	3	31	22.8	23.1	55.2
AGREE	4	55	40.4	41.0	96.3
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	3.7	3.7	100.0
	.	2	1.5	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.127 Std dev .992 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 134 Missing cases 2

Q51 NCOS KNOW AND ABIL TO TRAIN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	5	3.7	3.7	3.7
DISAGREE	2	16	11.8	11.9	15.6
NEUTRAL	3	13	9.6	9.6	25.2
AGREE	4	88	64.7	65.2	90.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	13	9.6	9.6	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.652 Std dev .941 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q52 JR OFF SKILL AND KNOW TO TRAIN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	4	2.9	2.9	2.9
DISAGREE	2	15	11.0	11.0	14.0
NEUTRAL	3	12	8.8	8.8	22.8
AGREE	4	93	68.4	68.4	91.2
STRONGLY AGREE	5	12	8.8	8.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.691 Std dev .890 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q53 JR OFF GROUNDED IN UNIT DOCTRINE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	2.2	2.2	2.2
DISAGREE	2	34	25.0	25.2	27.4
NEUTRAL	3	25	18.4	18.5	45.9
AGREE	4	68	50.0	50.4	96.3
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	3.7	3.7	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.281 Std dev .959 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q54 LEAVENWORTH PCC ADEQUATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	4	2.9	3.0	3.0
DISAGREE	2	11	8.1	8.2	11.2
NEUTRAL	3	27	19.9	20.1	31.3
AGREE	4	86	63.2	64.2	95.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	6	4.4	4.5	100.0
	.	2	1.5	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.590 Std dev .825 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 134 Missing cases 2

Q55 BRANCH PCC ADEQUATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	2.2	2.3	2.3
DISAGREE	2	5	3.7	3.8	6.0
NEUTRAL	3	25	18.4	18.8	24.8
AGREE	4	80	58.8	60.2	85.0
STRONGLY AGREE	5	20	14.7	15.0	100.0
	.	3	2.2	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.820 Std dev .815 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 133 Missing cases 3

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q56 OFF UNDERSTOOD ORG STRUC AND RELTN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	1.5	1.5	1.5
DISAGREE	2	11	8.1	8.1	9.6
NEUTRAL	3	11	8.1	8.1	17.8
AGREE	4	101	74.3	74.8	92.6
STRONGLY AGREE	5	10	7.4	7.4	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.785 Std dev .757 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q57 POST COMMAND CLIMATE SATISFACTORY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	6	4.4	4.4	4.4
DISAGREE	2	5	3.7	3.7	8.1
NEUTRAL	3	6	4.4	4.4	12.5
AGREE	4	74	54.4	54.4	66.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	45	33.1	33.1	100.0
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.081 Std dev .959 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q58 COC SUPPORTED ACCURATE REPORTING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	1.5	1.5	1.5
DISAGREE	2	6	4.4	4.4	5.9
NEUTRAL	3	11	8.1	8.1	14.0
AGREE	4	46	33.8	33.8	47.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	71	52.2	52.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.309 Std dev .907 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q59 ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS AND REPORTS UP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	1.5	1.5	1.5
DISAGREE	2	3	2.2	2.2	3.7
NEUTRAL	3	8	5.9	5.9	9.6
AGREE	4	78	57.4	57.4	66.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	45	33.1	33.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.184 Std dev .762 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q60 NCO MORAL AND ETHICAL STDS SAT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	.7	.7	.7
DISAGREE	2	5	3.7	3.7	4.4
NEUTRAL	3	13	9.6	9.6	14.0
AGREE	4	94	69.1	69.1	83.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	23	16.9	16.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.978 Std dev .694 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q61 OFF MORAL AND ETHICAL STDS SAT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	.7	.7	.7
NEUTRAL	3	4	2.9	2.9	3.7
AGREE	4	92	67.6	67.6	71.3
STRONGLY AGREE	5	39	28.7	28.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.235 Std dev .574 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q62 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR JR EM

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	25	18.4	18.4	18.4
DISAGREE	2	65	47.8	47.8	66.2
NEUTRAL	3	13	9.6	9.6	75.7
AGREE	4	27	19.9	19.9	95.6
STRONGLY AGREE	5	6	4.4	4.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.441 Std dev 1.134 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q63 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR NCOS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	33	24.3	24.3	24.3
DISAGREE	2	57	41.9	41.9	66.2
NEUTRAL	3	22	16.2	16.2	82.4
AGREE	4	20	14.7	14.7	97.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	4	2.9	2.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.301 Std dev 1.084 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q64 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR OFF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	73	53.7	53.7	53.7
DISAGREE	2	55	40.4	40.4	94.1
NEUTRAL	3	5	3.7	3.7	97.8
AGREE	4	2	1.5	1.5	99.3
STRONGLY AGREE	5	1	.7	.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.551 Std dev .708 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q65 UCMJ ACTIONS PER MONTH

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
0-5	1	110	80.9	80.9	80.9
6-10	2	22	16.2	16.2	97.1
11-15	3	3	2.2	2.2	99.3
>15	4	1	.7	.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.228 Std dev .516 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q66 FREQ MENTORED BY CDR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DAILY	1	3	2.2	2.2	2.2
WEEKLY	2	29	21.3	21.5	23.7
MONTHLY	3	30	22.1	22.2	45.9
QUARTERLY	4	28	20.6	20.7	66.7
ANNUALLY	5	7	5.1	5.2	71.9
AT OER TIME	6	14	10.3	10.4	82.2
NEVER	7	24	17.6	17.8	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.074 Std dev 1.835 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q67 FREQ COUNSELED SUBORDINATES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
WEEKLY	2	9	6.6	6.7	6.7
MONTHLY	3	25	18.4	18.5	25.2
QUARTERLY	4	71	52.2	52.6	77.8
ANNUALLY	5	12	8.8	8.9	86.7
AT OER TIME	6	16	11.8	11.9	98.5
NEVER	7	2	1.5	1.5	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.052 Std dev 1.074 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q68 YOUR FREEDOM TO COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	3	2.2	2.2	2.2
MODERATE	2	25	18.4	18.4	20.6
HIGH	3	108	79.4	79.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.772 Std dev .471 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q69 YOUR SUBORDINATES FREEDOM TO CMD

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	1	.7	.7	.7
MODERATE	2	50	36.8	37.0	37.8
HIGH	3	84	61.8	62.2	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.615 Std dev .503 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q70 IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO IMPORTANCE	1	7	5.1	5.1	5.1
NOT ENOUGH	2	3	2.2	2.2	7.4
ABOUT RIGHT	3	93	68.4	68.4	75.7
A LITTLE TOO IMP	4	26	19.1	19.1	94.9
ENTIRELY TOO IMP	5	7	5.1	5.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.169 Std dev .775 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q71 YOUR SENIOR RATER PROFILE KNOWN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	130	95.6	95.6	95.6
NO	2	6	4.4	4.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.044 Std dev .206 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q72 DISCUSS RATINGS WITH SUBORDINATES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	131	96.3	96.3	96.3
NO	2	5	3.7	3.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.037 Std dev .189 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q73 YOUR SENIOR RATERS PROFILE KNOWN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	63	46.3	46.3	46.3
NO	2	73	53.7	53.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.537 Std dev .500 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q74 RATER DISCUSSED YOUR REPORT PRIOR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	103	75.7	75.7	75.7
NO	2	33	24.3	24.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.243 Std dev .430 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

Q75 SR RTR DISCUSSED YOUR REPORT PRIOR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	26	19.1	19.1	19.1
NO	2	110	80.9	80.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.809 Std dev .395 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 136 Missing cases 0

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q76 SUPPORT FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	9	6.6	6.7	6.7
DISSATISFIED	2	8	5.9	5.9	12.6
BORDERLINE	3	34	25.0	25.2	37.8
SATISFIED	4	63	46.3	46.7	84.4
VERY SATISFIED	5	21	15.4	15.6	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.585 Std dev 1.039 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q77 HIGHER CDRS KNEW YOUR UNIT STATUS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	10	7.4	7.4	7.4
DISSATISFIED	2	11	8.1	8.1	15.6
BORDERLINE	3	23	16.9	17.0	32.6
SATISFIED	4	61	44.9	45.2	77.8
VERY SATISFIED	5	30	22.1	22.2	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.667 Std dev 1.133 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q78 FREQ OF IMMEDIATE CDR VISITS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEVER	1	1	.7	.7	.7
WEEKLY	2	48	35.3	35.6	36.3
MONTHLY	3	50	36.8	37.0	73.3
QUARTERLY	4	26	19.1	19.3	92.6
SEMI-ANNUALLY	5	8	5.9	5.9	98.5
ANNUALLY	6	2	1.5	1.5	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.985 Std dev .977 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q79 SENIOR CDRS WOULD SPT IN HARD TIMES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	6	4.4	4.4	4.4
DISAGREE	2	7	5.1	5.2	9.6
NEUTRAL	3	13	9.6	9.6	19.3
AGREE	4	55	40.4	40.7	60.0
STRONGLY AGREE	5	54	39.7	40.0	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.067 Std dev 1.052 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q80 SAT CMD CLIMATE FROM HIGHER HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	1.5	1.5	1.5
DISAGREE	2	19	14.0	14.1	15.6
NEUTRAL	3	11	8.1	8.1	23.7
AGREE	4	60	44.1	44.4	68.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	43	31.6	31.9	100.0
.	.	1	.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.911 Std dev 1.047 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q81 CHAIN OF CMD FAIR TO COMMANDERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	121	89.0	91.0	91.0
NO	2	12	8.8	9.0	100.0
.	.	3	2.2	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.090 Std dev .288 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 133 Missing cases 3

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q82 HOW POSITIVE ABOUT ARMY CAREER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MUCH LESS POSITIVELY	1	6	4.4	4.4	4.4
LESS POSITIVELY	2	18	13.2	13.3	17.8
ABOUT THE SAME	3	34	25.0	25.2	43.0
MORE POSITIVELY	4	46	33.8	34.1	77.0
MUCH MORE POSITIVELY	5	31	22.8	23.0	100.0
	.	1	.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.578 Std dev 1.116 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 135 Missing cases 1

Q83 TIME BN DEPLOYED IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1-2 MO	2	1	.7	2.9	2.9
3-4 MO	3	6	4.4	17.1	20.0
5-6 MO	4	11	8.1	31.4	51.4
>6 MO	5	17	12.5	48.6	100.0
	.	101	74.3	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.257 Std dev .852 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 101

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q84 TIME CMD BN IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1-2 MO	2	2	1.5	5.9	5.9
3-4 MO	3	5	3.7	14.7	20.6
5-6 MO	4	11	8.1	32.4	52.9
>6 MO	5	16	11.8	47.1	100.0
	.	102	75.0	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.206 Std dev .914 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

Q85 AMT OF TNG FROM NOTIF TO GRD CAMPAIGN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<1 MO	1	1	.7	3.0	3.0
1-2 MO	2	11	8.1	33.3	36.4
3-4 MO	3	7	5.1	21.2	57.6
5-6 MO	4	9	6.6	27.3	84.8
>6 MO	5	5	3.7	15.2	100.0
	.	103	75.7	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.182 Std dev 1.158 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 33 Missing cases 103

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q86 TNG WAS CRIT BASED ON SWA MISSION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	4	2.9	12.1	12.1
NEUTRAL	3	3	2.2	9.1	21.2
AGREE	4	12	8.8	36.4	57.6
STRONGLY AGREE	5	14	10.3	42.4	100.0
.	.	103	75.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.091 Std dev 1.011 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 33 Missing cases 103

Q87 DID BN FIGHT THE WAY TRAINED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	1	.7	3.0	3.0
SOMETIMES	3	1	.7	3.0	6.1
FREQUENTLY	4	6	4.4	18.2	24.2
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	25	18.4	75.8	100.0
.	.	103	75.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.667 Std dev .692 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 33 Missing cases 103

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q88 WAS BN DOCT CORRECT FOR DUTY IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	1	.7	3.0	3.0
SOMETIMES	3	5	3.7	15.2	18.2
FREQUENTLY	4	8	5.9	24.2	42.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	19	14.0	57.6	100.0
.	.	103	75.7	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.364 Std dev .859 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 33 Missing cases 103

Q89 ARE CHANGES REQUIRED TO TOE/TDA

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	1.5	5.9	5.9
DISAGREE	2	6	4.4	17.6	23.5
NEUTRAL	3	1	.7	2.9	26.5
AGREE	4	8	5.9	23.5	50.0
STRONGLY AGREE	5	17	12.5	50.0	100.0
.	.	102	75.0	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.941 Std dev 1.347 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q90 BNs TOE/TDA NEEDS CHANGES IN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO CHANGE REQUIRED	1	4	2.9	11.8	11.8
EQUIPMENT	2	19	14.0	55.9	67.6
PERSONNEL	3	7	5.1	20.6	88.2
ORGANIZATION	4	4	2.9	11.8	100.0
.	.	102	75.0	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.324 Std dev .843 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

Q91 BN PREPARED FOR NBC AT START OF GRD CAMP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	2	1.5	5.9	5.9
NEUTRAL	3	2	1.5	5.9	11.8
AGREE	4	14	10.3	41.2	52.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	16	11.8	47.1	100.0
.	.	102	75.0	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.294 Std dev .836 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q92 AREA OF DIFFICULTY WHILE DEPLOYED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOGISTICS SPT	1	26	19.1	76.5	76.5
COMMUNICATIONS	2	7	5.1	20.6	97.1
OTHER	4	1	.7	2.9	100.0
	.	102	75.0	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.294 Std dev .629 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

Q93 FREEDOM TO COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	1	.7	2.9	2.9
MODERATE	2	7	5.1	20.6	23.5
HIGH	3	26	19.1	76.5	100.0
	.	102	75.0	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.735 Std dev .511 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q94 SATISFIED WITH SPT FROM HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	3	2.2	8.8	8.8
DISSATISFIED	2	1	.7	2.9	11.8
BORDERLINE	3	6	4.4	17.6	29.4
SATISFIED	4	19	14.0	55.9	85.3
VERY SATISFIED	5	5	3.7	14.7	100.0
	.	102	75.0	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.647 Std dev 1.070 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

Q95 DID HIGHER CMD KNOW HOW UNIT PERFORMED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	3	2.2	8.8	8.8
DISSATISFIED	2	1	.7	2.9	11.8
BORDERLINE	3	2	1.5	5.9	17.6
SATISFIED	4	17	12.5	50.0	67.6
VERY SATISFIED	5	11	8.1	32.4	100.0
	.	102	75.0	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.941 Std dev 1.153 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q96 WOULD SENIOR CMDERS SUPPORT YOU

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	.7	2.9	2.9
DISAGREE	2	1	.7	2.9	5.9
NEUTRAL	3	5	3.7	14.7	20.6
AGREE	4	13	9.6	38.2	58.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	14	10.3	41.2	100.0
.	.	102	75.0	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.118 Std dev .977 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

Q97 DUD HIGHER HQ HAVE SATIS CMD CLIMATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	.7	2.9	2.9
DISAGREE	2	3	2.2	8.8	11.8
NEUTRAL	3	4	2.9	11.8	23.5
AGREE	4	15	11.0	44.1	67.6
STRONGLY AGREE	5	11	8.1	32.4	100.0
.	.	102	75.0	Missing	
Total		136	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.941 Std dev 1.043 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 102

COMBAT ARMS BATTALIONS

Q98 ARE FAM SPT PROG ESSENTIAL TO QUALITY FO

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	1.5	5.9	5.9
AGREE	4	9	6.6	26.5	32.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	23	16.9	67.6	100.0
.		102	75.0	Missing	
	Total	136	100.0	100.0	

Mean	4.500	Std dev	.992	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	5.000				

Valid cases	34	Missing cases	102
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Appendix C

Combat Support

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q02 AGE ASSUMED COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
38-40	3	22	34.9	34.9	34.9
41-43	4	34	54.0	54.0	88.9
44-46	5	7	11.1	11.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.762 Std dev .640 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q03 TYPE UNIT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SEPARATE BRIGADE	1	10	15.9	15.9	15.9
DIVISIONAL	2	16	25.4	25.4	41.3
CORPS	3	12	19.0	19.0	60.3
EAC	4	17	27.0	27.0	87.3
OTHER	5	8	12.7	12.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.952 Std dev 1.300 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q04 LENGTH OF COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
13-18 MO	2	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
19-24 MO	3	42	66.7	67.7	72.6
25-30 MO	4	15	23.8	24.2	96.8
31 OR MORE MO	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.258 Std dev .599 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q05 PERCENT WOMEN SOLDIERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NONE	1	7	11.1	11.1	11.1
<10%	2	14	22.2	22.2	33.3
10-19%	3	29	46.0	46.0	79.4
20-29%	4	11	17.5	17.5	96.8
>30	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.794 Std dev .970 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q06 UNIT CODED TO PRECLUDE WOMEN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	21	33.3	33.3	33.3
NO	2	42	66.7	66.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.667	Std dev	.475	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	2.000				

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q07 IMPACT FEMALE SOLDIERS ON MISSION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEG	2	4	6.3	6.3	6.3
NEITHER	3	15	23.8	23.8	30.2
POS	4	24	38.1	38.1	68.3
STRONG POS	5	13	20.6	20.6	88.9
N/A	6	7	11.1	11.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.063	Std dev	1.076	Minimum	2.000
Maximum	6.000				

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
CONUS	1	34	54.0	54.0	54.0
EUROPE	2	19	30.2	30.2	84.1
KOREA	3	4	6.3	6.3	90.5
PANAMA	4	2	3.2	3.2	93.7
ALASKA	5	1	1.6	1.6	95.2
HAWAII	6	1	1.6	1.6	96.8
OTHER	7	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.857 Std dev 1.390 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q09 ACCOMPANIED TOUR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES WITH SPOUSE	1	52	82.5	82.5	82.5
YES WITHOUT SPOUSE	2	4	6.3	6.3	88.9
NO	3	2	3.2	3.2	92.1
N/A	4	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.365 Std dev .885 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q10 SPOUSE PARTICIPATION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	4	6.3	6.5	6.5
SOMETIMES	3	8	12.7	12.9	19.4
FREQUENTLY	4	11	17.5	17.7	37.1
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	32	50.8	51.6	88.7
N/A	6	7	11.1	11.3	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.419 Std dev 1.235 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q11 SPOUSE EMPLOYMENT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
FULLTIME	1	17	27.0	27.0	27.0
PARTTIME	2	14	22.2	22.2	49.2
NOT OUTSIDE HOME	3	26	41.3	41.3	90.5
N/A	4	6	9.5	9.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.333 Std dev .984 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q12 PERCENT TIME ON BUDGET MANAGEMENT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<10%	1	40	63.5	63.5	63.5
11-20%	2	19	30.2	30.2	93.7
21-30%	3	3	4.8	4.8	98.4
41-50%	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.460 Std dev .737 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q13 ENOUGH AMMUNITION FOR STRAC

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
SELDOM	2	3	4.8	4.8	9.5
SOMETIMES	3	8	12.7	12.7	22.2
FREQUENTLY	4	14	22.2	22.2	44.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	35	55.6	55.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.190 Std dev 1.134 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q14 SUFFICIENT TRAINING FUNDS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
SOMETIMES	3	8	12.7	12.7	15.9
FREQUENTLY	4	17	27.0	27.0	42.9
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	36	57.1	57.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.381 Std dev .831 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q15 AVERAGE PERSONNEL TURNOVER RATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<10%	1	20	31.7	32.3	32.3
10-15%	2	31	49.2	50.0	82.3
16-20%	3	4	6.3	6.5	88.7
21-25%	4	5	7.9	8.1	96.8
26-30%	5	1	1.6	1.6	98.4
>30%	6	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.016 Std dev 1.063 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q16 AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING RESOURCES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	5	7.9	7.9	7.9
SOMETIMES	3	12	19.0	19.0	27.0
FREQUENTLY	4	26	41.3	41.3	68.3
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	20	31.7	31.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.968 Std dev .915 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q17 UFRS INHIBITED TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	23	36.5	36.5	36.5
SELDOM	2	23	36.5	36.5	73.0
SOMETIMES	3	12	19.0	19.0	92.1
FREQUENTLY	4	4	6.3	6.3	98.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.000 Std dev .984 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

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COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q18 ALO

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1	1	22	34.9	34.9	34.9
2	2	22	34.9	34.9	69.8
3	3	10	15.9	15.9	85.7
N/A	4	9	14.3	14.3	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.095 Std dev 1.043 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q19 ALO CONSTRAINED READINESS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	19	30.2	31.7	31.7
DISAGREE	2	19	30.2	31.7	63.3
NEUTRAL	3	10	15.9	16.7	80.0
AGREE	4	9	14.3	15.0	95.0
STRONGLY AGREE	5	3	4.8	5.0	100.0
.		3	4.8	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.300 Std dev 1.212 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 60 Missing cases 3

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q20 CRITICAL RESOURCES CROSSLEVELED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DONT KNOW	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
NOT AT ALL	2	7	11.1	11.1	14.3
SLIGHTLY	3	19	30.2	30.2	44.4
MODERATELY	4	29	46.0	46.0	90.5
GREATLY	5	6	9.5	9.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.476 Std dev .931 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q21 FACILITY AVAIL DEGRADED TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT AT ALL	1	25	39.7	39.7	39.7
SLIGHTLY	2	18	28.6	28.6	68.3
MODERATELY	3	15	23.8	23.8	92.1
GREATLY	4	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.000 Std dev .984 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q22 MOS SHORTAGES DEGRADED EFFECTIVENESS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT AT ALL	1	7	11.1	11.1	11.1
SLIGHTLY	2	22	34.9	34.9	46.0
MODERATELY	3	24	38.1	38.1	84.1
GREATLY	4	10	15.9	15.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.587 Std dev .891 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q23 REPAIR PARTS REQUISITIONS DEFERRED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	32	50.8	51.6	51.6
SELDOM	2	12	19.0	19.4	71.0
SOMETIMES	3	12	19.0	19.4	90.3
FREQUENTLY	4	5	7.9	8.1	98.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.887 Std dev 1.088 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q24 BASIS FOR BUDGET

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
PROJECTED EVENTS	1	38	60.3	60.3	60.3
PRIOR EXPENDITURES	2	15	23.8	23.8	84.1
OTHER	3	10	15.9	15.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.556 Std dev .757 Minimum 1.000
 Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q25 SUFFICIENT RESOURCES FOR TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LESS THAN REQUIRED	2	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
ONLY REQUIRED	3	7	11.1	11.1	14.3
MOST I DESIRED	4	46	73.0	73.0	87.3
ALL I DESIRED	5	8	12.7	12.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.952 Std dev .607 Minimum 2.000
 Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q26 TRAINING DEVELOPMENT BASED ON 25 SERIES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
SOMETIMES	3	11	17.5	17.5	19.0
FREQUENTLY	4	16	25.4	25.4	44.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	35	55.6	55.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.333 Std dev .880 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q27 CLEAR TRNG GUIDANCE FROM SENIOR HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
SELDOM	2	4	6.3	6.3	9.5
SOMETIMES	3	14	22.2	22.2	31.7
FREQUENTLY	4	15	23.8	23.8	55.6
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	28	44.4	44.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.000 Std dev 1.107 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q28 TRNG GUIDANCE SUPPORTED TOUGH TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISAGREE	2	2	3.2	3.2	6.3
NEUTRAL	3	7	11.1	11.1	17.5
AGREE	4	29	46.0	46.0	63.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	23	36.5	36.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.095 Std dev .946 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q29 SAME TRNG AREAS DEGRADED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	4	6.3	6.3	6.3
DISAGREE	2	27	42.9	42.9	49.2
NEUTRAL	3	17	27.0	27.0	76.2
AGREE	4	13	20.6	20.6	96.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.714 Std dev .974 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q30 FREQUENCY OF OFF POST TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	5	7.9	8.1	8.1
SELDOM	2	4	6.3	6.5	14.5
SOMETIMES	3	14	22.2	22.6	37.1
FREQUENTLY	4	23	36.5	37.1	74.2
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	16	25.4	25.8	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.661 Std dev 1.173 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q31 TRNG BASED ON MTPS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	27	42.9	42.9	42.9
SELDOM	2	6	9.5	9.5	52.4
SOMETIMES	3	13	20.6	20.6	73.0
FREQUENTLY	4	13	20.6	20.6	93.7
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	4	6.3	6.3	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.381 Std dev 1.385 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q32 MTPS PROVIDED BASIS FOR TOUGH TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	9	14.3	14.8	16.4
NEUTRAL	3	33	52.4	54.1	70.5
AGREE	4	14	22.2	23.0	93.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	4	6.3	6.6	100.0
.	.	2	3.2	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.180 Std dev .827 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 2

Q33 HIGHER HQ CHANGES HINDERED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	7	11.1	11.1	11.1
SELDOM	2	13	20.6	20.6	31.7
SOMETIMES	3	30	47.6	47.6	79.4
FREQUENTLY	4	12	19.0	19.0	98.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.794 Std dev .936 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

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COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q34 HIGHER HQ DIRECTIVES ENHANCED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISAGREE	2	14	22.2	22.2	25.4
NEUTRAL	3	19	30.2	30.2	55.6
AGREE	4	27	42.9	42.9	98.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.175 Std dev .908 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q35 TRNG INCLUDED COMBINED ARMS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	13	20.6	21.3	21.3
SELDOM	2	11	17.5	18.0	39.3
SOMETIMES	3	9	14.3	14.8	54.1
FREQUENTLY	4	20	31.7	32.8	86.9
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	8	12.7	13.1	100.0
.	.	2	3.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.984 Std dev 1.384 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 2

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

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COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q36 TRNG WAS JOINT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	19	30.2	30.2	30.2
SELDOM	2	11	17.5	17.5	47.6
SOMETIMES	3	14	22.2	22.2	69.8
FREQUENTLY	4	10	15.9	15.9	85.7
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	3	4.8	4.8	90.5
N/A	6	6	9.5	9.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.762 Std dev 1.604 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q37 NCOS ABILITY TO PLAN AND CONDUCT TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	9	14.3	14.3	15.9
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	3.2	19.0
AGREE	4	37	58.7	58.7	77.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	14	22.2	22.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.857 Std dev .981 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q38 OK TO TRANSFER INDIVIDUAL TRAINING FROM AIT TO UNIT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	15	23.8	23.8	23.8
DISAGREE	2	31	49.2	49.2	73.0
NEUTRAL	3	8	12.7	12.7	85.7
AGREE	4	8	12.7	12.7	98.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.190 Std dev .998 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q39 BNCOC/ANCOC IMPROVED CAPABILITY TO TRAIN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
NEUTRAL	3	6	9.5	9.5	14.3
AGREE	4	31	49.2	49.2	63.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	23	36.5	36.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.175 Std dev .794 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q40 JR OFF ABLE TO PLAN, CONDUCT TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY AGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
AGREE	2	2	3.2	3.2	4.8
NEUTRAL	3	8	12.7	12.7	17.5
DISAGREE	4	40	63.5	63.5	81.0
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5	12	19.0	19.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.952 Std dev .771 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q41 SCENARIOS AT CTC SUPPORTED ALB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
AGREE	2	2	3.2	3.4	3.4
NEUTRAL	3	30	47.6	50.8	54.2
DISAGREE	4	16	25.4	27.1	81.4
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5	11	17.5	18.6	100.0
	.	4	6.3	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.610 Std dev .831 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 59 Missing cases 4

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q42 CTC PERFORMANCE ON OER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES, EXPLICITLY	1	6	9.5	9.5	9.5
YES, IMPLIED	2	8	12.7	12.7	22.2
NO	3	7	11.1	11.1	33.3
N/A	4	42	66.7	66.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.349 Std dev 1.034 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q43 NUMBER OF CTC ROTATIONS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NONE	1	14	22.2	22.2	22.2
1	2	2	3.2	3.2	25.4
2	3	4	6.3	6.3	31.7
3	4	5	7.9	7.9	39.7
4 OR MORE	5	8	12.7	12.7	52.4
N/A	6	30	47.6	47.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.286 Std dev 2.051 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q44 FREQUENCY OF QTBS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEVER	1	6	9.5	9.5	9.5
ANNUALLY	2	1	1.6	1.6	11.1
SEMI-ANNUALLY	3	10	15.9	15.9	27.0
QUARTLERY	4	45	71.4	71.4	98.4
MORE THAN QUARTERLY	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.540 Std dev .947 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q45 ATTAIN STDS FOR INDIV MARKSMENSHIP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEVER	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
SOMETIMES	3	4	6.3	6.3	7.9
FREQUENTLY	4	8	12.7	12.7	20.6
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	49	77.8	77.8	98.4
N/A	6	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.698 Std dev .754 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q46 FREQUENCY OF PT PER WEEK

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
3 PER WEEK	2	30	47.6	48.4	48.4
4 PER WEEK	3	14	22.2	22.6	71.0
5 PER WEEK	4	18	28.6	29.0	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.806 Std dev .865 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q47 LENGTH OF GARRISON DUTY DAY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<8 HOURS	1	4	6.3	6.5	6.5
8-9 HOURS	2	25	39.7	40.3	46.8
10-11 HOURS	3	30	47.6	48.4	95.2
12 HOURS	4	1	1.6	1.6	96.8
>12 HOURS	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.548 Std dev .783 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q48 HAD SUFFICIENT TRNG DAYS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY AGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
AGREE	2	11	17.5	17.7	19.4
NEUTRAL	3	3	4.8	4.8	24.2
DISAGREE	4	38	60.3	61.3	85.5
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5	9	14.3	14.5	100.0
.		1	1.6	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.694 Std dev .985 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q49 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC SOLDIER SKILLS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	19	30.2	30.2	30.2
NEUTRAL	3	11	17.5	17.5	47.6
AGREE	4	31	49.2	49.2	96.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.254 Std dev .933 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q50 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC MOS SKILLS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
DISAGREE	2	25	39.7	39.7	44.4
NEUTRAL	3	12	19.0	19.0	63.5
AGREE	4	21	33.3	33.3	96.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.905 Std dev 1.027 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q51 NCOS KNOW AND ABIL TO TRAIN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISAGREE	2	12	19.0	19.0	22.2
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	3.2	25.4
AGREE	4	42	66.7	66.7	92.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.571 Std dev .995 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q52 JR OFF SKILL AND KNOW TO TRAIN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	8	12.7	12.7	12.7
NEUTRAL	3	7	11.1	11.1	23.8
AGREE	4	41	65.1	65.1	88.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	7	11.1	11.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.746 Std dev .822 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q53 JR OFF GROUNDED IN UNIT DOCTRINE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	22	34.9	34.9	36.5
NEUTRAL	3	15	23.8	23.8	60.3
AGREE	4	21	33.3	33.3	93.7
STRONGLY AGREE	5	4	6.3	6.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.079 Std dev 1.005 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q54 LEAVENWORTH PCC ADEQUATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	3	4.8	4.8	6.3
NEUTRAL	3	11	17.5	17.5	23.8
AGREE	4	43	68.3	68.3	92.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.762 Std dev .734 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q55 BRANCH PCC ADEQUATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISAGREE	2	7	11.1	11.1	14.3
NEUTRAL	3	11	17.5	17.5	31.7
AGREE	4	41	65.1	65.1	96.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.540 Std dev .858 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q56 OFF UNDERSTOOD ORG STRUC AND RELTN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	3	4.8	4.8	6.3
NEUTRAL	3	7	11.1	11.1	17.5
AGREE	4	46	73.0	73.0	90.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	6	9.5	9.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.841 Std dev .723 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q57 POST COMMAND CLIMATE SATISFACTORY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	7	11.1	11.3	12.9
NEUTRAL	3	3	4.8	4.8	17.7
AGREE	4	28	44.4	45.2	62.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	23	36.5	37.1	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.048 Std dev 1.015 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q58 COC SUPPORTED ACCURATE REPORTING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISAGREE	2	3	4.8	4.8	8.1
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	3.2	11.3
AGREE	4	30	47.6	48.4	59.7
STRONGLY AGREE	5	25	39.7	40.3	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.177 Std dev .950 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q59 ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS AND REPORTS UP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEUTRAL	3	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
AGREE	4	44	69.8	69.8	71.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	18	28.6	28.6	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.270 Std dev .482 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q60 NCO MORAL AND ETHICAL STDS SAT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISAGREE	2	4	6.3	6.3	9.5
NEUTRAL	3	12	19.0	19.0	28.6
AGREE	4	40	63.5	63.5	92.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.667 Std dev .842 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q61 OFF MORAL AND ETHICAL STDS SAT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISAGREE	2	1	1.6	1.6	4.8
NEUTRAL	3	3	4.8	4.8	9.5
AGREE	4	45	71.4	71.4	81.0
STRONGLY AGREE	5	12	19.0	19.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.016 Std dev .772 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q62 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR JR EM

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	10	15.9	15.9	15.9
DISAGREE	2	29	46.0	46.0	61.9
NEUTRAL	3	6	9.5	9.5	71.4
AGREE	4	17	27.0	27.0	98.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.524 Std dev 1.105 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q63 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR NCOS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	9	14.3	14.3	14.3
DISAGREE	2	34	54.0	54.0	68.3
NEUTRAL	3	5	7.9	7.9	76.2
AGREE	4	15	23.8	23.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.413 Std dev 1.010 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q64 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR OFF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	29	46.0	46.0	46.0
DISAGREE	2	31	49.2	49.2	95.2
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	3.2	98.4
AGREE	4	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.603 Std dev .636 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q65 UCMJ ACTIONS PER MONTH

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
0-5	1	59	93.7	93.7	93.7
6-10	2	4	6.3	6.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.063 Std dev .246 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q66 FREQ MENTORED BY CDR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DAILY	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
WEEKLY	2	8	12.7	12.7	14.3
MONTHLY	3	18	28.6	28.6	42.9
QUARTERLY	4	14	22.2	22.2	65.1
ANNUALLY	5	5	7.9	7.9	73.0
AT OER TIME	6	7	11.1	11.1	84.1
NEVER	7	10	15.9	15.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.190 Std dev 1.703 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q67 FREQ COUNSELED SUBORDINATES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DAILY	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
WEEKLY	2	2	3.2	3.2	4.8
MONTHLY	3	10	15.9	16.1	21.0
QUARTERLY	4	36	57.1	58.1	79.0
ANNUALLY	5	5	7.9	8.1	87.1
AT OER TIME	6	8	12.7	12.9	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.065 Std dev 1.022 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q68 YOUR FREEDOM TO COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
MODERATE	2	10	15.9	15.9	17.5
HIGH	3	52	82.5	82.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.810 Std dev .435 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q69 YOUR SUBORDINATES FREEDOM TO CMD

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MODERATE	2	18	28.6	28.6	28.6
HIGH	3	45	71.4	71.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.714 Std dev .455 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q70 IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO IMPORTANCE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
ABOUT RIGHT	3	42	66.7	66.7	69.8
A LITTLE TOO MUCH	4	15	23.8	23.8	93.7
ENTIRELY TOO MUCH	5	4	6.3	6.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.302 Std dev .733 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q71 YOUR SENIOR RATER PROFILE KNOWN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	59	93.7	93.7	93.7
NO	2	4	6.3	6.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.063 Std dev .246 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q72 DISCUSS RATINGS WITH SUBORDINATES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	63	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.000	Std dev	.000	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	1.000				

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q73 YOUR SENIOR RATERS PROFILE KNOWN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	26	41.3	41.3	41.3
NO	2	37	58.7	58.7	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.587	Std dev	.496	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	2.000				

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q74 RATER DISCUSSED YOUR REPORT PRIOR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	42	66.7	66.7	66.7
NO	2	21	33.3	33.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.333 Std dev .475 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q75 SR RTR DISCUSSED YOUR REPORT PRIOR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	6	9.5	9.7	9.7
NO	2	56	88.9	90.3	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.903 Std dev .298 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q76 SUPPORT FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISSATISFIED	2	7	11.1	11.1	14.3
BORDERLINE	3	8	12.7	12.7	27.0
SATISFIED	4	36	57.1	57.1	84.1
VERY SATISFIED	5	10	15.9	15.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.714 Std dev .974 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q77 HIGHER CDRS KNEW YOUR UNIT STATUS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
DISSATISFIED	2	6	9.5	9.5	14.3
BORDERLINE	3	5	7.9	7.9	22.2
SATISFIED	4	34	54.0	54.0	76.2
VERY SATISFIED	5	15	23.8	23.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.825 Std dev 1.056 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q78 FREQ OF IMMEDIATE CDR VISITS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEVER	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
WEEKLY	2	6	9.5	9.5	11.1
MONTHLY	3	26	41.3	41.3	52.4
QUARTERLY	4	22	34.9	34.9	87.3
SEMI-ANNUALLY	5	6	9.5	9.5	96.8
ANNUALLY	6	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.508 Std dev .965 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q79 SENIOR CDRS WOULD SPT IN HARD TIMES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	6	9.5	9.5	11.1
NEUTRAL	3	4	6.3	6.3	17.5
AGREE	4	27	42.9	42.9	60.3
STRONGLY AGREE	5	25	39.7	39.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.095 Std dev .995 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q80 SAT CMD CLIMATE FROM HIGHER HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	9	14.3	14.3	14.3
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	3.2	17.5
AGREE	4	34	54.0	54.0	71.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	18	28.6	28.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.968 Std dev .950 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q81 CHAIN OF CMD FAIR TO COMMANDERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	53	84.1	86.9	86.9
NO	2	8	12.7	13.1	100.0
	.	2	3.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.131 Std dev .340 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 2

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q82 HOW POSITIVE ABOUT ARMY CAREER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MUCH LESS POSITIVELY	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
LESS POSITIVELY	2	14	22.2	22.6	25.8
ABOUT THE SAME	3	15	23.8	24.2	50.0
MORE POSITIVELY	4	20	31.7	32.3	82.3
MUCH MORE POSITIVELY	5	11	17.5	17.7	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.387 Std dev 1.121 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q83 TIME BN DEPLOYED IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
3-4 MO	3	2	3.2	11.8	11.8
5-6 MO	4	4	6.3	23.5	35.3
>6 MO	5	11	17.5	64.7	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.529 Std dev .717 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q84 TIME CMD BN IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<1 MO	1	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
1-2 MO	2	1	1.6	5.9	11.8
3-4 MO	3	1	1.6	5.9	17.6
5-6 MO	4	5	7.9	29.4	47.1
>6 MO	5	9	14.3	52.9	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.176 Std dev 1.185 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q85 AMT OF TNG FROM NOTIF TO GRD CAMPAIGN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<1 MO	1	4	6.3	23.5	23.5
3-4 MO	3	2	3.2	11.8	35.3
5-6 MO	4	7	11.1	41.2	76.5
>6 MO	5	4	6.3	23.5	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.412 Std dev 1.502 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q86 TNG WAS CRIT BASED ON SWA MISSION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
DISAGREE	2	5	7.9	29.4	35.3
NEUTRAL	3	1	1.6	5.9	41.2
AGREE	4	8	12.7	47.1	88.2
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	3.2	11.8	100.0
.		46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.294 Std dev 1.213 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q87 DID BN FIGHT THE WAY TRAINED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	2	3.2	11.8	11.8
SOMETIMES	3	1	1.6	5.9	17.6
FREQUENTLY	4	5	7.9	29.4	47.1
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	9	14.3	52.9	100.0
.		46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.235 Std dev 1.033 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q88 WAS BN DOCT CORRECT FOR DUTY IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	3	4.8	17.6	17.6
SELDOM	2	2	3.2	11.8	29.4
SOMETIMES	3	2	3.2	11.8	41.2
FREQUENTLY	4	8	12.7	47.1	88.2
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	2	3.2	11.8	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.235 Std dev 1.348 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q89 ARE CHANGES REQUIRED TO TOE/TDA

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	2	3.2	11.8	11.8
AGREE	4	8	12.7	47.1	58.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	7	11.1	41.2	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.176 Std dev .951 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q90 BNs TOE/TDA NEEDS CHANGES IN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO CHANGE REQUIRED	1	2	3.2	11.8	11.8
EQUIPMENT	2	8	12.7	47.1	58.8
ORGANIZATION	4	7	11.1	41.2	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.706 Std dev 1.160 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q91 BN PREPARED FOR NBC AT START OF GRD CAMP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	3	4.8	17.6	17.6
NEUTRAL	3	3	4.8	17.6	35.3
AGREE	4	8	12.7	47.1	82.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	3	4.8	17.6	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.647 Std dev .996 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q92 AREA OF DIFFICULTY WHILE DEPLOYED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOGISTICS SPT	1	10	15.9	58.8	58.8
COMMUNICATIONS	2	5	7.9	29.4	88.2
INTELLIGENCE SPT	3	1	1.6	5.9	94.1
OTHER	4	1	1.6	5.9	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.588 Std dev .870 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q93 FREEDOM TO COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
MODERATE	2	3	4.8	17.6	23.5
HIGH	3	13	20.6	76.5	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.706 Std dev .588 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q94 SATISFIED WITH SPT FROM HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	3	4.8	17.6	17.6
DISSATISFIED	2	1	1.6	5.9	23.5
SATISFIED	4	8	12.7	47.1	70.6
VERY SATISFIED	5	5	7.9	29.4	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.647 Std dev 1.455 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q95 DID HIGHER CMD KNOW HOW UNIT PERFORMED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
DISSATISFIED	2	2	3.2	11.8	17.6
SATISFIED	4	5	7.9	29.4	47.1
VERY SATISFIED	5	9	14.3	52.9	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.118 Std dev 1.269 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q96 WOULD SENIOR CMDERS SUPPORT YOU

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
DISAGREE	2	3	4.8	17.6	23.5
AGREE	4	5	7.9	29.4	52.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	8	12.7	47.1	100.0
.		46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.941 Std dev 1.345 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q97 DUD HIGHER HQ HAVE SATIS CMD CLIMATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	4	6.3	23.5	23.5
AGREE	4	4	6.3	23.5	47.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	9	14.3	52.9	100.0
.		46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.824 Std dev 1.667 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q98 ARE FAM SPT PROG ESSENTIAL TO QUALITY FO

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
AGREE	4	5	7.9	29.4	29.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	12	19.0	70.6	100.0
	.	46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean	4.706	Std dev	.470	Minimum	4.000
Maximum	5.000				

Valid cases	17	Missing cases	46
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Appendix D

Combat Service Support

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q02 AGE ASSUMED COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
35-37	2	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
38-40	3	23	36.5	37.1	41.9
41-43	4	31	49.2	50.0	91.9
44-46	5	5	7.9	8.1	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.613 Std dev .710 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q03 TYPE UNIT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SEPARATE BRIGADE	1	5	7.9	7.9	7.9
DIVISIONAL	2	22	34.9	34.9	42.9
CORPS	3	17	27.0	27.0	69.8
EAC	4	9	14.3	14.3	84.1
OTHER	5	10	15.9	15.9	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.952 Std dev 1.211 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q04 LENGTH OF COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
12 MO OR LESS	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
13-18 MO	2	1	1.6	1.6	3.2
19-24 MO	3	44	69.8	69.8	73.0
25-30 MO	4	16	25.4	25.4	98.4
31 OR MORE MO	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.238 Std dev .588 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q05 PERCENT WOMEN SOLDIERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	valid Percent	Cum Percent
NONE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
<10%	2	5	7.9	7.9	11.1
10-19%	3	26	41.3	41.3	52.4
20-29%	4	22	34.9	34.9	87.3
>30	5	8	12.7	12.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.460 Std dev .930 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q06 UNIT CODED TO PRECLUDE WOMEN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	7	11.1	11.1	11.1
NO	2	54	85.7	85.7	96.8
DO NOT KNOW	3	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.921 Std dev .373 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q07 IMPACT FEMALE SOLDIERS ON MISSION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEG	2	6	9.5	9.5	9.5
NEITHER	3	15	23.8	23.8	33.3
POS	4	28	44.4	44.4	77.8
STRONG POS	5	12	19.0	19.0	96.8
N/A	6	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.825 Std dev .959 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
CONUS	1	38	60.3	60.3	60.3
EUROPE	2	16	25.4	25.4	85.7
KOREA	3	5	7.9	7.9	93.7
PANAMA	4	2	3.2	3.2	96.8
HAWAII	6	1	1.6	1.6	98.4
OTHER	7	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.683 Std dev 1.175 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q09 ACCOMPANIED TOUR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES WITH SPOUSE	1	59	93.7	93.7	93.7
YES WITHOUT SPOUSE	2	2	3.2	3.2	96.8
NO	3	1	1.6	1.6	98.4
N/A	4	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.111 Std dev .479 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q10 SPOUSE PARTICIPATION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
SOMETIMES	3	10	15.9	15.9	19.0
FREQUENTLY	4	16	25.4	25.4	44.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	33	52.4	52.4	96.8
N/A	6	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.333 Std dev 1.000 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q11 SPOUSE EMPLOYMENT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
FULLTIME	1	22	34.9	34.9	34.9
PARTTIME	2	13	20.6	20.6	55.6
NOT OUTSIDE HOME	3	26	41.3	41.3	96.8
N/A	4	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.127 Std dev .942 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q12 PERCENT TIME ON BUDGET MANAGEMENT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<10%	1	34	54.0	54.0	54.0
11-20%	2	22	34.9	34.9	88.9
21-30%	3	4	6.3	6.3	95.2
31-40%	4	3	4.8	4.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.619 Std dev .812 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q13 ENOUGH AMMUNITION FOR STRAC

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	2	3.2	3.3	3.3
SOMETIMES	3	11	17.5	18.3	21.7
FREQUENTLY	4	15	23.8	25.0	46.7
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	32	50.8	53.3	100.0
.		3	4.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.250 Std dev .985 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 60 Missing cases 3

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q14 SUFFICIENT TRAINING FUNDS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SOMETIMES	3	5	7.9	8.1	8.1
FREQUENTLY	4	18	28.6	29.0	37.1
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	39	61.9	62.9	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.548 Std dev .645 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q15 AVERAGE PERSONNEL TURNOVER RATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<10%	1	22	34.9	36.1	36.1
10-15%	2	28	44.4	45.9	82.0
16-20%	3	7	11.1	11.5	93.4
21-25%	4	4	6.3	6.6	100.0
.	.	2	3.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.885 Std dev .858 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 2

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q16 AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING RESOURCES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
SELDOM	2	8	12.7	12.7	14.3
SOMETIMES	3	12	19.0	19.0	33.3
FREQUENTLY	4	21	33.3	33.3	66.7
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	21	33.3	33.3	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.841 Std dev 1.081 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q17 UFRS INHIBITED TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	25	39.7	39.7	39.7
SELDOM	2	18	28.6	28.6	68.3
SOMETIMES	3	20	31.7	31.7	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.921 Std dev .848 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q18 ALO

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1	1	21	33.3	34.4	34.4
2	2	21	33.3	34.4	68.9
3	3	13	20.6	21.3	90.2
N/A	4	6	9.5	9.8	100.0
	.	2	3.2	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.066 Std dev .981 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 2

Q19 ALO CONSTRAINED READINESS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	18	28.6	29.5	29.5
DISAGREE	2	19	30.2	31.1	60.7
NEUTRAL	3	11	17.5	18.0	78.7
AGREE	4	7	11.1	11.5	90.2
STRONGLY AGREE	5	6	9.5	9.8	100.0
	.	2	3.2	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.410 Std dev 1.296 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 2

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q20 CRITICAL RESOURCES CROSSLEVELED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DONT KNOW	1	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
NOT AT ALL	2	13	20.6	21.0	25.8
SLIGHTLY	3	26	41.3	41.9	67.7
MODERATELY	4	16	25.4	25.8	93.5
GREATLY	5	4	6.3	6.5	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.081 Std dev .963 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q21 FACILITY AVAIL DEGRADED TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT AT ALL	1	16	25.4	25.4	25.4
SLIGHTLY	2	28	44.4	44.4	69.8
MODERATELY	3	11	17.5	17.5	87.3
GREATLY	4	7	11.1	11.1	98.4
DONT KNOW	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.190 Std dev .998 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q22 MOS SHORTAGES DEGRADED EFFECTIVENESS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT AT ALL	1	5	7.9	7.9	7.9
SLIGHTLY	2	25	39.7	39.7	47.6
MODERATELY	3	22	34.9	34.9	82.5
GREATLY	4	11	17.5	17.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.619 Std dev .869 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q23 REPAIR PARTS REQUISITIONS DEFERRED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	43	68.3	68.3	68.3
SELDOM	2	15	23.8	23.8	92.1
SOMETIMES	3	4	6.3	6.3	98.4
FREQUENTLY	4	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.413 Std dev .687 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q24 BASIS FOR BUDGET

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
PROJECTED EVENTS	1	33	52.4	52.4	52.4
PRIOR EXPENDITURES	2	12	19.0	19.0	71.4
OTHER	3	18	28.6	28.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.762 Std dev .875 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q25 SUFFICIENT RESOURCES FOR TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ONLY REQUIRED	3	4	6.3	6.3	6.3
MOST I DESIRED	4	47	74.6	74.6	81.0
ALL I DESIRED	5	12	19.0	19.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.127 Std dev .492 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q26 TRAINING DEVELOPMENT BASED ON 25 SERIES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
SELDOM	2	1	1.6	1.6	6.3
SOMETIMES	3	6	9.5	9.5	15.9
FREQUENTLY	4	18	28.6	28.6	44.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	35	55.6	55.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.286 Std dev 1.038 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q27 CLEAR TRNG GUIDANCE FROM SENIOR HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
SELDOM	2	3	4.8	4.8	6.3
SOMETIMES	3	19	30.2	30.2	36.5
FREQUENTLY	4	19	30.2	30.2	66.7
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	21	33.3	33.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.889 Std dev .986 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q28 TRNG GUIDANCE SUPPORTED TOUGH TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
NEUTRAL	3	6	9.5	9.5	11.1
AGREE	4	38	60.3	60.3	71.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	18	28.6	28.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.159 Std dev .653 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q29 SAME TRNG AREAS DEGRADED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	4	6.3	6.3	6.3
DISAGREE	2	26	41.3	41.3	47.6
NEUTRAL	3	18	28.6	28.6	76.2
AGREE	4	13	20.6	20.6	96.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.730 Std dev .971 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q30 FREQUENCY OF OFF POST TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	5	7.9	7.9	7.9
SELDOM	2	4	6.3	6.3	14.3
SOMETIMES	3	13	20.6	20.6	34.9
FREQUENTLY	4	34	54.0	54.0	88.9
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	7	11.1	11.1	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.540 Std dev 1.045 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q31 TRNG BASED ON MTPS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	20	31.7	31.7	31.7
SELDOM	2	9	14.3	14.3	46.0
SOMETIMES	3	17	27.0	27.0	73.0
FREQUENTLY	4	14	22.2	22.2	95.2
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	3	4.8	4.8	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.540 Std dev 1.280 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q32 MTPS PROVIDED BASIS FOR TOUGH TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	5	7.9	8.1	9.7
NEUTRAL	3	29	46.0	46.8	56.5
AGREE	4	27	42.9	43.5	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.323 Std dev .696 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q33 HIGHER HQ CHANGES HINDERED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	7	11.1	11.1	11.1
SELDOM	2	8	12.7	12.7	23.8
SOMETIMES	3	26	41.3	41.3	65.1
FREQUENTLY	4	21	33.3	33.3	98.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.016 Std dev .992 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q34 HIGHER HQ DIRECTIVES ENHANCED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	11	17.5	17.5	17.5
NEUTRAL	3	25	39.7	39.7	57.1
AGREE	4	24	38.1	38.1	95.2
STRONGLY AGREE	5	3	4.8	4.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.302 Std dev .816 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q35 TRNG INCLUDED COMBINED ARMS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	17	27.0	27.9	27.9
SELDOM	2	8	12.7	13.1	41.0
SOMETIMES	3	14	22.2	23.0	63.9
FREQUENTLY	4	16	25.4	26.2	90.2
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	6	9.5	9.8	100.0
.	.	2	3.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.770 Std dev 1.371 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 2

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q36 TRNG WAS JOINT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	34	54.0	54.8	54.8
SELDOM	2	9	14.3	14.5	69.4
SOMETIMES	3	9	14.3	14.5	83.9
FREQUENTLY	4	4	6.3	6.5	90.3
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	3	4.8	4.8	95.2
N/A	6	3	4.8	4.8	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.065 Std dev 1.481 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q37 NCOS ABILITY TO PLAN AND CONDUCT TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	18	28.6	28.6	28.6
NEUTRAL	3	7	11.1	11.1	39.7
AGREE	4	32	50.8	50.8	90.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	6	9.5	9.5	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.413 Std dev 1.010 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q38 OK TO TRNSFR INDIV TRNG FROM AIT TO UNIT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	27	42.9	43.5	43.5
DISAGREE	2	20	31.7	32.3	75.8
NEUTRAL	3	5	7.9	8.1	83.9
AGREE	4	9	14.3	14.5	98.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.984 Std dev 1.123 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q39 BNCOC/ANCOC IMPROVED CAPABILITY TO TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	3.2	6.3
AGREE	4	40	63.5	63.5	69.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	19	30.2	30.2	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.206 Std dev .652 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q40 JR OFF ABLE TO PLAN, CONDUCT TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY AGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
AGREE	2	8	12.7	12.7	14.3
NEUTRAL	3	4	6.3	6.3	20.6
DISAGREE	4	45	71.4	71.4	92.1
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.714 Std dev .851 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q41 SCENARIOS AT CTC SUPPORTED ALB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
AGREE	2	1	1.6	1.7	1.7
NEUTRAL	3	26	41.3	44.1	45.8
DISAGREE	4	17	27.0	28.8	74.6
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5	15	23.8	25.4	100.0
	.	4	6.3	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.780 Std dev .852 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 59 Missing cases 4

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q42 CTC PERFORMANCE ON OER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES, EXPLICITLY	1	17	27.0	27.4	27.4
YES, IMPLIED	2	4	6.3	6.5	33.9
NO	3	4	6.3	6.5	40.3
N/A	4	37	58.7	59.7	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.984 Std dev 1.337 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q43 NUMBER OF CTC ROTATIONS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NONE	1	17	27.0	28.3	28.3
1	2	9	14.3	15.0	43.3
2	3	4	6.3	6.7	50.0
3	4	3	4.8	5.0	55.0
4 OR MORE	5	6	9.5	10.0	65.0
N/A	6	21	33.3	35.0	100.0
	.	3	4.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.583 Std dev 2.149 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 60 Missing cases 3

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q44 FREQUENCY OF QTBS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEVER	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
ANNUALLY	2	1	1.6	1.6	4.8
SEMI-ANNUALLY	3	6	9.5	9.5	14.3
QUARTLERY	4	52	82.5	82.5	96.8
MORE THAN QUARTERLY	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.810 Std dev .669 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q45 ATTAIN STDS FOR INDIV MARKSMENSHIP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
SOMETIMES	3	1	1.6	1.6	3.2
FREQUENTLY	4	11	17.5	17.5	20.6
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	50	79.4	79.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.746 Std dev .567 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q46 FREQUENCY OF PT PER WEEK

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<3 PER WEEK	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
3 PER WEEK	2	34	54.0	55.7	57.4
4 PER WEEK	3	13	20.6	21.3	78.7
5 PER WEEK	4	13	20.6	21.3	100.0
	.	2	3.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.623 Std dev .840 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 2

Q47 LENGTH OF GARRISON DUTY DAY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<8 HOURS	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
8-9 HOURS	2	20	31.7	31.7	34.9
10-11 HOURS	3	36	57.1	57.1	92.1
12 HOURS	4	4	6.3	6.3	98.4
>12 HOURS	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.714 Std dev .705 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q48 HAD SUFFICIENT TRNG DAYS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY AGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
AGREE	2	15	23.8	24.2	25.8
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	3.2	29.0
DISAGREE	4	30	47.6	48.4	77.4
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5	14	22.2	22.6	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.661 Std dev 1.130 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q49 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC SOLDIER SKILLS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	5	7.9	7.9	7.9
DISAGREE	2	13	20.6	20.6	28.6
NEUTRAL	3	14	22.2	22.2	50.8
AGREE	4	31	49.2	49.2	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.127 Std dev 1.008 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q50 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC MOS SKILLS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	5	7.9	7.9	7.9
DISAGREE	2	24	38.1	38.1	46.0
NEUTRAL	3	16	25.4	25.4	71.4
AGREE	4	18	28.6	28.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.746 Std dev .967 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q51 NCOS KNOW AND ABIL TO TRAIN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	15	23.8	23.8	25.4
NEUTRAL	3	4	6.3	6.3	31.7
AGREE	4	41	65.1	65.1	96.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	3.2	3.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.444 Std dev .947 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q52 JR OFF SKILL AND KNOW TO TRAIN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	14	22.2	22.2	22.2
NEUTRAL	3	6	9.5	9.5	31.7
AGREE	4	39	61.9	61.9	93.7
STRONGLY AGREE	5	4	6.3	6.3	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.524 Std dev .913 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q53 JR OFF GROUNDED IN UNIT DOCTRINE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
DISAGREE	2	23	36.5	36.5	41.3
NEUTRAL	3	10	15.9	15.9	57.1
AGREE	4	26	41.3	41.3	98.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.984 Std dev 1.024 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q54 LEAVENWORTH PCC ADEQUATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISAGREE	2	1	1.6	1.6	3.2
NEUTRAL	3	10	15.9	15.9	19.0
AGREE	4	46	73.0	73.0	92.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.841 Std dev .653 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q55 BRANCH PCC ADEQUATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	4	6.3	6.3	6.3
DISAGREE	2	13	20.6	20.6	27.0
NEUTRAL	3	11	17.5	17.5	44.4
AGREE	4	30	47.6	47.6	92.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.302 Std dev 1.087 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q56 OFF UNDERSTOOD ORG STRUC AND RELTN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	7	11.1	11.1	11.1
NEUTRAL	3	7	11.1	11.1	22.2
AGREE	4	42	66.7	66.7	88.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	7	11.1	11.1	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.778 Std dev .792 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q57 POST COMMAND CLIMATE SATISFACTORY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISAGREE	2	5	7.9	7.9	11.1
NEUTRAL	3	5	7.9	7.9	19.0
AGREE	4	17	27.0	27.0	46.0
STRONGLY AGREE	5	34	54.0	54.0	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.206 Std dev 1.095 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q58 COC SUPPORTED ACCURATE REPORTING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	3.2	6.3
AGREE	4	26	41.3	41.3	47.6
STRONGLY AGREE	5	33	52.4	52.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.429 Std dev .712 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q59 ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS AND REPORTS UP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEUTRAL	3	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
AGREE	4	40	63.5	63.5	68.3
STRONGLY AGREE	5	20	31.7	31.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.270 Std dev .545 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q60 NCO MORAL AND ETHICAL STDS SAT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	5	7.9	7.9	7.9
NEUTRAL	3	9	14.3	14.3	22.2
AGREE	4	44	69.8	69.8	92.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.778 Std dev .706 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q61 OFF MORAL AND ETHICAL STDS SAT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	3.2	4.8
AGREE	4	45	71.4	71.4	76.2
STRONGLY AGREE	5	15	23.8	23.8	100.0
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.175 Std dev .555 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q62 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR JR EM

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	8	12.7	12.7	12.7
DISAGREE	2	37	58.7	58.7	71.4
NEUTRAL	3	5	7.9	7.9	79.4
AGREE	4	13	20.6	20.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.365 Std dev .955 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q63 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR NCOS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	10	15.9	15.9	15.9
DISAGREE	2	38	60.3	60.3	76.2
NEUTRAL	3	11	17.5	17.5	93.7
AGREE	4	4	6.3	6.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.143 Std dev .759 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q64 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR OFF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	37	58.7	58.7	58.7
DISAGREE	2	26	41.3	41.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.413 Std dev .496 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q65 UCMJ ACTIONS PER MONTH

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
0-5	1	57	90.5	90.5	90.5
6-10	2	3	4.8	4.8	95.2
11-15	3	2	3.2	3.2	98.4
>15	4	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.159 Std dev .545 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q66 FREQ MENTORED BY CDR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DAILY	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
WEEKLY	2	17	27.0	27.0	28.6
MONTHLY	3	16	25.4	25.4	54.0
QUARTERLY	4	15	23.8	23.8	77.8
ANNUALLY	5	1	1.6	1.6	79.4
AT OER TIME	6	5	7.9	7.9	87.3
NEVER	7	8	12.7	12.7	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.714 Std dev 1.708 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q67 FREQ COUNSELED SUBORDINATES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
WEEKLY	2	4	6.3	6.5	6.5
MONTHLY	3	13	20.6	21.0	27.4
QUARTERLY	4	36	57.1	58.1	85.5
ANNUALLY	5	3	4.8	4.8	90.3
AT OER TIME	6	5	7.9	8.1	98.4
NEVER	7	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
	.	1	1.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.919 Std dev .997 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q68 YOUR FREEDOM TO COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
MODERATE	2	10	15.9	15.9	17.5
HIGH	3	52	82.5	82.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.810 Std dev .435 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q69 YOUR SUBORDINATES FREEDOM TO CMD

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MODERATE	2	19	30.2	30.2	30.2
HIGH	3	44	69.8	69.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.698 Std dev .463 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q70 IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT ENOUGH	2	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
ABOUT RIGHT	3	41	65.1	65.1	69.8
A LITTLE TOO MUCH	4	14	22.2	22.2	92.1
ENTIRELY TOO MUCH	5	5	7.9	7.9	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.333	Std dev	.696	Minimum	2.000
Maximum	5.000				

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q71 YOUR SENIOR RATER PROFILE KNOWN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	59	93.7	93.7	93.7
NO	2	4	6.3	6.3	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.063	Std dev	.246	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	2.000				

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q72 DISCUSS RATINGS WITH SUBORDINATES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	60	95.2	95.2	95.2
NO	2	3	4.8	4.8	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.048 Std dev .215 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q73 YOUR SENIOR RATERS PROFILE KNOWN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	25	39.7	39.7	39.7
NO	2	38	60.3	60.3	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.603 Std dev .493 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q74 RATER DISCUSSED YOUR REPORT PRIOR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	49	77.8	77.8	77.8
NO	2	14	22.2	22.2	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.222 Std dev .419 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q75 SR RTR DISCUSSED YOUR REPORT PRIOR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	12	19.0	19.0	19.0
NO	2	51	81.0	81.0	100.0
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.810 Std dev .396 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q76 SUPPORT FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISSATISFIED	2	5	7.9	7.9	9.5
BORDERLINE	3	12	19.0	19.0	28.6
SATISFIED	4	33	52.4	52.4	81.0
VERY SATISFIED	5	12	19.0	19.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.794 Std dev .901 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q77 HIGHER CDRS KNEW YOUR UNIT STATUS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	1	1.6	1.6	1.6
DISSATISFIED	2	4	6.3	6.3	7.9
BORDERLINE	3	6	9.5	9.5	17.5
SATISFIED	4	31	49.2	49.2	66.7
VERY SATISFIED	5	21	33.3	33.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.063 Std dev .914 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q78 FREQ OF IMMEDIATE CDR VISITS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
WEEKLY	2	17	27.0	27.0	27.0
MONTHLY	3	27	42.9	42.9	69.8
QUARTERLY	4	15	23.8	23.8	93.7
SEMI-ANNUALLY	5	3	4.8	4.8	98.4
LESS THAN ANNUALLY	7	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.127 Std dev .975 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q79 SENIOR CDRS WOULD SPT IN HARD TIMES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
DISAGREE	2	4	6.3	6.3	9.5
NEUTRAL	3	3	4.8	4.8	14.3
AGREE	4	25	39.7	39.7	54.0
STRONGLY AGREE	5	29	46.0	46.0	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.190 Std dev 1.014 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q80 SAT CMD CLIMATE FROM HIGHER HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	6	9.5	9.5	9.5
NEUTRAL	3	7	11.1	11.1	20.6
AGREE	4	27	42.9	42.9	63.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	23	36.5	36.5	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.063 Std dev .931 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 63 Missing cases 0

Q81 CHAIN OF CMD FAIR TO COMMANDERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	55	87.3	90.2	90.2
NO	2	6	9.5	9.8	100.0
	.	2	3.2	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.098 Std dev .300 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 2

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q82 HOW POSITIVE ABOUT ARMY CAREER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MUCH LESS POSITIVELY	1	3	4.8	4.8	4.8
LESS POSITIVELY	2	11	17.5	17.7	22.6
ABOUT THE SAME	3	11	17.5	17.7	40.3
MORE POSITIVELY	4	20	31.7	32.3	72.6
MUCH MORE POSITIVELY	5	17	27.0	27.4	100.0
.	.	1	1.6	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.597 Std dev 1.207 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 1

Q83 TIME BN DEPLOYED IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
5-6 MO	4	8	12.7	47.1	47.1
>6 MO	5	9	14.3	52.9	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.529 Std dev .514 Minimum 4.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q84 TIME CMD BN IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
3-4 MO	3	2	3.2	12.5	12.5
5-6 MO	4	7	11.1	43.8	56.3
>6 MO	5	7	11.1	43.8	100.0
.		47	74.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.313 Std dev .704 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 16 Missing cases 47

Q85 AMT OF TNG FROM NOTIF TO GRD CAMPAIGN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1-2 MO	2	3	4.8	17.6	17.6
3-4 MO	3	5	7.9	29.4	47.1
5-6 MO	4	4	6.3	23.5	70.6
>6 MO	5	5	7.9	29.4	100.0
.		46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.647 Std dev 1.115 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q86 TNG WAS CRIT BASED ON SWA MISSION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
DISAGREE	2	3	4.8	17.6	23.5
NEUTRAL	3	5	7.9	29.4	52.9
AGREE	4	6	9.5	35.3	88.2
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	3.2	11.8	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.294 Std dev 1.105 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q87 DID BN FIGHT THE WAY TRAINED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
SOMETIMES	3	5	7.9	29.4	35.3
FREQUENTLY	4	5	7.9	29.4	64.7
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	6	9.5	35.3	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.941 Std dev .966 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q88 WAS BN DOCT CORRECT FOR DUTY IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
SELDOM	2	3	4.8	17.6	23.5
SOMETIMES	3	5	7.9	29.4	52.9
FREQUENTLY	4	6	9.5	35.3	88.2
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	2	3.2	11.8	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.294 Std dev 1.105 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q89 ARE CHANGES REQUIRED TO TOE/TDA

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
AGREE	4	5	7.9	29.4	29.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	12	19.0	70.6	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.706 Std dev .470 Minimum 4.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q90 BNs TOE/TDA NEEDS CHANGES IN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
EQUIPMENT	2	4	6.3	23.5	23.5
PERSONNEL	3	2	3.2	11.8	35.3
ORGANIZATION	4	11	17.5	64.7	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.412 Std dev .870 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q91 BN PREPARED FOR NBC AT START OF GRD CAMP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	2	3.2	11.8	11.8
NEUTRAL	3	2	3.2	11.8	23.5
AGREE	4	9	14.3	52.9	76.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	4	6.3	23.5	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.882 Std dev .928 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q92 AREA OF DIFFICULTY WHILE DEPLOYED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOGISTICS SPT	1	6	9.5	35.3	35.3
COMMUNICATIONS	2	9	14.3	52.9	88.2
OTHER	4	2	3.2	11.8	100.0
	.	46	73.0	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.882 Std dev .928 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q93 FREEDOM TO COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
MODERATE	2	3	4.8	17.6	23.5
HIGH	3	13	20.6	76.5	100.0
	.	46	73.0	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.706 Std dev .588 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q94 SATISFIED WITH SPT FROM HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	2	3.2	11.8	11.8
DISSATISFIED	2	2	3.2	11.8	23.5
BORDERLINE	3	5	7.9	29.4	52.9
SATISFIED	4	7	11.1	41.2	94.1
VERY SATISFIED	5	1	1.6	5.9	100.0
.		46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.176 Std dev 1.131 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q95 DID HIGHER CMD KNOW HOW UNIT PERFORMED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
DISSATISFIED	2	1	1.6	5.9	11.8
BORDERLINE	3	2	3.2	11.8	23.5
SATISFIED	4	9	14.3	52.9	76.5
VERY SATISFIED	5	4	6.3	23.5	100.0
.		46	73.0	Missing	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.824 Std dev 1.074 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q96 WOULD SENIOR CMDERS SUPPORT YOU

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	1	1.6	5.9	5.9
NEUTRAL	3	3	4.8	17.6	23.5
AGREE	4	9	14.3	52.9	76.5
STRONGLY AGREE	5	4	6.3	23.5	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.941 Std dev .827 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

Q97 DUD HIGHER HQ HAVE SATIS CMD CLIMATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	2	3.2	11.8	11.8
NEUTRAL	3	3	4.8	17.6	29.4
AGREE	4	10	15.9	58.8	88.2
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	3.2	11.8	100.0
.	.	46	73.0	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		63	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.706 Std dev .849 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 17 Missing cases 46

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALIONS

Q98 ARE FAM SPT PROG ESSENTIAL TO QUALITY FO

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	2	3.2	11.1	11.1
AGREE	4	2	3.2	11.1	22.2
STRONGLY AGREE	5	14	22.2	77.8	100.0
.	.	45	71.4	Missing	
	Total	63	100.0	100.0	

Mean	4.444	Std dev	1.294	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	5.000				

Valid cases	18	Missing cases	45
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Appendix E

Other

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q02 AGE ASSUMED COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
35-37	2	2	5.6	5.6	5.6
38-40	3	13	36.1	36.1	41.7
41-43	4	18	50.0	50.0	91.7
44-46	5	3	8.3	8.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.611 Std dev .728 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q03 TYPE UNIT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SEPARATE BRIGADE	1	7	19.4	19.4	19.4
OTHER	5	29	80.6	80.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.222 Std dev 1.606 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q04 LENGTH OF COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
13-18 MO	2	2	5.6	5.7	5.7
19-24 MO	3	24	66.7	68.6	74.3
25-30 MO	4	6	16.7	17.1	91.4
31 OR MORE MO	5	3	8.3	8.6	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.286 Std dev .710 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q05 PERCENT WOMEN SOLDIERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NONE	1	4	11.1	11.1	11.1
<10%	2	12	33.3	33.3	44.4
10-19%	3	5	13.9	13.9	58.3
20-29%	4	7	19.4	19.4	77.8
>30	5	8	22.2	22.2	100.0
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.083 Std dev 1.381 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q06 UNIT CODED TO PRECLUDE WOMEN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	3	8.3	8.6	8.6
NO	2	31	86.1	88.6	97.1
DO NOT KNOW	3	1	2.8	2.9	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.943 Std dev .338 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q07 IMPACT FEMALE SOLDIERS ON MISSION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEG	2	1	2.8	2.8	2.8
NEITHER	3	18	50.0	50.0	52.8
POS	4	9	25.0	25.0	77.8
STRONG POS	5	5	13.9	13.9	91.7
N/A	6	3	8.3	8.3	100.0
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.750 Std dev 1.025 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
CONUS	1	28	77.8	82.4	82.4
EUROPE	2	4	11.1	11.8	94.1
PANAMA	4	1	2.8	2.9	97.1
ALASKA	5	1	2.8	2.9	100.0
	.	2	5.6	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.324 Std dev .878 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 2

Q09 ACCOMPANIED TOUR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES WITH SPOUSE	1	34	94.4	94.4	94.4
NO	3	1	2.8	2.8	97.2
N/A	4	1	2.8	2.8	100.0
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.139 Std dev .593 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q10 SPOUSE PARTICIPATION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	2	5.6	5.7	5.7
SELDOM	2	1	2.8	2.9	8.6
SOMETIMES	3	3	8.3	8.6	17.1
FREQUENTLY	4	12	33.3	34.3	51.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	17	47.2	48.6	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.171 Std dev 1.098 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q11 SPOUSE EMPLOYMENT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
FULLTIME	1	15	41.7	42.9	42.9
PARTTIME	2	5	13.9	14.3	57.1
NOT OUTSIDE HOME	3	15	41.7	42.9	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.000 Std dev .939 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

OTHER COMMANDS

Q12 PERCENT TIME ON BUDGET MANAGEMENT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<10%	1	24	66.7	68.6	68.6
11-20%	2	8	22.2	22.9	91.4
21-30%	3	1	2.8	2.9	94.3
31-40%	4	1	2.8	2.9	97.1
>50%	6	1	2.8	2.9	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.514 Std dev 1.040 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q13 ENOUGH AMMUNITION FOR STRAC

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	3	8.3	10.3	10.3
SELDOM	2	1	2.8	3.4	13.8
SOMETIMES	3	5	13.9	17.2	31.0
FREQUENTLY	4	4	11.1	13.8	44.8
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	16	44.4	55.2	100.0
.	.	7	19.4	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.000 Std d 1.363 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 29 Missing cases 7

OTHER COMMANDS

Q14 SUFFICIENT TRAINING FUNDS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	1	2.8	2.9	2.9
SELDOM	2	2	5.6	5.7	8.6
SOMETIMES	3	6	16.7	17.1	25.7
FREQUENTLY	4	7	19.4	20.0	45.7
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	19	52.8	54.3	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.171 Std dev 1.098 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q15 AVERAGE PERSONNEL TURNOVER RATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<10%	1	18	50.0	50.0	50.0
10-15%	2	8	22.2	22.2	72.2
16-20%	3	3	8.3	8.3	80.6
21-25%	4	3	8.3	8.3	88.9
>30%	6	4	11.1	11.1	100.0
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.194 Std dev 1.653 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q16 AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING RESOURCES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	2	5.6	5.9	5.9
SELDOM	2	3	8.3	8.8	14.7
SOMETIMES	3	1	2.8	2.9	17.6
FREQUENTLY	4	4	11.1	11.8	29.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	24	66.7	70.6	100.0
.	.	2	5.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.324 Std dev 1.249 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 2

Q17 UFRS INHIBITED TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	11	30.6	31.4	31.4
SELDOM	2	8	22.2	22.9	54.3
SOMETIMES	3	13	36.1	37.1	91.4
FREQUENTLY	4	3	8.3	8.6	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.229 Std dev 1.003 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q18 ALO

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
1	1	1	2.8	2.9	2.9
2	2	2	5.6	5.7	8.6
3	3	1	2.8	2.9	11.4
N/A	4	31	86.1	88.6	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.771 Std dev .690 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q19 ALO CONSTRAINED READINESS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	8.3	10.3	10.3
DISAGREE	2	4	11.1	13.8	24.1
NEUTRAL	3	18	50.0	62.1	86.2
AGREE	4	4	11.1	13.8	100.0
	.	7	19.4	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.793 Std dev .819 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 29 Missing cases 7

OTHER COMMANDS

Q20 CRITICAL RESOURCES CROSSLEVELED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DONT KNOW	1	2	5.6	5.6	5.6
NOT AT ALL	2	6	16.7	16.7	22.2
SLIGHTLY	3	10	27.8	27.8	50.0
MODERATELY	4	15	41.7	41.7	91.7
GREATLY	5	3	8.3	8.3	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.306 Std dev 1.037 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q21 FACILITY AVAIL DEGRADED TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT AT ALL	1	8	22.2	22.2	22.2
SLIGHTLY	2	19	52.8	52.8	75.0
MODERATELY	3	7	19.4	19.4	94.4
DONT KNOW	5	2	5.6	5.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.139 Std dev .961 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q22 MOS SHORTAGES DEGRADED EFFECTIVENESS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NOT AT ALL	1	9	25.0	25.0	25.0
SLIGHTLY	2	16	44.4	44.4	69.4
MODERATELY	3	9	25.0	25.0	94.4
GREATLY	4	1	2.8	2.8	97.2
NOT APPLICABLE	5	1	2.8	2.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.139 Std dev .931 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q23 REPAIR PARTS REQUISITIONS DEFERRED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	18	50.0	54.5	54.5
SELDOM	2	9	25.0	27.3	81.8
SOMETIMES	3	5	13.9	15.2	97.0
FREQUENTLY	4	1	2.8	3.0	100.0
.	.	3	8.3	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.667 Std dev .854 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 33 Missing cases 3

OTHER COMMANDS

Q24 BASIS FOR BUDGET

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
PROJECTED EVENTS	1	16	44.4	44.4	44.4
PRIOR EXPENDITURES	2	13	36.1	36.1	80.6
OTHER	3	7	19.4	19.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.750 Std dev .770 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q25 SUFFICIENT RESOURCES FOR TRAINING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MUCH LESS	1	2	5.6	5.6	5.6
LESS THAN REQUIRED	2	2	5.6	5.6	11.1
ONLY REQUIRED	3	7	19.4	19.4	30.6
MOST I DESIRED	4	17	47.2	47.2	77.8
ALL I DESIRED	5	8	22.2	22.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.750 Std dev 1.052 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q26 TRAINING DEVELOPMENT BASED ON 25 SERIES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	2	5.6	5.7	5.7
SELDOM	2	2	5.6	5.7	11.4
SOMETIMES	3	7	19.4	20.0	31.4
FREQUENTLY	4	8	22.2	22.9	54.3
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	16	44.4	45.7	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.971 Std dev 1.200 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q27 CLEAR TRNG GUIDANCE FROM SENIOR HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	2	5.6	5.6	5.6
SELDOM	2	3	8.3	8.3	13.9
SOMETIMES	3	6	16.7	16.7	30.6
FREQUENTLY	4	13	36.1	36.1	66.7
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	12	33.3	33.3	100.0
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.833 Std dev 1.159 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q28 TRNG GUIDANCE SUPPORTED TOUGH TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	8.3	8.6	8.6
DISAGREE	2	3	8.3	8.6	17.1
NEUTRAL	3	4	11.1	11.4	28.6
AGREE	4	17	47.2	48.6	77.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	8	22.2	22.9	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.686 Std dev 1.183 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q29 SAME TRNG AREAS DEGRADED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	9	25.0	25.0	25.0
NEUTRAL	3	17	47.2	47.2	72.2
AGREE	4	9	25.0	25.0	97.2
STRONGLY AGREE	5	1	2.8	2.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.056 Std dev .791 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q30 FREQUENCY OF OFF POST TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	16	44.4	44.4	44.4
SELDOM	2	5	13.9	13.9	58.3
SOMETIMES	3	7	19.4	19.4	77.8
FREQUENTLY	4	6	16.7	16.7	94.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	2	5.6	5.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.250 Std dev 1.339 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q31 TRNG BASED ON MTPS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	12	33.3	37.5	37.5
SELDOM	2	3	8.3	9.4	46.9
SOMETIMES	3	7	19.4	21.9	68.8
FREQUENTLY	4	5	13.9	15.6	84.4
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	5	13.9	15.6	100.0
	.	4	11.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.625 Std dev 1.519 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 32 Missing cases 4

OTHER COMMANDS

Q32 MTPS PROVIDED BASIS FOR TOUGH TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEUTRAL	3	13	36.1	40.6	40.6
AGREE	4	14	38.9	43.8	84.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	13.9	15.6	100.0
	.	4	11.1	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.750 Std dev .718 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 32 Missing cases 4

Q33 HIGHER HQ CHANGES HINDERED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	8	22.2	22.2	22.2
SELDOM	2	7	19.4	19.4	41.7
SOMETIMES	3	13	36.1	36.1	77.8
FREQUENTLY	4	8	22.2	22.2	100.0
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.583 Std dev 1.079 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q34 HIGHER HQ DIRECTIVES ENHANCED TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	7	19.4	19.4	19.4
NEUTRAL	3	16	44.4	44.4	63.9
AGREE	4	11	30.6	30.6	94.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	5.6	5.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.222 Std dev .832 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q35 TRNG INCLUDED COMBINED ARMS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	22	61.1	68.8	68.8
SELDOM	2	2	5.6	6.3	75.0
SOMETIMES	3	4	11.1	12.5	87.5
FREQUENTLY	4	4	11.1	12.5	100.0
.	.	4	11.1	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.688 Std dev 1.120 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 32 Missing cases 4

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q36 TRNG WAS JOINT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
ALMOST NEVER	1	16	44.4	48.5	48.5
SELDOM	2	3	8.3	9.1	57.6
SOMETIMES	3	2	5.6	6.1	63.6
FREQUENTLY	4	1	2.8	3.0	66.7
N/A	6	11	30.6	33.3	100.0
	.	3	8.3	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.970 Std dev 2.284 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 33 Missing cases 3

Q37 NCOS ABILITY TO PLAN AND CONDUCT TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	3	8.3	8.6	8.6
NEUTRAL	3	2	5.6	5.7	14.3
AGREE	4	17	47.2	48.6	62.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	13	36.1	37.1	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.143 Std dev .879 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

OTHER COMMANDS

Q38 OK TO TRNSFR INDIV TRNG FROM AIT TO UNIT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	7	19.4	23.3	23.3
DISAGREE	2	6	16.7	20.0	43.3
NEUTRAL	3	12	33.3	40.0	83.3
AGREE	4	4	11.1	13.3	96.7
STRONGLY AGREE	5	1	2.8	3.3	100.0
	.	6	16.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.533 Std dev 1.106 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 30 Missing cases 6

Q39 BNCOC/ANCOC IMPROVED CAPABILITY TO TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	2.8	2.9	2.9
NEUTRAL	3	3	8.3	8.6	11.4
AGREE	4	22	61.1	62.9	74.3
STRONGLY AGREE	5	9	25.0	25.7	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.086 Std dev .781 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q40 JR OFF ABLE TO PLAN, CONDUCT TRNG

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
AGREE	2	1	2.8	3.2	3.2
NEUTRAL	3	6	16.7	19.4	22.6
DISAGREE	4	21	58.3	67.7	90.3
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5	3	8.3	9.7	100.0
.	.	5	13.9	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.839 Std dev .638 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 31 Missing cases 5

Q41 SCENARIOS AT CTC SUPPORTED ALB

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEUTRAL	3	18	50.0	64.3	64.3
DISAGREE	4	10	27.8	35.7	100.0
.	.	8	22.2	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.357 Std dev .488 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 28 Missing cases 8

OTHER COMMANDS

Q42 CTC PERFORMANCE ON OER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
N/A	4	32	88.9	100.0	100.0
	.	4	11.1	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.000 Std dev .000 Minimum 4.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 32 Missing cases 4

Q43 NUMBER OF CTC ROTATIONS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NONE	1	10	27.8	28.6	28.6
N/A	6	25	69.4	71.4	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.571 Std dev 2.292 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

OTHER COMMANDS

Q44 FREQUENCY OF QTBS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEVER	1	9	25.0	26.5	26.5
ANNUALLY	2	2	5.6	5.9	32.4
SEMI-ANNUALLY	3	5	13.9	14.7	47.1
QUARTLERY	4	17	47.2	50.0	97.1
MORE THAN QUARTERLY	5	1	2.8	2.9	100.0
.	.	2	5.6	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.971 Std dev 1.337 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 2

Q45 ATTAIN STDS FOR INDIV MARKSMENSHIP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
SELDOM	2	2	5.6	5.7	5.7
SOMETIMES	3	1	2.8	2.9	8.6
FREQUENTLY	4	4	11.1	11.4	20.0
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	21	58.3	60.0	80.0
N/A	6	7	19.4	20.0	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.857 Std dev .974 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

OTHER COMMANDS

Q46 FREQUENCY OF PT PER WEEK

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<3 PER WEEK	1	1	2.8	3.1	3.1
3 PER WEEK	2	12	33.3	37.5	40.6
4 PER WEEK	3	3	8.3	9.4	50.0
5 PER WEEK	4	16	44.4	50.0	100.0
.	.	4	11.1	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.063 Std dev 1.014 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 32 Missing cases 4

Q47 LENGTH OF GARRISON DUTY DAY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
<8 HOURS	1	2	5.6	5.9	5.9
8-9 HOURS	2	4	11.1	11.8	17.6
10-11 HOURS	3	14	38.9	41.2	58.8
12 HOURS	4	6	16.7	17.6	76.5
>12 HOURS	5	8	22.2	23.5	100.0
.	.	2	5.6	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.412 Std dev 1.158 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 2

OTHER COMMANDS

Q48 HAD SUFFICIENT TRNG DAYS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY AGREE	1	4	11.1	11.8	11.8
AGREE	2	6	16.7	17.6	29.4
NEUTRAL	3	2	5.6	5.9	35.3
DISAGREE	4	15	41.7	44.1	79.4
STRONGLY DISAGREE	5	7	19.4	20.6	100.0
.	.	2	5.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.441 Std dev 1.330 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 2

Q49 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC SOLDIER SKILLS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	3	8.3	8.8	8.8
DISAGREE	2	4	11.1	11.8	20.6
NEUTRAL	3	3	8.3	8.8	29.4
AGREE	4	22	61.1	64.7	94.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	5.6	5.9	100.0
.	.	2	5.6	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.471 Std dev 1.080 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 2

OTHER COMMANDS

Q50 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC MOS SKILLS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	2.8	3.3	3.3
DISAGREE	2	2	5.6	6.7	10.0
NEUTRAL	3	7	19.4	23.3	33.3
AGREE	4	18	50.0	60.0	93.3
STRONGLY AGREE	5	2	5.6	6.7	100.0
	.	6	16.7	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.600 Std dev .855 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 30 Missing cases 6

Q51 NCOS KNOW AND ABIL TO TRAIN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	3	8.3	8.6	8.6
NEUTRAL	3	2	5.6	5.7	14.3
AGREE	4	20	55.6	57.1	71.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	10	27.8	28.6	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.057 Std dev .838 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

OTHER COMMANDS

Q52 JR OFF SKILL AND KNOW TO TRAIN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	2.8	2.9	2.9
DISAGREE	2	2	5.6	5.7	8.6
NEUTRAL	3	5	13.9	14.3	22.9
AGREE	4	22	61.1	62.9	85.7
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	13.9	14.3	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.800 Std dev .868 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q53 JR OFF GROUNDED IN UNIT DOCTRINE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	2.8	3.0	3.0
DISAGREE	2	5	13.9	15.2	18.2
NEUTRAL	3	15	41.7	45.5	63.6
AGREE	4	9	25.0	27.3	90.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	3	8.3	9.1	100.0
.	.	3	8.3	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.242 Std dev .936 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 33 Missing cases 3

OTHER COMMANDS

Q54 LEAVENWORTH PCC ADEQUATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	2.8	2.9	2.9
DISAGREE	2	3	8.3	8.6	11.4
NEUTRAL	3	12	33.3	34.3	45.7
AGREE	4	18	50.0	51.4	97.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	1	2.8	2.9	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.429 Std dev .815 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q55 BRANCH PCC ADEQUATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	6	16.7	18.2	18.2
NEUTRAL	3	6	16.7	18.2	36.4
AGREE	4	15	41.7	45.5	81.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	6	16.7	18.2	100.0
.	.	3	8.3	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.636 Std dev .994 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 33 Missing cases 3

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q56 OFF UNDERSTOOD ORG STRUC AND RELTN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	1	2.8	2.8	2.8
NEUTRAL	3	1	2.8	2.8	5.6
AGREE	4	29	80.6	80.6	86.1
STRONGLY AGREE	5	5	13.9	13.9	100.0
Total		36	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.056	Std dev	.532	Minimum	2.000
Maximum	5.000				

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q57 POST COMMAND CLIMATE SATISFACTORY

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	2.8	2.8	2.8
DISAGREE	2	3	8.3	8.3	11.1
NEUTRAL	3	2	5.6	5.6	16.7
AGREE	4	17	47.2	47.2	63.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	13	36.1	36.1	100.0
Total		36	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.056	Std dev	1.013	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	5.000				

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q58 COC SUPPORTED ACCURATE REPORTING

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	3	8.3	8.3	8.3
NEUTRAL	3	1	2.8	2.8	11.1
AGREE	4	12	33.3	33.3	44.4
STRONGLY AGREE	5	20	55.6	55.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.361	Std dev	.899	Minimum	2.000
Maximum	5.000				

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q59 ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS AND REPORTS UP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	2	5.6	5.6	5.6
NEUTRAL	3	1	2.8	2.8	8.3
AGREE	4	25	69.4	69.4	77.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	8	22.2	22.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.083	Std dev	.692	Minimum	2.000
Maximum	5.000				

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q60 NCO MORAL AND ETHICAL STDS SAT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	3	8.3	8.6	8.6
NEUTRAL	3	3	8.3	8.6	17.1
AGREE	4	25	69.4	71.4	88.6
STRONGLY AGREE	5	4	11.1	11.4	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.857 Std dev .733 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q61 OFF MORAL AND ETHICAL STDS SAT

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISAGREE	2	2	5.6	5.6	5.6
NEUTRAL	3	1	2.8	2.8	8.3
AGREE	4	26	72.2	72.2	80.6
STRONGLY AGREE	5	7	19.4	19.4	100.0
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.056 Std dev .674 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q62 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR JR EM

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	11	30.6	31.4	31.4
DISAGREE	2	18	50.0	51.4	82.9
NEUTRAL	3	5	13.9	14.3	97.1
AGREE	4	1	2.8	2.9	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.886 Std dev .758 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q63 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR NCOS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	8	22.2	22.9	22.9
DISAGREE	2	22	61.1	62.9	85.7
NEUTRAL	3	3	8.3	8.6	94.3
AGREE	4	2	5.6	5.7	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.971 Std dev .747 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q64 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR OFF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	23	63.9	63.9	63.9
DISAGREE	2	11	30.6	30.6	94.4
NEUTRAL	3	2	5.6	5.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.417 Std dev .604 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q65 UCMJ ACTIONS PER MONTH

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
0-5	1	26	72.2	78.8	78.8
6-10	2	6	16.7	18.2	97.0
11-15	3	1	2.8	3.0	100.0
.		3	8.3	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.242 Std dev .502 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 33 Missing cases 3

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q66 FREQ MENTORED BY CDR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DAILY	1	3	8.3	8.6	8.6
WEEKLY	2	10	27.8	28.6	37.1
MONTHLY	3	5	13.9	14.3	51.4
QUARTERLY	4	6	16.7	17.1	68.6
ANNUALLY	5	3	8.3	8.6	77.1
AT OER TIME	6	3	8.3	8.6	85.7
NEVER	7	5	13.9	14.3	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.714 Std dev 1.949 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

Q67 FREQ COUNSELED SUBORDINATES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
WEEKLY	2	3	8.3	8.3	8.3
MONTHLY	3	4	11.1	11.1	19.4
QUARTERLY	4	23	63.9	63.9	83.3
ANNUALLY	5	2	5.6	5.6	88.9
AT OER TIME	6	4	11.1	11.1	100.0
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.000 Std dev .986 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 6.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q68 YOUR FREEDOM TO COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MODERATE	2	8	22.2	22.2	22.2
HIGH	3	28	77.8	77.8	100.0
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.778 Std dev .422 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q69 YOUR SUBORDINATES FREEDOM TO CMD

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LOW	1	1	2.8	2.9	2.9
MODERATE	2	14	38.9	40.0	42.9
HIGH	3	20	55.6	57.1	100.0
.	.	1	2.8	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.543 Std dev .561 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 3.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

OTHER COMMANDS

Q70 IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NO IMPORTANCE	1	2	5.6	5.6	5.6
ABOUT RIGHT	3	28	77.8	77.8	83.3
A LITTLE TOO MUCH	4	5	13.9	13.9	97.2
ENTIRELY TOO MUCH	5	1	2.8	2.8	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.083 Std dev .692 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q71 YOUR SENIOR RATER PROFILE KNOWN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	33	91.7	94.3	94.3
NO	2	2	5.6	5.7	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.057 Std dev .236 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

OTHER COMMANDS

Q72 DISCUSS RATINGS WITH SUBORDINATES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	34	94.4	94.4	94.4
NO	2	2	5.6	5.6	100.0
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.056 Std dev .232 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q73 YOUR SENIOR RATERS PROFILE KNOWN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	17	47.2	47.2	47.2
NO	2	19	52.8	52.8	100.0
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.528 Std dev .506 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q74 RATER DISCUSSED YOUR REPORT PRIOR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	29	80.6	80.6	80.6
NO	2	7	19.4	19.4	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.194	Std dev	.401	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	2.000				

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q75 SR RTR DISCUSSED YOUR REPORT PRIOR

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	8	22.2	22.9	22.9
NO	2	27	75.0	77.1	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	
Mean	1.771	Std dev	.426	Minimum	1.000
Maximum	2.000				

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q76 SUPPORT FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
VERY DISSATISFIED	1	2	5.6	5.6	5.6
DISSATISFIED	2	1	2.8	2.8	8.3
BORDERLINE	3	6	16.7	16.7	25.0
SATISFIED	4	21	58.3	58.3	83.3
VERY SATISFIED	5	6	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.778 Std dev .959 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q77 HIGHER CDRS KNEW YOUR UNIT STATUS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
DISSATISFIED	2	1	2.8	2.8	2.8
SATISFIED	4	26	72.2	72.2	75.0
VERY SATISFIED	5	9	25.0	25.0	100.0
Total		36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.194 Std dev .577 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/22/92

OTHER COMMANDS

Q78 FREQ OF IMMEDIATE CDR VISITS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
WEEKLY	2	16	44.4	44.4	44.4
MONTHLY	3	9	25.0	25.0	69.4
QUARTERLY	4	7	19.4	19.4	88.9
SEMI-ANNUALLY	5	2	5.6	5.6	94.4
LESS THAN ANNUALLY	7	2	5.6	5.6	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.083 Std dev 1.339 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 7.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q79 SENIOR CDRS WOULD SPT IN HARD TIMES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NEUTRAL	3	6	16.7	16.7	16.7
AGREE	4	13	36.1	36.1	52.8
STRONGLY AGREE	5	17	47.2	47.2	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 4.306 Std dev .749 Minimum 3.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

OTHER COMMANDS

Q80 SAT CMD CLIMATE FROM HIGHER HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	1	2.8	2.8	2.8
DISAGREE	2	6	16.7	16.7	19.4
NEUTRAL	3	4	11.1	11.1	30.6
AGREE	4	12	33.3	33.3	63.9
STRONGLY AGREE	5	13	36.1	36.1	100.0
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.833 Std dev 1.183 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 36 Missing cases 0

Q81 CHAIN OF CMD FAIR TO COMMANDERS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
YES	1	32	88.9	91.4	91.4
NO	2	3	8.3	8.6	100.0
	.	1	2.8	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.086 Std dev .284 Minimum 1.000
Maximum 2.000

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 1

OTHER COMMANDS

Q82 HOW POSITIVE ABOUT ARMY CAREER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
LESS POSITIVELY	2	4	11.1	11.8	11.8
ABOUT THE SAME	3	9	25.0	26.5	38.2
MORE POSITIVELY	4	12	33.3	35.3	73.5
MUCH MORE POSITIVELY	5	9	25.0	26.5	100.0
.	.	2	5.6	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Mean 3.765 Std dev .987 Minimum 2.000
Maximum 5.000

Valid cases 34 Missing cases 2

Q83 TIME BN DEPLOYED IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
.	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

Q84 TIME CMD BN IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
.	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

OTHER COMMANDS

Q85 AMT OF TNG FROM NOTIF TO GRD CAMPAIGN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

Q86 TNG WAS CRIT BASED ON SWA MISSION

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

Q87 DID BN FIGHT THE WAY TRAINED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

Q88 WAS BN DOCT CORRECT FOR DUTY IN GULF

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

OTHER COMMANDS

Q89 ARE CHANGES REQUIRED TO TOE/TDA

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

Q90 BNs TOE/TDA NEEDS CHANGES IN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

Q91 BN PREPARED FOR NBC AT START OF GRD CAMP

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

Q92 AREA OF DIFFICULTY WHILE DEPLOYED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

OTHER COMMANDS

Q93 FREEDOM TO COMMAND

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	0	Missing cases	36		

Q94 SATISFIED WITH SPT FROM HQ

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	0	Missing cases	36		

Q95 DID HIGHER CMD KNOW HOW UNIT PERFORMED

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	0	Missing cases	36		

Q96 WOULD SENIOR CMDERS SUPPORT YOU

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	0	Missing cases	36		

OTHER COMMANDS

Q97 DUD HIGHER HQ HAVE SATIS CMD CLIMATE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

Q98 ARE FAM SPT PROG ESSENTIAL TO QUALITY FO

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	.	36	100.0	Missing	
	Total	36	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 0 Missing cases 36

Appendix F

Cross Tabulations

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/23/92

Q03 TYPE UNIT by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

Q03	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q01				Row Total
		COMBAT ARMS 1	COMBAT SUPPORT 2	COMBAT SERV SPT 3	OTHER 4	
SEPARATE BRIGADE	1	56.0	20.0	10.0	14.0	50
		20.6	15.9	7.9	19.4	16.8
		9.4	3.4	1.7	2.3	
DIVISIONAL	2	66.4	14.2	19.5		113
		55.1	25.4	34.9		37.9
		25.2	5.4	7.4		
CORPS	3	35.6	26.7	37.8		45
		11.8	19.0	27.0		15.1
		5.4	4.0	5.7		
EAC	4	18.8	53.1	28.1		32
		4.4	27.0	14.3		10.7
		2.0	5.7	3.0		
OTHER	5	19.0	13.8	17.2	50.0	58
		8.1	12.7	15.9	80.6	19.5
		3.7	2.7	3.4	9.7	
Column		136	63	63	36	298
Total		45.6	21.1	21.1	12.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 4

Q08 COMMAND LOCATION by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

Q08	Row Pct	Q01				Row
	Col Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Total
	Tot Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
		1	2	3	4	
CONUS	1	44.8	18.8	21.0	15.5	181
		59.6	54.0	60.3	82.4	61.1
		27.4	11.5	12.8	9.5	
EUROPE	2	50.6	24.1	20.3	5.1	79
		29.4	30.2	25.4	11.8	26.7
		13.5	6.4	5.4	1.4	
KOREA	3	35.7	28.6	35.7		14
		3.7	6.3	7.9		4.7
		1.7	1.4	1.7		
PANAMA	4	37.5	25.0	25.0	12.5	8
		2.2	3.2	3.2	2.9	2.7
		1.0	.7	.7	.3	
ALASKA	5	50.0	25.0		25.0	4
		1.5	1.6		2.9	1.4
		.7	.3		.3	
HAWAII	6	71.4	14.3	14.3		7
		3.7	1.6	1.6		2.4
		1.7	.3	.3		
OTHER	7		66.7	33.3		3
			3.2	1.6		1.0
			.7	.3		
Column		136	63	63	34	296
Total		45.9	21.3	21.3	11.5	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 6

Q12 PERCENT TIME ON BUDGET MANAGEMENT by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

		Q01				Page 1 of 1	
		COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER		
		ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT			
		1	2	3	4	Row	Total
Q12							
<10%	1	47.3	21.5	18.3	12.9	186	
		64.7	63.5	54.0	68.6	62.6	
		29.6	13.5	11.4	8.1		
11-20%	2	44.9	21.3	24.7	9.0	89	
		29.4	30.2	34.9	22.9	30.0	
		13.5	6.4	7.4	2.7		
21-30%	3	42.9	21.4	28.6	7.1	14	
		4.4	4.8	6.3	2.9	4.7	
		2.0	1.0	1.3	.3		
31-40%	4	20.0		60.0	20.0	5	
		.7		4.8	2.9	1.7	
		.3		1.0	.3		
41-50%	5	50.0	50.0			2	
		.7	1.6			.7	
		.3	.3				
>50%	6				100.0	1	
					2.9	.3	
					.3		
Column		136	63	63	35	297	
Total		45.8	21.2	21.2	11.8	100.0	

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q13 ENOUGH AMMUNITION FOR STRAC by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q13	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
ALMOST NEVER	1	57.9	15.8	10.5	15.8	19
		8.1	4.8	3.3	10.3	6.6
		3.8	1.0	.7	1.0	
SELDOM	2	66.7	25.0		8.3	12
		5.9	4.8		3.4	4.2
		2.8	1.0		.3	
SOMETIMES	3	36.8	21.1	28.9	13.2	38
		10.4	12.7	18.3	17.2	13.2
		4.9	2.8	3.8	1.7	
FREQUENTLY	4	49.2	21.5	23.1	6.2	65
		23.7	22.2	25.0	13.8	22.6
		11.1	4.9	5.2	1.4	
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	45.8	22.9	20.9	10.5	153
		51.9	55.6	53.3	55.2	53.3
		24.4	12.2	11.1	5.6	
Column		135	63	60	29	287
Total		47.0	22.0	20.9	10.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 15

Q13 ENOUGH AMMUNITION FOR STRAC by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

		Q08					
Q13	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	Row Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
ALMOST NEVER	1	68.4	26.3		5.3		19
		7.4	6.3		12.5		6.6
		4.5	1.7		.3		
SELDOM	2	41.7	58.3				12
		2.9	8.9				4.2
		1.7	2.4				
SOMETIMES	3	65.8	21.1	7.9	2.6		38
		14.3	10.1	23.1	12.5		13.1
		8.7	2.8	1.0	.3		
FREQUENTLY	4	60.3	23.5	8.8	4.4	1.5	68
		23.4	20.3	46.2	37.5	25.0	23.5
		14.2	5.5	2.1	1.0	.3	
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	59.9	28.3	2.6	2.0	2.0	152
		52.0	54.4	30.8	37.5	75.0	52.6
		31.5	14.9	1.4	1.0	1.0	
Column		175	79	13	8	4	289
(Continued) Total		60.6	27.3	4.5	2.8	1.4	100.0

Q13 ENOUGH AMMUNITION FOR STRAC by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
		HAWAII	OTHER	
Row Pct	Col Pct			Row
Tot Pct				Total
		6	7	
Q13				
1				19
ALMOST NEVER				6.6
2				12
SELDOM				4.2
3		2.6		38
SOMETIMES		14.3		13.1
		.3		
4			1.5	68
FREQUENTLY			33.3	23.5
			.3	
5		3.9	1.3	152
ALMOST ALWAYS		85.7	66.7	52.6
		2.1	.7	
Column		7	3	289
Total		2.4	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 13

Q14 SUFFICIENT TRAINING FUNDS by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q14	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
ALMOST NEVER	1	80.0			20.0	5
		3.0			2.9	1.7
		1.4			.3	
SELDOM	2	60.0	20.0		20.0	10
		4.4	3.2		5.7	3.4
		2.0	.7		.7	
SOMETIMES	3	47.2	22.2	13.9	16.7	36
		12.6	12.7	8.1	17.1	12.2
		5.8	2.7	1.7	2.0	
FREQUENTLY	4	46.2	21.8	23.1	9.0	78
		26.7	27.0	29.0	20.0	26.4
		12.2	5.8	6.1	2.4	
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	43.4	21.7	23.5	11.4	166
		53.3	57.1	62.9	54.3	56.3
		24.4	12.2	13.2	6.4	
Column		135	63	62	35	295
Total		45.8	21.4	21.0	11.9	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 7

Q14 SUFFICIENT TRAINING FUNDS by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

Q14	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q08					Row Total
		CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	
		1	2	3	4	5	
ALMOST NEVER	1	80.0	20.0				5
		2.2	1.3				1.7
		1.3	.3				
SELDOM	2	70.0	30.0				10
		3.8	3.8				3.4
		2.4	1.0				
SOMETIMES	3	73.0	16.2	5.4	2.7		37
		14.8	7.6	14.3	12.5		12.5
		9.1	2.0	.7	.3		
FREQUENTLY	4	70.0	18.8	6.3	5.0		80
		30.8	19.0	35.7	50.0		26.9
		18.9	5.1	1.7	1.3		
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	53.3	32.7	4.2	1.8	2.4	165
		48.4	68.4	50.0	37.5	100.0	55.6
		29.6	18.2	2.4	1.0	1.3	
Column		182	79	14	8	4	297
(Continued)	Total	61.3	26.6	4.7	2.7	1.3	100.0

Q14 SUFFICIENT TRAINING FUNDS by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
Q14	Row Pct	HAWAII	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct			
	Tot Pct	6	7	
1				5
ALMOST NEVER				1.7
2				10
SELDOM				3.4
3		2.7		37
SOMETIMES		14.3		12.5
		.3		
4				80
FREQUENTLY				26.9
5		3.6	1.8	165
ALMOST ALWAYS		85.7	100.0	55.6
		2.0	1.0	
Column		7	3	297
Total		2.4	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q16 AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING RESOURCES by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q16	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
ALMOST NEVER	1			33.3	66.7	3
				1.6	5.9	1.0
				.3	.7	
SELDOM	2	36.0	20.0	32.0	12.0	25
		6.7	7.9	12.7	8.8	8.5
		3.1	1.7	2.7	1.0	
SOMETIMES	3	52.8	22.6	22.6	1.9	53
		20.7	19.0	19.0	2.9	18.0
		9.5	4.1	4.1	.3	
FREQUENTLY	4	51.9	24.5	19.8	3.8	106
		40.7	41.3	33.3	11.8	35.9
		18.6	8.8	7.1	1.4	
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	39.8	18.5	19.4	22.2	108
		31.9	31.7	33.3	70.6	36.6
		14.6	6.8	7.1	8.1	
Column		135	63	63	34	295
Total		45.8	21.4	21.4	11.5	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 7

Q16 AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING RESOURCES by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

		Q08					
Q16	Row Pct	CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	Row Total
	Col Pct Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	5	
ALMOST NEVER	1	100.0					3
		1.6					1.0
		1.0					
SELDOM	2	34.6	42.3	15.4	3.8		26
		4.9	13.9	28.6	12.5		8.8
		3.0	3.7	1.3	.3		
SOMETIMES	3	51.9	35.2	7.4	5.6		54
		15.4	24.1	28.6	37.5		18.2
		9.4	6.4	1.3	1.0		
FREQUENTLY	4	62.6	27.1	2.8	1.9	.9	107
		36.8	36.7	21.4	25.0	25.0	36.0
		22.6	9.8	1.0	.7	.3	
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	70.1	18.7	2.8	1.9	2.8	107
		41.2	25.3	21.4	25.0	75.0	36.0
		25.3	6.7	1.0	.7	1.0	
Column		182	79	14	8	4	297
(Continued) Total		61.3	26.6	4.7	2.7	1.3	100.0

Q16 AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING RESOURCES by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
Q16	Row Pct	HAWAII	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct			
	Tot Pct	6	7	
1				3
ALMOST NEVER				1.0
2		3.8		26
SELDOM		14.3		8.8
		.3		
3				54
SOMETIMES				18.2
4		3.7	.9	107
FREQUENTLY		57.1	33.3	36.0
		1.3	.3	
5		1.9	1.9	107
ALMOST ALWAYS		28.6	66.7	36.0
		.7	.7	
Column		7	3	297
Total		2.4	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q22 MOS SHORTAGES DEGRADED EFFECTIVENESS by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Row	Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row
Col	Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		Total
Tot	Pct	1	2	3	4	
Q22						
	1	32.3	22.6	16.1	29.0	31
NOT AT ALL		7.5	11.1	7.9	25.0	10.5
		3.4	2.4	1.7	3.0	
	2	48.8	17.9	20.3	13.0	123
SLIGHTLY		44.8	34.9	39.7	44.4	41.6
		20.3	7.4	8.4	5.4	
	3	46.1	23.5	21.6	8.8	102
MODERATELY		35.1	38.1	34.9	25.0	34.5
		15.9	8.1	7.4	3.0	
	4	42.1	26.3	28.9	2.6	38
GREATLY		11.9	15.9	17.5	2.8	12.8
		5.4	3.4	3.7	.3	
	5	50.0			50.0	2
NOT APPLICABLE		.7			2.8	.7
		.3			.3	
Column		134	63	63	36	296
Total		45.3	21.3	21.3	12.2	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 6

Q22 MOS SHORTAGES DEGRADED EFFECTIVENESS by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

		Q08					Row Total
Row Pct	Col Pct	CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	
Tot Pct		1	2	3	4	5	
Q22							
NOT AT ALL	1	66.7	16.7	10.0		3.3	30
		10.9	6.3	21.4		25.0	10.1
		6.7	1.7	1.0		.3	
SLIGHTLY	2	60.2	29.3	4.1	1.6	2.4	123
		40.4	45.6	35.7	25.0	75.0	41.3
		24.8	12.1	1.7	.7	1.0	
MODERATELY	3	60.6	26.9	4.8	3.8		104
		34.4	35.4	35.7	50.0		34.9
		21.1	9.4	1.7	1.3		
GREATLY	4	63.2	26.3	2.6	5.3		38
		13.1	12.7	7.1	25.0		12.8
		8.1	3.4	.3	.7		
NOT APPLICABLE	5	66.7					3
		1.1					1.0
		.7					
Column		183	79	14	8	4	298
(Continued)	Total	61.4	26.5	4.7	2.7	1.3	100.0

Q22 MOS SHORTAGES DEGRADED EFFECTIVENESS by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
Q22	Row Pct	HAWAII	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct Tot Pct	6	7	
NOT AT ALL	1		3.3	30
			33.3	10.1
			.3	
SLIGHTLY	2	2.4		123
		42.9		41.3
		1.0		
MODERATELY	3	1.9	1.9	104
		28.6	66.7	34.9
		.7	.7	
GREATLY	4	2.6		38
		14.3		12.8
		.3		
NOT APPLICABLE	5	33.3		3
		14.3		1.0
		.3		
Column		7	3	298
Total		2.3	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 4

Q29 SAME TRNG AREAS DEGRADED TRNG by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

		Q08					
		CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	
Row Pct	Col Pct						Row
Tot Pct		1	2	3	4	5	Total
Q29							
	1	68.4	26.3				19
STRONGLY DISAGREE		7.1	6.3				6.4
		4.4	1.7				
	2	57.7	28.8	4.5	4.5	1.8	111
DISAGREE		35.2	40.5	35.7	62.5	50.0	37.4
		21.5	10.8	1.7	1.7	.7	
	3	59.5	28.4	4.1	4.1		74
NEUTRAL		24.2	26.6	21.	37.5		24.9
		14.8	7.1	1.0	1.0		
	4	64.6	25.3	6.3		1.3	79
AGREE		28.0	25.3	35.7		25.0	26.6
		17.2	6.7	1.7		.3	
	5	71.4	7.1	7.1		7.1	14
STRONGLY AGREE		5.5	1.3	7.1		25.0	4.7
		3.4	.3	.3		.3	
Column		182	79	14	8	4	297
(Continued)	Total	61.3	26.6	4.7	2.7	1.3	100.0

Q29 SAME TRNG AREAS DEGRADED TRNG by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
Q29	Row Pct	HAWAII	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct Tot Pct	6	7	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	5.3		19
		14.3		6.4
		.3		
DISAGREE	2	1.8	.9	111
		28.6	33.3	37.4
		.7	.3	
NEUTRAL	3	1.4	2.7	74
		14.3	66.7	24.9
		.3	.7	
AGREE	4	2.5		79
		28.6		26.6
		.7		
STRONGLY AGREE	5	7.1		14
		14.3		4.7
		.3		
Column		7	3	297
Total		2.4	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q37 NCOS ABILITY TO PLAN AND CONDUCT TRNG by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q37	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	66.7	33.3			3
		1.5	1.6			1.0
		.7	.3			
DISAGREE	2	36.2	19.1	38.3	6.4	47
		12.6	14.3	28.6	8.6	15.9
		5.7	3.0	6.1	1.0	
NEUTRAL	3	56.0	8.0	28.0	8.0	25
		10.4	3.2	11.1	5.7	8.4
		4.7	.7	2.4	.7	
AGREE	4	47.2	22.7	19.6	10.4	163
		57.0	58.7	50.8	48.6	55.1
		26.0	12.5	10.8	5.7	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	43.1	24.1	10.3	22.4	58
		18.5	22.2	9.5	37.1	19.6
		8.4	4.7	2.0	4.4	
Column		135	63	63	35	296
Total		45.6	21.3	21.3	11.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 6

Q38 OK TO TRNSFR INDIV TRNG FROM AIT TO UNIT by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q38	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	44.9	16.9	30.3	7.9	89
		29.9	23.8	43.5	23.3	30.8
		13.8	5.2	9.3	2.4	
DISAGREE	2	41.8	31.6	20.4	6.1	98
		30.6	49.2	32.3	20.0	33.9
		14.2	10.7	6.9	2.1	
NEUTRAL	3	32.4	21.6	13.5	32.4	37
		9.0	12.7	8.1	40.0	12.8
		4.2	2.8	1.7	4.2	
AGREE	4	59.6	15.4	17.3	7.7	52
		23.1	12.7	14.5	13.3	18.0
		10.7	2.8	3.1	1.4	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	76.9	7.7	7.7	7.7	13
		7.5	1.6	1.6	3.3	4.5
		3.5	.3	.3	.3	
Column		134	63	62	30	289
Total		46.4	21.8	21.5	10.4	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 13

Q47 LENGTH OF GARRISON DUTY DAY by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q47	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
		ARMS 1	SUPPORT 2	SERV SPT 3	4	
<8 HOURS	1	20.0	40.0	20.0	20.0	10
		1.5	6.5	3.2	5.9	3.4
		.7	1.4	.7	.7	
8-9 HOURS	2	44.3	28.4	22.7	4.5	88
		28.7	40.3	31.7	11.8	29.8
		13.2	8.5	6.8	1.4	
10-11 HOURS	3	48.4	19.4	23.2	9.0	155
		55.1	48.4	57.1	41.2	52.5
		25.4	10.2	12.2	4.7	
12 HOURS	4	52.2	4.3	17.4	26.1	23
		8.8	1.6	6.3	17.6	7.8
		4.1	.3	1.4	2.0	
>12 HOURS	5	42.1	10.5	5.3	42.1	19
		5.9	3.2	1.6	23.5	6.4
		2.7	.7	.3	2.7	
Column		136	62	63	34	295
Total		46.1	21.0	21.4	11.5	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 7

Q47 LENGTH OF GARRISON DUTY DAY by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

Q47	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q08					Row Total
		CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	
		1	2	3	4	5	
<8 HOURS	1	60.0	30.0				10
		3.3	3.8				3.4
		2.0	1.0				
8-9 HOURS	2	60.2	30.7	4.5	1.1		88
		29.1	34.2	28.6	12.5		29.6
		17.8	9.1	1.3	.3		
10-11 HOURS	3	58.1	28.4	5.2	3.2	1.9	155
		49.5	55.7	57.1	62.5	75.0	52.2
		30.3	14.8	2.7	1.7	1.0	
12 HOURS	4	76.0	16.0	4.0		4.0	25
		10.4	5.1	7.1		25.0	8.4
		6.4	1.3	.3		.3	
>12 HOURS	5	73.7	5.3	5.3	10.5		19
		7.7	1.3	7.1	25.0		6.4
		4.7	.3	.3	.7		
Column		182	79	14	8	4	297
(Continued)	Total	61.3	26.6	4.7	2.7	1.3	100.0

Q47 LENGTH OF GARRISON DUTY DAY by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
Q47	Row Pct	HAWAII	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct Tot Pct	6	7	
<8 HOURS	1	10.0		10
		14.3		3.4
		.3		
8-9 HOURS	2	1.1	2.3	88
		14.3	66.7	29.6
		.3	.7	
10-11 HOURS	3	2.6	.6	155
		57.1	33.3	52.2
		1.3	.3	
12 HOURS	4			25
				8.4
>12 HOURS	5	5.3		19
		14.3		6.4
		.3		
Column		7	3	297
Total		2.4	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/29/92

Q48 HAD SUFFICIENT TRNG DAYS by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q48	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	50.0	8.3	8.3	33.3	12
		4.4	1.6	1.6	11.8	4.1
		2.0	.3	.3	1.4	
DISAGREE	2	40.7	20.4	27.8	11.1	54
		16.2	17.7	24.2	17.6	18.4
		7.5	3.7	5.1	2.0	
NEUTRAL	3	66.7	14.3	9.5	9.5	21
		10.3	4.8	3.2	5.9	7.1
		4.8	1.0	.7	.7	
AGREE	4	46.5	24.5	19.4	9.7	155
		52.9	61.3	48.4	44.1	52.7
		24.5	12.9	10.2	5.1	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	42.3	17.3	26.9	13.5	52
		16.2	14.5	22.6	20.6	17.7
		7.5	3.1	4.8	2.4	
Column		136	62	62	34	294
Total		46.3	21.1	21.1	11.6	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 8

FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS' SURVEY, AY92

1/29/92

Q48 HAD SUFFICIENT TRNG DAYS by Q03 TYPE UNIT

Page 1 of 1

		Q03					Row Total
Q48	Row Pct	SEPARATE DIVISION		CORPS	EAC	OTHER	
	Col Pct	BRIGADE	AL				
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	5	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	8.3	16.7	16.7	8.3	50.0	12
		2.0	1.7	4.4	3.1	10.9	4.0
		.3	.7	.7	.3	2.0	
DISAGREE	2	21.4	35.7	17.9	8.9	16.1	56
		24.0	17.2	22.2	15.6	16.4	18.8
		4.0	6.7	3.4	1.7	3.0	
NEUTRAL	3	26.1	43.5	8.7	4.3	17.4	23
		12.0	8.6	4.4	7.1	7.3	7.7
		2.0	3.4	.7	.3	1.3	
AGREE	4	11.0	43.9	16.8	10.3	18.1	155
		34.0	58.6	57.8	50.0	50.9	52.0
		5.7	22.8	8.7	5.4	9.4	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	26.9	30.8	9.6	17.3	15.4	52
		28.0	13.8	11.1	28.1	14.5	17.4
		4.7	5.4	1.7	3.0	2.7	
Column		50	116	45	32	55	298
Total		16.8	38.9	15.1	10.7	18.5	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 4

Q49 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC SOLDIER SKILLS by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q49	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	33.3		41.7	25.0	12
		3.0		7.9	8.8	4.1
		1.4		1.7	1.0	
DISAGREE	2	36.8	33.3	22.8	7.0	57
		15.7	30.2	20.6	11.8	19.4
		7.1	6.5	4.4	1.4	
NEUTRAL	3	46.2	21.2	26.9	5.8	52
		17.9	17.5	22.2	8.8	17.7
		8.2	3.7	4.8	1.0	
AGREE	4	48.1	19.1	19.1	13.6	162
		58.2	49.2	49.2	64.7	55.1
		26.5	10.5	10.5	7.5	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	63.6	18.2		18.2	11
		5.2	3.2		5.9	3.7
		2.4	.7		.7	
Column		134	63	63	34	294
Total		45.6	21.4	21.4	11.6	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 8

Q50 NEW SOLDIERS HAD BASIC MOS SKILLS by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q50	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	35.7	21.4	35.7	7.1	14
		3.7	4.8	7.9	3.3	4.8
		1.7	1.0	1.7	.3	
DISAGREE	2	42.7	28.1	27.0	2.2	89
		28.4	39.7	38.1	6.7	30.7
		13.1	8.6	8.3	.7	
NEUTRAL	3	47.0	18.2	24.2	10.6	66
		23.1	19.0	25.4	23.3	22.8
		10.7	4.1	5.5	2.4	
AGREE	4	49.1	18.8	16.1	16.1	112
		41.0	33.3	28.6	60.0	38.6
		19.0	7.2	6.2	6.2	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	55.6	22.2		22.2	9
		3.7	3.2		6.7	3.1
		1.7	.7		.7	
Column		134	63	63	30	290
Total		46.2	21.7	21.7	10.3	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 12

Q51 NCOS KNOW AND ABIL TO TRAIN by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q51	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	62.5	25.0	12.5		8
		3.7	3.2	1.6		2.7
		1.7	.7	.3		
DISAGREE	2	34.8	26.1	32.6	6.5	46
		11.9	19.0	23.8	8.6	15.5
		5.4	4.1	5.1	1.0	
NEUTRAL	3	61.9	9.5	19.0	9.5	21
		9.6	3.2	6.3	5.7	7.1
		4.4	.7	1.4	.7	
AGREE	4	46.1	22.0	21.5	10.5	191
		65.2	66.7	65.1	57.1	64.5
		29.7	14.2	13.9	6.8	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	43.3	16.7	6.7	33.3	30
		9.6	7.9	3.2	28.6	10.1
		4.4	1.7	.7	3.4	
Column		135	63	63	35	296
Total		45.6	21.3	21.3	11.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 6

Q54 LEAVENWORTH PCC ADEQUATE by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q54	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	57.1	14.3	14.3	14.3	7
		3.0	1.6	1.6	2.9	2.4
		1.4	.3	.3	.3	
DISAGREE	2	61.1	16.7	5.6	16.7	18
		8.2	4.8	1.6	8.6	6.1
		3.7	1.0	.3	1.0	
NEUTRAL	3	45.0	18.3	16.7	20.0	60
		20.1	17.5	15.9	34.3	20.3
		9.2	3.7	3.4	4.1	
AGREE	4	44.6	22.3	23.8	9.3	193
		64.2	68.3	73.0	51.4	65.4
		29.2	14.6	15.6	6.1	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	35.3	29.4	29.4	5.9	17
		4.5	7.9	7.9	2.9	5.8
		2.0	1.7	1.7	.3	
Column		134	63	63	35	295
Total		45.4	21.4	21.4	11.9	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 7

Q55 BRANCH PCC ADEQUATE by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q55	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	33.3	22.2	44.4		9
		2.3	3.2	6.3		3.1
		1.0	.7	1.4		
DISAGREE	2	16.1	22.6	41.9	19.4	31
		3.8	11.1	20.6	18.2	10.6
		1.7	2.4	4.5	2.1	
NEUTRAL	3	47.2	20.8	20.8	11.3	53
		18.8	17.5	17.5	18.2	18.2
		8.6	3.8	3.8	2.1	
AGREE	4	48.2	24.7	18.1	9.0	166
		60.2	65.1	47.6	45.5	56.8
		27.4	14.0	10.3	5.1	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	60.6	6.1	15.2	18.2	33
		15.0	3.2	7.9	18.2	11.3
		6.8	.7	1.7	2.1	
Column		133	63	63	33	292
Total		45.5	21.6	21.6	11.3	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 10

Q60 NCO MORAL AND ETHICAL STDS SAT by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q60	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	33.3	66.7			3
		.7	3.2			1.0
		.3	.7			
DISAGREE	2	29.4	23.5	29.4	17.6	17
		3.7	6.3	7.9	8.6	5.7
		1.7	1.3	1.7	1.0	
NEUTRAL	3	35.1	32.4	24.3	8.1	37
		9.6	19.0	14.3	8.6	12.5
		4.4	4.0	3.0	1.0	
AGREE	4	46.3	19.7	21.7	12.3	203
		69.1	63.5	69.8	71.4	68.4
		31.6	13.5	14.8	8.4	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	62.2	13.5	13.5	10.8	37
		16.9	7.9	7.9	11.4	12.5
		7.7	1.7	1.7	1.3	
Column		136	63	63	35	297
Total		45.8	21.2	21.2	11.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q62 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR JR EM by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q62	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	46.3	18.5	14.8	20.4	54
		18.4	15.9	12.7	31.4	18.2
		8.4	3.4	2.7	3.7	
DISAGREE	2	43.6	19.5	24.8	12.1	149
		47.8	46.0	58.7	51.4	50.2
		21.9	9.8	12.5	6.1	
NEUTRAL	3	44.8	20.7	17.2	17.2	29
		9.6	9.5	7.9	14.3	9.8
		4.4	2.0	1.7	1.7	
AGREE	4	46.6	29.3	22.4	1.7	58
		19.9	27.0	20.6	2.9	19.5
		9.1	5.7	4.4	.3	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	85.7	14.3			7
		4.4	1.6			2.4
		2.0	.3			
Column		136	63	63	35	297
Total		45.8	21.2	21.2	11.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q62 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR JR EM by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

		Q08					
Q62	Row Pct	CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	Row Total
	Col Pct						
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	5	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	77.8	16.7		3.7		54
		22.8	11.4		25.0		18.1
		14.0	3.0		.7		
DISAGREE	2	61.7	26.8	5.4	1.3	.7	149
		50.0	50.6	57.1	25.0	25.0	49.8
		30.8	13.4	2.7	.7	.3	
NEUTRAL	3	62.1	31.0	3.4		3.4	29
		9.8	11.4	7.1		25.0	9.7
		6.0	3.0	.3		.3	
AGREE	4	46.7	30.0	8.3	6.7	3.3	60
		15.2	22.8	35.7	50.0	50.0	20.1
		9.4	6.0	1.7	1.3	.7	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	57.1	42.9				7
		2.2	3.8				2.3
		1.3	1.0				
Column		184	79	14	8	4	299
(Continued)	Total	61.5	26.4	4.7	2.7	1.3	100.0

Q62 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR JR EM by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
		HAWAII	OTHER	
Row Pct	Col Pct			Row
Tot Pct		6	7	Total
Q62				
	1	1.9		54
STRONGLY DISAGREE		14.3		18.1
		.3		
	2	3.4	.7	149
DISAGREE		71.4	33.3	49.8
		1.7	.3	
	3			29
NEUTRAL				9.7
	4	1.7	3.3	60
AGREE		14.3	66.7	20.1
		.3	.7	
	5			7
STRONGLY AGREE				2.3
Column		7	3	299
Total		2.3	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 3

Q63 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR NCOS by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q63	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	55.0	15.0	16.7	13.3	60
		24.3	14.3	15.9	22.9	20.2
		11.1	3.0	3.4	2.7	
DISAGREE	2	37.7	22.5	25.2	14.6	151
		41.9	54.0	60.3	62.9	50.8
		19.2	11.4	12.8	7.4	
NEUTRAL	3	53.7	12.2	26.8	7.3	41
		16.2	7.9	17.5	8.6	13.8
		7.4	1.7	3.7	1.0	
AGREE	4	48.8	36.6	9.8	4.9	41
		14.7	23.8	6.3	5.7	13.8
		6.7	5.1	1.3	.7	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	100.0				4
		2.9				1.3
		1.3				
Column		136	63	63	35	297
Total		45.8	21.2	21.2	11.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q63 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR NCOS by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

		Q08					
Q63	Row Pct	CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	Row Total
	Col Pct Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	5	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	77.0	18.0		3.3		61
		25.5	13.9		25.0		20.4
		15.7	3.7		.7		
DISAGREE	2	63.1	24.2	5.4	1.3	.7	149
		51.1	45.6	57.1	25.0	25.0	49.8
		31.4	12.0	2.7	.7	.3	
NEUTRAL	3	48.8	39.5	4.7	2.3	4.7	43
		11.4	21.5	14.3	12.5	50.0	14.4
		7.0	5.7	.7	.3	.7	
AGREE	4	47.6	31.0	9.5	7.1	2.4	42
		10.9	16.5	28.6	37.5	25.0	14.0
		6.7	4.3	1.3	1.0	.3	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	50.0	50.0				4
		1.1	2.5				1.3
		.7	.7				
Column		184	79	14	8	4	299
(Continued) Total		61.5	26.4	4.7	2.7	1.3	100.0

Q63 DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBLEM FOR NCOS by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
		HAWAII	OTHER	
Row Pct	Col Pct			Row
Tot Pct		6	7	Total
Q63				
	1	1.6		61
STRONGLY DISAGREE		14.3		20.4
		.3		
	2	3.4	2.0	149
DISAGREE		71.4	100.0	49.8
		1.7	1.0	
	3			43
NEUTRAL				14.4
	4	2.4		42
AGREE		14.3		14.0
		.3		
	5			4
STRONGLY AGREE				1.3
Column		7	3	299
Total		2.3	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 3

Q66 FREQ MENTORED BY CDR by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

Q66	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q01				Row Total
		COMBAT ARMS 1	COMBAT SUPPORT 2	COMBAT SERV SPT 3	OTHER 4	
DAILY	1	37.5	12.5	12.5	37.5	8
		2.2	1.6	1.6	8.6	2.7
		1.0	.3	.3	1.0	
WEEKLY	2	45.3	12.5	26.6	15.6	64
		21.5	12.7	27.0	28.6	21.6
		9.8	2.7	5.7	3.4	
MONTHLY	3	43.5	26.1	23.2	7.2	69
		22.2	28.6	25.4	14.3	23.3
		10.1	6.1	5.4	1.7	
QUARTERLY	4	44.4	22.2	23.8	9.5	63
		20.7	22.2	23.8	17.1	21.3
		9.5	4.7	5.1	2.0	
ANNUALLY	5	43.8	31.3	6.3	18.8	16
		5.2	7.9	1.6	8.6	5.4
		2.4	1.7	.3	1.0	
AT OER TIME	6	48.3	24.1	17.2	10.3	29
		10.4	11.1	7.9	8.6	9.8
		4.7	2.4	1.7	1.0	
NEVER	7	51.1	21.3	17.0	10.6	47
		17.8	15.9	12.7	14.3	15.9
		8.1	3.4	2.7	1.7	
Column		135	63	63	35	296
Total		45.6	21.3	21.3	11.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 6

Q70 IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICS by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q70	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
1 NO IMPORTANCE	1	63.6	18.2		18.2	11
		5.1	3.2		5.6	3.7
		2.3	.7		.7	
2 NOT ENOUGH	2	50.0		50.0		6
		2.2		4.8		2.0
		1.0		1.0		
3 ABOUT RIGHT	3	45.6	20.6	20.1	13.7	204
		68.4	66.7	65.1	77.8	68.5
		31.2	14.1	13.8	9.4	
4 A LITTLE TOO IMP	4	43.3	25.0	23.3	8.3	60
		19.1	23.8	22.2	13.9	20.1
		8.7	5.0	4.7	1.7	
5 ENTIRELY TOO IMP	5	41.2	23.5	29.4	5.9	17
		5.1	6.3	7.9	2.8	5.7
		2.3	1.3	1.7	.3	
Column		136	63	63	36	298
Total		45.6	21.1	21.1	12.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 4

Q70 IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICS by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

Q70	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q08					Row Total
		CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	
		1	2	3	4	5	
NO IMPORTANCE	1	54.5	45.5				11
		3.2	6.3				3.7
		2.0	1.7				
NOT ENOUGH	2	50.0	50.0				6
		1.6	3.8				2.0
		1.0	1.0				
ABOUT RIGHT	3	64.2	22.5	3.9	3.4	1.5	204
		70.8	58.2	57.1	87.5	75.0	68.0
		43.7	15.3	2.7	2.3	1.0	
A LITTLE TOO IMP	4	54.1	32.8	8.2	1.6	1.6	61
		17.8	25.3	35.7	12.5	25.0	20.3
		11.0	6.7	1.7	.3	.3	
ENTIRELY TOO IMP	5	66.7	27.8	5.6			18
		6.5	6.3	7.1			6.0
		4.0	1.7	.3			
Column		185	79	14	8	4	300
(Continued) Total		61.7	26.3	4.7	2.7	1.3	100.0

Q70 IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICS by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
		HAWAII	OTHER	
Row Pct	Col Pct			Row
Tot Pct				Total
		6	7	
Q70				
1				11
NO IMPORTANCE				3.7
2				6
NOT ENOUGH				2.0
3		3.4	1.0	204
ABOUT RIGHT		100.0	66.7	68.0
		2.3	.7	
4			1.6	61
A LITTLE TOO IMP			33.3	20.3
			.3	
5				18
ENTIRELY TOO IMP				6.0
Column		7	3	300
Total		2.3	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 2

Q74 RATER DISCUSSED YOUR REPORT PRIOR by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q74	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
YES	1	46.2	18.8	22.0	13.0	223
		75.7	66.7	77.8	80.6	74.8
		34.6	14.1	16.4	9.7	
NO	2	44.0	28.0	18.7	9.3	75
		24.3	33.3	22.2	19.4	25.2
		11.1	7.0	4.7	2.3	
Column		136	63	63	36	298
Total		45.6	21.1	21.1	12.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 4

Q79 SENIOR CDRS WOULD SPT IN HARD TIMES by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q79	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	66.7	11.1	22.2		9
		4.4	1.6	3.2		3.0
		2.0	.3	.7		
DISAGREE	2	41.2	35.3	23.5		17
		5.2	9.5	6.3		5.7
		2.4	2.0	1.3		
NEUTRAL	3	50.0	15.4	11.5	23.1	26
		9.6	6.3	4.8	16.7	8.8
		4.4	1.3	1.0	2.0	
AGREE	4	45.8	22.5	20.8	10.8	120
		40.7	42.9	39.7	36.1	40.4
		18.5	9.1	8.4	4.4	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	43.2	20.0	23.2	13.6	125
		40.0	39.7	46.0	47.2	42.1
		18.2	8.4	9.8	5.7	
Column		135	63	63	36	297
Total		45.5	21.2	21.2	12.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q80 SAT CMD CLIMATE FROM HIGHER HQ by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q80	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	66.7			33.3	3
		1.5			2.8	1.0
		.7			.3	
DISAGREE	2	47.5	22.5	15.0	15.0	40
		14.1	14.3	9.5	16.7	13.5
		6.4	3.0	2.0	2.0	
NEUTRAL	3	45.8	8.3	29.2	16.7	24
		8.1	3.2	11.1	11.1	8.1
		3.7	.7	2.4	1.3	
AGREE	4	45.1	25.6	20.3	9.0	133
		44.4	54.0	42.9	33.3	44.8
		20.2	11.4	9.1	4.0	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	44.3	18.6	23.7	13.4	97
		31.9	28.6	36.5	36.1	32.7
		14.5	6.1	7.7	4.4	
Column		135	63	63	36	297
Total		45.5	21.2	21.2	12.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q81 CHAIN OF CMD FAIR TO COMMANDERS by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q81	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
YES	1	46.4	20.3	21.1	12.3	261
		91.0	86.9	90.2	91.4	90.0
		41.7	18.3	19.0	11.0	
NO	2	41.4	27.6	20.7	10.3	29
		9.0	13.1	9.8	8.6	10.0
		4.1	2.8	2.1	1.0	
Column		133	61	61	35	290
Total		45.9	21.0	21.0	12.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 12

Q82 HOW POSITIVE ABOUT ARMY CAREER by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01				
Q82	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT		
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	
1 MUCH LESS POSITI	1	54.5	18.2	27.3		11
		4.4	3.2	4.8		3.8
		2.0	.7	1.0		
2 LESS POSITIVELY	2	38.3	29.8	23.4	8.5	47
		13.3	22.6	17.7	11.8	16.0
		6.1	4.8	3.8	1.4	
3 ABOUT THE SAME	3	49.3	21.7	15.9	13.0	69
		25.2	24.2	17.7	26.5	23.5
		11.6	5.1	3.8	3.1	
4 MORE POSITIVELY	4	46.9	20.4	20.4	12.2	98
		34.1	32.3	32.3	35.3	33.4
		15.7	6.8	6.8	4.1	
5 MUCH MORE POSITI	5	45.6	16.2	25.0	13.2	68
		23.0	17.7	27.4	26.5	23.2
		10.6	3.8	5.8	3.1	
Column		135	62	62	34	293
Total		46.1	21.2	21.2	11.6	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 9

Q82 HOW POSITIVE ABOUT ARMY CAREER by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 2

Q82	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q08					Row Total
		CONUS	EUROPE	KOREA	PANAMA	ALASKA	
		1	2	3	4	5	
1 MUCH LESS POSITI		33.3	58.3	8.3			12
		2.2	8.9	7.1			4.1
		1.4	2.4	.3			
2 LESS POSITIVELY		72.3	17.0	4.3	4.3	2.1	47
		18.8	10.1	14.3	28.6	25.0	15.9
		11.5	2.7	.7	.7	.3	
3 ABOUT THE SAME		60.0	22.9	2.9	4.3	1.4	70
		23.2	20.3	14.3	42.9	25.0	23.7
		14.2	5.4	.7	1.0	.3	
4 MORE POSITIVELY		61.2	25.5	7.1	1.0	2.0	98
		33.1	31.6	50.0	14.3	50.0	33.2
		20.3	8.5	2.4	.3	.7	
5 MUCH MORE POSITI		60.3	33.8	2.9	1.5		68
		22.7	29.1	14.3	14.3		23.1
		13.9	7.8	.7	.3		
Column		181	79	14	7	4	295
(Continued) Total		61.4	26.8	4.7	2.4	1.4	100.0

Q82 HOW POSITIVE ABOUT ARMY CAREER by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 2 of 2

		Q08		
Q82	Row Pct	HAWAII	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct Tot Pct	6	7	
1				12
MUCH LESS POSITI				4.1
2				47
LESS POSITIVELY				15.9
3		4.3	4.3	70
ABOUT THE SAME		42.9	100.0	23.7
		1.0	1.0	
4		3.1		98
MORE POSITIVELY		42.9		33.2
		1.0		
5		1.5		68
MUCH MORE POSITI		14.3		23.1
		.3		
Column		7	3	295
Total		2.4	1.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 7

Q86 TNG WAS CRIT BASED ON SWA MISSION by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01			
Row	Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	Row Total
Col	Pct	ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT	
Tot	Pct	1	2	3	
Q86	1		50.0	50.0	2
	STRONGLY DISAGREE		5.9	5.9	3.0
			1.5	1.5	
	2	33.3	41.7	25.0	12
	DISAGREE	12.1	29.4	17.6	17.9
		6.0	7.5	4.5	
	3	33.3	11.1	55.6	9
	NEUTRAL	9.1	5.9	29.4	13.4
		4.5	1.5	7.5	
	4	46.2	30.8	23.1	26
	AGREE	36.4	47.1	35.3	38.8
		17.9	11.9	9.0	
	5	77.8	11.1	11.1	18
	STRONGLY AGREE	42.4	11.8	11.8	26.9
		20.9	3.0	3.0	
Column		33	17	17	67
Total		49.3	25.4	25.4	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 235

Q86 TNG WAS CRIT BASED ON SWA MISSION by Q08 COMMAND LOCATION

Page 1 of 1

		Q08			
Q86	Row Pct	CONUS	EUROPE	HAWAII	Row Total
	Col Pct Tot Pct	1	2	6	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	50.0	50.0		2
		2.1	5.3		2.9
		1.5	1.5		
DISAGREE	2	58.3	33.3	8.3	12
		14.6	21.1	100.0	17.6
		10.3	5.9	1.5	
NEUTRAL	3	55.6	44.4		9
		10.4	21.1		13.2
		7.4	5.9		
AGREE	4	69.2	30.8		26
		37.5	42.1		38.2
		26.5	11.8		
STRONGLY AGREE	5	89.5	10.5		19
		35.4	10.5		27.9
		25.0	2.9		
Column		48	19	1	68
Total		70.6	27.9	1.5	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 234

Q88 WAS BN DOCT CORRECT FOR DUTY IN GULF by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01			
Row Pct	Col Pct	COMBAT ARMS	COMBAT SUPPORT	COMBAT SERV SPT	Row Total
Tot Pct		1	2	3	
Q88					
	1		75.0	25.0	4
ALMOST NEVER			17.6	5.9	6.0
			4.5	1.5	
	2	16.7	33.3	50.0	6
SELDOM		3.0	11.8	17.6	9.0
		1.5	3.0	4.5	
	3	41.7	16.7	41.7	12
SOMETIMES		15.2	11.8	29.4	17.9
		7.5	3.0	7.5	
	4	36.4	36.4	27.3	22
FREQUENTLY		24.2	47.1	35.3	32.8
		11.9	11.9	9.0	
	5	82.6	8.7	8.7	23
ALMOST ALWAYS		57.6	11.8	11.8	34.3
		28.4	3.0	3.0	
Column		33	17	17	67
Total		49.3	25.4	25.4	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 235

Q88 WAS BN DOCT CORRECT FOR DUTY IN GULF by Q03 TYPE UNIT

Page 1 of 1

		Q03					
Q88	Row Pct	SEPARATE	DIVISION	CORPS	EAC	OTHER	Row Total
	Col Pct	BRIGADE	AL				
	Tot Pct	1	2	3	4	5	
ALMOST NEVER	1		50.0	25.0	25.0		4
			6.3	6.3	16.7		5.9
			2.9	1.5	1.5		
SELDOM	2		16.7	50.0	16.7	16.7	6
			3.1	18.8	16.7	20.0	8.8
			1.5	4.4	1.5	1.5	
SOMETIMES	3		50.0	33.3	8.3	8.3	12
			18.8	25.0	16.7	20.0	17.6
			8.8	5.9	1.5	1.5	
FREQUENTLY	4	22.7	40.9	22.7	9.1	4.5	22
		55.6	28.1	31.3	33.3	20.0	32.4
		7.4	13.2	7.4	2.9	1.5	
ALMOST ALWAYS	5	16.7	58.3	12.5	4.2	8.3	24
		44.4	43.8	18.8	16.7	40.0	35.3
		5.9	20.6	4.4	1.5	2.9	
Column		9	32	16	6	5	68
Total		13.2	47.1	23.5	8.8	7.4	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 234

Q89 ARE CHANGES REQUIRED TO TOE/TDA by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01			
Q89	Row Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	Row Total
	Col Pct Tot Pct	ARMS 1	SUPPORT 2	SERV SPT 3	
STRONGLY DISAGREE	1	100.0			2
		5.9			2.9
		2.9			
DISAGREE	2	75.0	25.0		8
		17.6	11.8		11.8
		8.8	2.9		
NEUTRAL	3	100.0			1
		2.9			1.5
		1.5			
AGREE	4	38.1	38.1	23.8	21
		23.5	47.1	29.4	30.9
		11.8	11.8	7.4	
STRONGLY AGREE	5	47.2	19.4	33.3	36
		50.0	41.2	70.6	52.9
		25.0	10.3	17.6	
Column		34	17	17	68
Total		50.0	25.0	25.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 234

Q94 SATISFIED WITH SPT FROM HQ by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Q01

Page 1 of 1

Row Pct	Col Pct	Tot Pct	COMBAT ARMS	COMBAT SUPPORT	COMBAT SERV SPT	Row Total
			1	2	3	
Q94	1		37.5	37.5	25.0	8
	VERY DISSATISFIED		8.8	17.6	11.8	11.8
			4.4	4.4	2.9	
	2		25.0	25.0	50.0	4
	DISSATISFIED		2.9	5.9	11.8	5.9
			1.5	1.5	2.9	
	3		54.5		45.5	11
	BORDERLINE		17.6		29.4	16.2
			8.8		7.4	
	4		55.9	23.5	20.6	34
	SATISFIED		55.9	47.1	41.2	50.0
			27.9	11.8	10.3	
5		45.5	45.5	9.1	11	
VERY SATISFIED		14.7	29.4	5.9	16.2	
		7.4	7.4	1.5		
Column			34	17	17	68
Total			50.0	25.0	25.0	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 234

Q98 ARE FAM SPT PROG ESSENTIAL TO QUALITY FO by Q01 TYPE BATTALION

Page 1 of 1

		Q01			
Row Pct	Col Pct	COMBAT	COMBAT	COMBAT	Row Total
Tot Pct		ARMS	SUPPORT	SERV SPT	
		1	2	3	
Q98	1	50.0		50.0	4
	STRONGLY DISAGREE	5.9		11.1	5.8
		2.9		2.9	
	4	56.3	31.3	12.5	16
	AGREE	26.5	29.4	11.1	23.2
		13.0	7.2	2.9	
	5	46.9	24.5	28.6	49
	STRONGLY AGREE	67.6	70.6	77.8	71.0
		33.3	17.4	20.3	
Column		34	17	18	69
Total		49.3	24.6	26.1	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 233

Appendix G

SPSS/PC Program Data Disks

(Record Copy Only)

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